The Danish Cartoon-Crisis 2005-2006: 
A Cultural and Theological Analysis

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Abstract

The international crisis following upon of the publication of 12 Muhammed-cartoons in the Danish Newspaper Jyllands-Posten (September 29, 2005) raises the general question of the place of religion in the public sphere, and of the Christian roots of secularisation. In this article the specific importance of Lutheranism for religious and political culture in Denmark will be examined. The thesis is that the Lutheran doctrine of the two regiments has given rise to two models for interpretation which have both been historically active. The doctrine of the two regiments has been interpreted both as a 'liberalist' argument for the separation of religion and politics, and as a social-conservative (later on social-democratic) argument for the view that the state should take care of its citizens’ welfare through education, the legal system and social services. In today’s global and multi-religious world this leads us to ask to what extent religious communities should be kept out of public life or be recognised as non-governmental organizations in civil society, and as natural partners for the state.

Keywords: Cartoon-Crisis, Denmark, Luther, Mohammed, Theories of Secularization, Two Regiments

The 20th century was the golden age of secularisation. The question for us at the beginning of the 21st is whether the retreat of religion from the public sphere will, or should, continue.

Is there a limit to secularisation? Is the proper place of religion simply in the private sphere, all the while that the interests of religious groups can be either neglected or rejected cost-free in the public sphere? Or must a modern complex society recognise the presence of various kinds of religious communities and subcultures, each with their vulnerabilities which society is bound to protect to a reasonable degree – without of course compromising fundamental freedom rights, including the freedom to criticise the claims to validity and socio-ethical consequences of any religion?

It is the latter position of mutual recognition which I wish to promote – in three steps. Firstly I shall present general historical arguments showing that religion – like education, for
example – cuts across both the private and the public sphere. Since religions are practised in social fellowships, they cannot help but have an effect on society as a whole; they are not merely sets of beliefs (in the head), they are also something that is practised (by embodied agents). And since they also take public form in linguistic and symbolic expressions, religions are more than purely private. The political sphere should therefore respond to the pre-political fact of religion, be it through legislation, through teaching in schools or through political rhetoric. The question is, How?

Secondly, I shall examine how Lutheranism has had a twofold effect. Through his doctrine of the two regiments Luther laid the groundwork for the distinction between the religious and the political sphere. Protestant Lutheranism is often appealed to from proponents of the liberalist idea of society. Yet at the same time Lutheranism formed the basis of a comprehensive welfare state, where the king – later on the politicians – was expected to take care of the citizens’ well-being through the legal, educational, health and social systems. In other words at one and the same time Lutheranism formed the basis for the liberalist distinction between private and public and for the modern welfare state. The universalist welfare state, where resources are shared among all citizens, was set in motion in Denmark by a conservative government with the pension reform of 1891, but was first realised by social democrat governments in the course of the 20th century, most markedly in the Old People’s Pensions Act of 1955 (without support from the right-wing parties).

With this in mind I shall finally offer some thoughts on the international crisis for Denmark’s reputation and economy provoked by the publication of the Muhammed-cartoons in the newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* on September 29, 2005.

**Has secularisation a limit?**

The word ‘secularisation’ can mean many things. As a purely politico-economic concept it means that the property and numerous tasks of the Church are gradually taken over by the state. In this sense the beginning of the Reformation in Denmark in 1536 led to an immediate and thorough-going secularisation of Danish society. The king simply took over large areas of church land (which probably made up one-third of the country), while the state assumed control of all obligations of the public legal system, the education system and social care (including the functions that previously belonged under canon law, church schools education and monastic poor relief).

But more commonly secularisation is used about the lengthy historical process during which religion gradually weakens its hold on the public life of society. I shall settle here for briefly presenting two theories of secularisation which attempt to explain this development from a macro-sociological perspective.
The rationalist theory of secularisation

The classical ‘secularisation thesis’ was formulated by the sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) and the historian of ideas Karl Löwith (1897-1973). Its premise is that Christianity (especially Protestantism) initiated a process of rationalisation by which it will eventually and reluctantly dig its own grave. The process began with an apologetic “natural theology” in the seventeenth century and ended up, in the mid-nineteenth century, with Ludwig Feuerbach’s and Karl Marx’s effective critiques of religion which aimed to show that all images of God are ultimately human projections based on humanity’s insatiable demand for meaning and comfort.

According to Weber’s thesis of ‘Occidental Rationalisation’, the ‘value-based rationality’ with which Christianity’s moral universe encircled life has been replaced by ‘goal-oriented’ rationality – as we find it for example in political bureaucracy and ethical utilitarianism. ‘The good’ is what leads to good consequences without anything beforehand being deemed either good or bad ‘in itself’.

In principle it is Weber’s secularisation theory that is the inheritance of the young sociologist Peter L. Berger and the social philosopher Jürgen Habermas. On the above theory many sociologists in the 1960s and 1970s prophesied the decline of religion, which was seen as a left-over from pre-modern times, condemned to an inevitable death. But the theory has been difficult to maintain. In the first place a number of religions have shown the ability to make their case in a rationally understandable form, and secondly, religious problems have returned to the agenda even in highly-developed countries like the USA and South Korea. Already around 1970 Berger was aware of the simultaneity of secularisation and de-secularisation, while it is only in recent years that Habermas acknowledged that religion not only plays a role as the interpreter of the contingencies of life situations (death, guilt, happiness), but also as a source of ethical visions guiding common life. The reason is not least that religion continues to be a cultural resource that forms part of society’s preferences, which are never entirely rational. Why, for example, spend money on establishing hospices, when society gets nothing out of them, and why not use the heat from crematoria ovens for district heating?

Recently Habermas published an essay on “Religion in the Public Sphere”, in which he reluctantly acknowledged that “the significance of religion for the political objective is now increasing throughout the world...In a world-historical perspective Max Weber’s “Occidental Okcidental Rationalism” now appears to be a specific historical exception” And even though he continues to insist that secular reasons should be given priority in the political system, he now admits that liberal democracy neither can nor should “prevent religious citizens from publicly expressing and justifying their convictions in a religious language”. Habermas continues: “The liberal state actually has a self-interest in letting the religious voices sound in the political public sphere and in the political participation of religious organisations... The society cannot know whether the secular society would otherwise be cut off from important
resources for the formation of opinion and identity". According to this view, there is neither rational reason nor political prudence in an over-hasty reduction of the multi-voiced complexity. Habermas is now prepared to admit that religious traditions may articulate moral intuitions of general importance for the common good, and that religions may also present “cognitive challenges”, worth being taken seriously by the secular public. In short, Habermas calls for the emergence of a new political culture in which mutual learning processes can take place between religious and secular views of reality and society.

Habermas is thus today aware of the difficulties of the rationalisation thesis – as a contemporary diagnosis, as a moral position, and as a potentially one-sided cognitive strategy. Religious people – be they Christian, Muslim or Buddhist – are not of necessity more stupid than everyone else. On the contrary the various religions may contain a reservoir of life-orienting wisdom that cannot easily be tapped into from anywhere else.

**Secularisation as a consequence of the centreless society**

A different theory of secularisation, which in my view is better equipped to explain why religion is simultaneously both retreating from the centre of society and yet returning with renewed vigour, is the so-called theory of differentiation. The German system theorist Niklas Luhmann has argued that a modern hyper-complex society is a centreless society, where the central control of political and religious life of previous ages is no longer possible. We are moving away from a uniform dogmatic religion towards a religious pluralism, in which religious groups are appearing with various world-pictures. At the same time sporadic resonances of the language- and life-forms of religion are arising in many and various media, from daily and weekly newspapers to literature and art. According to this thesis religion has the almost Sisyphean task of creating coherence in a world that is split up into various systems: the political, the legal, the educational, the religious, the moral, the scientific, the artistic and so on.

The thesis of the centreless society is that all of society’s constituent systems lack the ability to define society’s centre. The political system has also proved incapable of controlling the economic system from above, just as both moral opinions and religious commitments have shown themselves to be relatively uncontrollable by the political system. The political agenda is thus set to a very high degree by the media’s agenda, which articulates fluid moral and religious ideas that cannot be controlled by political power. That was the case with the youth rebellion of the 1960s and that has been the case ever since. The way that the Danish firm Arla Foods managed the cartoon-crisis in 2005 and ever since shows that even the economic system must adapt to a value politics and a religious politics that are not dictated by purely economic calculations. Today large firms are participating in a symbol politics to a degree that no one could have imagined 20 years ago. For example the board of Arla Foods is consciously working towards including religio-ethnic groups into their management.
If we are to understand secularisation as a retreat from the centre of society, then we must immediately add to the list of retreating spheres even powerful systems such as politics and the economy. Though religion no longer finds itself at the centre of society, there is no reason to suppose that it will disappear from the public sphere. On the other hand the major religious denominations, such as the Lutheran Church in Denmark, are expected to decline in relation to the total population (even though it lost only 3,000 members out of 4½ million in 2005). At the same time it is likely that many smaller religious communities will come into being, while “faith in God is thinly smeared over everywhere,” as the Norwegian sociologist of religion Ingvild Sælid Gilhus puts it.\(^7\)

Religion is thus changing – but not actually declining. According to Luhmann, religion will survive for the simple reason that it deals with questions that can only be given a religious answer: What is the ultimate horizon for human life (which we cannot observe)? What is the purpose of life (which we cannot see)? and what is my or our specific task in life (which we must decide on on pre-rational grounds)? According to Luhmann, religion is therefore necessary because it relates to recurring and emerging problems (Dauerprobleme), but its position tends to be weak because its forms of communication are by nature relatively vague. It is hard to speak with certainty of one's place in life, what we should spend our resources on, the purpose of suffering or its absurdity, how the individual's life fits into universal principles such as creation and salvation, samsara and nirvana, and so on.

The difficulty that religion faces is that faith or “spiritual communication” has no medium that flows as well and effectively as money does in the economic system, or power in the political system. Religion therefore remains a rather uneasy system in the modern world. On the one hand it is a limited player in the social system, yet on the other its universal themes stretch beyond the individual group and its members: life and death, joy and suffering, existence and annihilation.

Thus it is natural that religion is found in both solid and fluid forms, highly institutionalised or loosely flexible in its forms of communication, since religious semantics (meanings and priorities) float around in society more or less independent of the religious commitment of the individual. Religion functions as an underlying resource which orients the individual towards personal existence and social value.

**The twofold presence of religion in the public sphere**

To understand the return of religion to the public sphere it is worth remembering that it is not only something one has (or does not have), but also something one does (or does not do). Religion is not merely about religious feelings which emerge now and again and then evaporate. Above all religion has to do with the orientation of life. This is also true of Christianity. Whether we look at the young Christianity of the early church or Christianity at the Reformation, three practical elements endure. They are:
• Issues of food and drink (what we take into the body)
• Issues of bodiliness, clothing and sexuality (use of the body and clothing as signals)
• The issue of images and other items in space (which we have before the body and hence influence our imagination and fantasy)

It is not by chance that food and drink, body and clothing and finally images have occupied the mind. Yet it is precisely Christianity that has helped to secularise their meaning – largely in the course of the 20th century, with perhaps sexuality and one-to-one relationships as the only exception. The preference for the individual, which can be traced throughout the history of Christianity, was extended during 19th century romanticism to include the idea of the privileged beloved. Love must be of one's own free will, and yet it commits one, so Danes believe. Despite attempts in the 1970s with free sexuality and open marriages, sexual life today is regarded predominantly as a privilege, at least after one has contracted oneself to a committed relationship. Not only in Islam, but also in secularised Protestant forms of Christianity there are taboos—which are first discovered when they are violated. Danish legislation includes the taboo against killing (which goes back to the Jewish understanding of man as being created in God's image, Gen 9:6, and whose historical context is that the taboo also covers the killing of slaves). But we also have a taboo in relation to the dead – cf. Penal Code Art. 139 on “the desecration of graves” and “unseemly treatment of corpses”, punishable by up to 6 months’ imprisonment. There also remains the moral taboo that one must not make fun of the suffering and death of others. So jokes about the holocaust and torture are morally repugnant. When a group of Palestinian youths in Odense publicly celebrated the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, they provoked a deep animosity among virtually all native Danes. The holy zones of taboo are only discovered when they are violated.

On the other hand imagery, food and drink, body and clothing have been desacralised in the Christian tradition. A predominantly Christian culture such as the Danish has therefore found it hard to relate to Islam, since significant numbers of the Muslim population observe specific rules for food and drink, nakedness and clothing, as well as imagery. Islam is naturally many things – devotion to God, prayer and so on – but it is characteristic that the public debate on Islam has so often turned on pork and halal (what is taken into the body), on arranged marriages and the veil (what the body is used for), and now the cartoons of Muhammed (in front of our eyes). Because religion is never totally invisible, it follows that it must appear in the public sphere too.

Religion is of course not just about eating regulations and suchlike, it is also present in the public sphere as a resource for practical decision-making. It is not just about ‘ideas of God’ but contains a set of values that serve to determine which preferences we have – and wish to live by. In modern society there are principles which all citizens are expected to share,
as well as a whole series of choices. But between the general principles and the individual choices we have a large number of relatively shared, or overlapping, values and preferences which have their source in the great semantics of our comprehensive world-views, and which we acquire through our social life, for example through family and school.

When we look at the historical influence of Christianity in European and North American cultures, we find, for example, a strong preference for the individual. Such an orientation is far from universal, and is more rare in African cultures, and in South and Eastern Asia. There are further preferences in relation to family and worklife, which draw on the resources from a Protestant ethics of vocation and work morale. Then there are preferences for the welfare state in its concern for the public good which stretch beyond one’s own family and ethnic groups. And so taxes are accepted by Europeans to a degree that would be regarded as unreasonable in other cultures.

Such values or preferences continue to be negotiable of course; religious resources can both erode and return with renewed strength. It is also clear that non-religious equivalents exist as regards the individual, the family, work and the public good, such as in a post-Christian humanism or in Confucianism in China. But it is difficult to ignore the fact that religions continue to be present in the public sphere as underlying models of orientation for what the good life consists of, and how in practice it can be achieved. Just as religion exists in both solid and fluid forms, so does Christianity appear in both church-related forms of Christianity and in a cultural Christianity without the latter being necessarily less ‘Christian’ than the former.  

**Christianity’s contribution to secularisation**

So far I have spoken relatively abstractly about ‘religion’ as a phenomenon, as though it were an object. But ‘religion’ is a designation for a host of actual religions which again branch out into endless variants. It is now time to be more concrete and look at the particular historical conditions as to why, when the majority of Danes in September 2005 did not regard Jyllands-Posten’s Muhammed cartoons as especially disgraceful, a great number of Muslims did. My point in the following is that precisely Christianity has been instrumental in its own secularisation, inasmuch as eating habits, clothing and imagery have been seen as immaterial to keeping the faith. At the same time Christianity has formed a special sensibility towards hypocrisy, which has a history of being exposed through satire and humour.

**The Jesus tradition and the distinction between the inner and the outer**

Let me add perspectives from the Jesus-tradition. Some of his sayings have been particularly influential for the European-Christian mentality through their distinction between the inner and the outer, which we often meet in his ministry:
“Don't you see that nothing that enters a man from the outside can make him ‘unclean’? For it doesn't go into his heart but into his stomach, and then out of his body”. (In saying this, Jesus declared all foods ‘clean’) He went on: “What comes out of a man is what makes him ‘unclean’.” (Mk 7: 18-23)

With this distinction between inner and outer not only is all food declared clean (though early Christianity continued to debate the subject, see Acts 11:1-18), but hypocrites and all kinds of double standards were put in their place, with a further reference to Isaiah: “These people honour me with their lips, but their hearts are far from me. They worship me in vain; their teachings are but rules taught by men. You have let go of the commands of God and are holding on to the traditions of men.” (Mk 7:6-7)

The attack on religious hypocrisy led to a retreat from worshipping God so outwardly – praying in the streets and squares in order to be seen instead of in one's own heart of hearts (Mt 6: 1-3). But this also meant that evil could no longer be explained as always someone else's fault, with oneself as the perennial victim. Now evil came from within, and one should therefore examine oneself before judging others: “Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother's eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye?” (Mt 7:3). Such Christian semantics have had major and lasting effects. We do not have to read many of the writings of Martin Luther (1483-1546) before we run into sharp satire against the papacy and all the pomp and circumstance with which its bishops covered up the fact that it was hiding the gospel from the people.

Drawing again on this distinction between inner and outer it is also possible to understand why the majority of Danes (who hardly wish to mock Muslims' religious feelings) had not imagined that the Muhammed cartoons in Jyllands-Posten on 30th September 2005 would be regarded as so disrespectful For in a Christian cultural circle, images are normally seen as peripheral to the central existential and religious message. There is no doubt that the effects of the Muhammed cartoons surprised the majority of Danes, including parliamentary politicians. By way of comparison we can look at the series of caricatures of Jesus' crucifixion published in Universitetsavisen, the official organ of the University of Copenhagen in the autumn of 2005 (and reprinted in spring 2006) which barely raised an eyebrow. Admittedly other works, such as Andres Serrano's Piss Christ (in which a crucifix with Jesus is soaked in the artist's own urine), have been regarded as disrespectful by certain Christian groups in the USA. But others have seen Piss Christ as a work of art calling for a religious reflection on the depth of divine incarnation – into the very shit of this world.

It is doubtful whether Western Christianity has the sensibility to understand the offence caused by images. On the other hand, as we have seen, we have a strong aversion to hypocrisy and double-speak. When Arab governments which themselves allow Judaism and Christianity to be violated in their own countries therefore asked the Danish government to apologise for
picture published in a Danish newspaper over which the government had no influence, the vast majority of Danes, including a number of immigrants (who were themselves persecuted in Arab countries), experienced this as patent hypocrisy. And when imam Abu Laban of The Islamic Faith Community (det islamiske trossamfund) told Danish TV that the Community were against a boycott of Danish goods but a few days later argued for the opposite on a major Arab TV channel, this was taken in Denmark to be godless mendacity.

My point here is that the sense of hypocrisy is independent of whether individual Danes understand themselves as Christians or not. There is a religious sensibility which has gone into the blood of the Danish mentality. This is simply just one example of how a religion functions as a norm-setter.

The Pauline tradition and the Christian distinction between freedom and benefit

The criticism of the Jesus-tradition against flamboyant worship of God has not led to a general rejection of outward worship, but it has made possible a new attitude to all visible and organised religion. Christianity was born as a freedom culture, building on the motto of the apostle Paul that “Everything is permissible for me, but not everything is beneficial” (1 Cor 6:12).

Thus Christian freedom is not the same as inconsiderateness. Ultimately, what is or is not beneficial always has to do with the weaker brother. Let the man weak in faith eat vegetables (and not meat from the Roman temples), says Paul, as long as he does so in Christ (Rom 10). Let you heathens have your images, they are not worth anything anyway, he says to the Athenians:

“Men of Athens! I see that in every way you are very religious... But the God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and earth and does not live in temples built by hands... For in him we live and move and have our being. As some of your own poets have said, “We are his offspring.” Therefore since we are God’s offspring, we should not think that the divine being is like gold or silver or stone – an image made by man’s design and skill. (Acts 17:22-29)

Again we meet the same line of thinking. Paul obviously regards images of God as an expression of religious misunderstanding. But the tone is conciliatory, since he regards those who worship images of God as confused. What they need is clear preaching and religious instruction, not violent suppression.

John of Damascus on the limits to image worship

But images do have an effect. That is why in Christianity too there was a dispute over images in the 8th and 9th centuries, moreover under the influence of Islamic thought. The so-called
iconoclasts referred to the prohibition against images in the Old Testament, while the iconolaters (image-worshippers) maintained that although eternal God could not himself be depicted, nevertheless one is allowed to make pictures of Jesus Christ, in whom God has entered in the flesh and the image. For does not Paul tell the Colossians that Christ is “the invisible God’s (visible) image” (Col 1:15)?

The man who defined this theology was John of Damascus (680-749); he it was who formulated the following theological ground rules that became normative in both the Eastern and the Western Church:

- God’s nature (ousia) cannot be depicted, but God’s energies (energeiai) and the grace (charis), through which He approaches man’s imagination can.
- Images can therefore not be worshipped; only God can be worshipped (latreia).
- Images may however serve as paths to God, and in that sense may be embraced with veneration (timê) and worship (proskynesis).
- Hence the image is only a depiction (ektypos) of the reality of the divine image (archetypos) which alone is worthy of worship.
- Since God has become human in Jesus Christ, depictions of him are allowed, well-knowing that it is through his human manifestation that his divine nature is worshipped.

Ultimately it is thus belief in the incarnation which makes the use of imagery legitimate for the Church: “In honouring the image of the precious and life-giving cross, we are honouring not the wood (God forbid!), but we are honouring the image as a symbol of Christ ... Everything is therefore directed towards God, whom we worship, in that we transfer worship from the image to him” (De fide Ortodoxa, IV, 11).

This solution was elevated to orthodox doctrine at the Council of Nicea in 787, and despite recurrent disputes on the subject in the 9th century it remains normative theology. In the words of the great medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas (died 1274), images rank far below man in status, for it is man who has fabricated the images and not the other way round. Nonetheless images have a legitimate function in the religious life, in that “the image’s honour is passed on to the prototype, that is, God himself ”(Summa Theologiae III q. 25 a 3). As we can see, this is a continuation of John of Damascus’ argument.

The laying down of these principles did not prevent a steady criticism of the excessively luxurious imagery throughout the Middle Ages, at the same time as it was defended for its educational value. For what the scholar can read his or her way to in the Bible, the illiterate layperson must acquire through perception. This view, which can be traced back to Pope Gregory the Great (c. 540-604), has led to Christianity’s wealth of imagery in medieval icons and frescos, and the richly illustrated bibles known as Biblia pauporum or bibles for the poor – not because they were cheap but because they could be read by illiterates.
**Luther and Calvin on imagery**

Nevertheless the dispute over images dragged on into the Reformation, at which point iconoclasts like Andreas Karlstadt and his supporters smashed images in the churches of Wittenberg in 1520-21, while Luther was in exile in Wartburg castle. The desire for white, unpainted churches also became the norm in the Calvinist churches, which took the prohibition against imagery in the 10 commandments quite literally.

Luther in contrast followed John of Damascus’ theological arguments and Gregory the Great’s educational argument. The difference can be seen in the amount of ink and energy that Johannes Calvin (1509-1564) expends on his commentary to the Ten Commandments, telling his readers that because God is invisible and without form, he cannot and must not be worshipped through any man-made image, not even for educational purposes (*Institutio*, 1536).

Luther on the other hand omits to treat the second commandment on graven images in both the *Small Catechism* and the *Large Catechism* from 1529. According to him the Ten Commandments are of their time, and though still apposite as a formulation of natural law of conscience, to which all men can subscribe, he points out in a Lenten sermon in 1521 (immediately after his return to Wittenberg) that the Old Testament contains numerous examples of Noah, Abraham and Jacob building altars to the honour of God (Gen 8:20; 12:7; 33:20). Even Moses used a copper snake as an image of God’s guidance (Num 21:9). As Luther says in the Third Invocavit Sermon in 1522: “Here we must admit that we can have images and may fabricate images, but we must not worship them, and if they are worshipped, they must be removed and destroyed.”

We do not serve God through images, but nor is there any reason to destroy them, for in reality they are harmless.

The deeper reason for Luther’s relaxed attitude to images is that a prohibition will make no difference anyway. For it is above all the mental pictures we conjure up of God that can throw us off track (in the spiritspirit of the Law), or build us up (in the spirit of the Gospel). False allegiance to the Law involves us removing the outer images yet filling ourselves up inside with idols, he says in a later work against the Anabaptists from 1525. Luther’s position may be summed up in three main points that fuse together the distinction between the inner and the outer which we found in the Jesus-tradition, and the freedom-and-benefit view from the Pauline tradition:

- “Everything is free” (p. 91); hence the question of imagery is a secondary matter.
- “One is to trust alone in Christ” (p. 91); accordingly each believer is responsible for destroying the false images with the Word of God, not through the Law but through the Gospel.
- “For the sake of remembrance and better understanding” (p. 99), it can be beneficial to make use of images, especially images of Christ.
Thus by all accounts the Lutheran reformation has played a decisive role in creating a relaxed attitude to religious images, and thence to a secular view of human art products. At the same time God, according to Luther, is alive and present in the world of the senses: “Our home, farm, field and garden and everything are full of the Bible, by which God through his wonderful deeds not only preaches to us but also taps on our eyes, touches our senses, and in secret illuminates our hearts” (Sermon of 25th May 1544).12).

The twofold inheritance of Luther’s doctrine of the two regiments

The Lutheran reformation was born as an internal church reform movement with a clear theological profile. But how was this religious vision to be converted into an idea of social community? Historically we know that to begin with Luther and his associates had no vision for society. But on 10th December 1520 when he burned the canon law together with the papal bull of excommunication, he was not only calling into question the pope’s religious authority, He was also performing a political act – in the middle of the public sphere. Religion became politics.

The task ahead was to find out what society should build on, now that canon law had ceased to rule. Luther’s response was his famous doctrine of the two regiments, as revealed in particular in the work, Temporal Authority: To What Extent it Should be Obeyed from 1523.13) It is this doctrine of Luther’s that has further contributed to the self-secularisation of Christianity, without ever leading to a total separation of religion and politics, however.

In this work on secular authority, Luther builds on the view of Augustine (354-430) that the kingdom of God in this world is confronting the kingdom of the Devil in single combat. Correspondingly Luther divides people into two groups: “the first belonging to the kingdom of God the second belonging to the kingdom of the world” (p. 88). Luther was definitely not an optimist either on behalf of humanity or Christianity. Even though he lived in a society in which everybody (with the exception of a few Jews) was baptised and raised in the Christian faith, he was convinced that very few were actually Christians: “the world and the masses are and always will be un-Christian, even if they are all baptized and Christian in name. Christians are few and far between (as the saying is)” (p. 91. Society cannot therefore be built on the goodness of humankind, which is a rare phenomenon, but solely on public order, which keeps wickedness down. It is therefore an important point in the doctrine of the two regiments that in the final count it is God who rules the world, both “by the word” (by persuasion) and “by the sword” (by force). The Devil himself is merely a creature, not a divine power alongside God.

When the gospel is publicly preached, faith is offered to all citizens of society, but it is always voluntary. This is crucial to Luther and explains why he opposed church discipline. “No one shall or can command the soul, unless he is able to show it the way to heaven; but this no man can do, only God alone” (p. 106). Luther therefore turns sharply against the
attempt by the state to force anyone into faith by legislation or some other way: “Therefore, where the temporal authority presumes to prescribe laws for the soul, it encroaches upon God’s government and only misleads souls and destroys them” (p. 105). This awareness of the limits of the state later paved the way for constitutional notions of freedom of religion. But the crucial point is that God also protects public order through the legal system and political power. The authorities must of necessity act with force. Because the world is with the wicked – “among thousands there is scarcely a single true Christian” – we have the sword of the authorities so that the wicked “are obliged to keep still and to maintain an outward peace” (p. 91). Here we find the view of political power as the source of a society governed by law, but also a power which ultimately has the means to uphold law and order through the penal system if the law is violated. This power does not exist for the sake of the authorities, but for the weak in society who would otherwise be overwhelmed by the wicked.

The question for Luther was then whether evangelical Christians could participate in the authorities’ exercise of power without damaging their souls. His answer was a resounding ‘yes’. It is possible for a Christian, indeed it is a duty to be a judge, a soldier, a hangman. For the authorities are installed by God for the benefit of the weak in society. Here, then, is the structure of Luther’s doctrine of the two regiments:

- There is only one God, who rules the world (the monotheist premise)
- God rules the world with his right hand and his left hand
- With God’s right hand God rules the life of the Church through the preaching of the Gospel, which can only be received voluntarily, without church discipline or force from the authorities
- With God’s left hand God rules society as a whole through authorities, which must exert force to bring the wicked to keep the law (preventative) and to uphold the rule of law for the benefit of the weak (protective).

From this summary one could regard Lutheranism as a forerunner of the liberalist state, which combines the powers of the state with a sense of what lies outside its domain: the citizens’ faith and doubt, their hope and desperation, their love and lack of love. And true it is that Luther removed the earlier Medieval view that the worldly authorities are subordinated to the order of the Church.

However, on closer scrutiny we discover that the political programme which Luther and his associates worked out in the course of the 1520s also contained powerful exchanges between the spiritual and the secular regiments. It was a ruler’s duty, for instance, to ensure that the gospel was indeed preached in freedom to the citizens, so there was the possibility that faith could grow among them. As a modern counterpart, we might note that both pastors and imams are attached to the Danish prison service, and the desire for spiritual care for the
inmates will hardly decrease over the coming years. In the second place, Lutheranism also had a complete cultural programme for reorganising society. This is because society was not seen as a godless territory but as an area within which God’s “natural law” ruled. Whereas marriage in a Catholic context was regarded as a church sacrament, in the Protestant church it was now seen as a civic arrangement pleasing to God; marriage is not about eternal bliss but about happiness and well-being. Whereas education belonged previously under the Church, there were now serious moves towards a public education system, since education was good for both society and for the individual. As noted, the reformation was decisive for the renovation in 1537 of the University of Copenhagen, which had fallen into disrepair. Also the legal system was similarly reformed, with the courts being moved from Church to state jurisdiction, whereas large areas of canon law continued as they were. The idea was that equality should prevail while people remained free to follow particular traditions.\textsuperscript{14} It was similar in the case of the citizens’ health and of poor relief.

In organisational terms all this must be seen as a move towards secularisation, but as regards content everything points to religious themes acquiring a more prominent place than before. We only need to look at the list of contents in the Danish Church Ordinance of 1537/39 to observe how the visiting of the sick and the poor, instruction of midwives and women in confinement, school attendance, poor relief and hospitals are far more conspicuous in the Church’s – and thus society’s – understanding of its tasks.\textsuperscript{15}

In brief: Along with the division of the spiritual and the temporal regiments comes an increasingly reciprocal permeation of the religious and political sphere. The civic regulations are introduced not just preventative and protectively to safeguard society from evil, but also positively and procreatively to take care of the welfare of its citizens in a broader sense. As we read in the Lutheran confession, Confessio Augustana article 21, the regulations of society and the family, are to be upheld as “God’s good regulations... so that love can be exercised in them”.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, the Christian love is the measure also for what is right and proper, including in the secular realm.

Accordingly, the political programme of Lutheranism not only led to a secular state governed by law and order but also to the formation of the modern welfare state, in which citizens dare to trust that the state wishes them well, while the state knows that politically it cannot make its citizens either happy or blessed. In this connection we must ask why precisely Denmark became the first country to introduce compulsory school attendance (in 1814) and the second country, after Germany, to introduce the old age pension (1891), for both men and women. The political scientist Tim Knudsen and the historian Uffe Østergaard have attempted to trace the roots of the welfare state back to the Lutheran understanding that grace (in the spiritual regiment) is given free of charge. In similar fashion the Scandinavian countries have created the universalist welfare state (within the temporal regiment), where services are given to all citizens whether or not they have deserved them and irrespective of
any private pensions. This idea of the universalist welfare state is not itself universal; its emergence depends on specific religio-cultural conditions.

The Lutheran doctrine of the two regiments has thus had a twofold historical effect. On the one hand it has laid the foundation for a liberalist separation of religion and politics, each of which has its sphere. On the other hand the spiritual regiment has provided inspiration for civic regulations, resulting in a conservative, later on a social-democratic, welfare state. The distinction is made between religion and politics, but the two domains have never been separated. Nor has such separation ever been intended.

**The politics of separation versus the politics of recognition**

In contrast to Luther we no longer live in a guardian state, where care of the citizens’ well-being is controlled by an autocratic political system. We live in a centreless society, without a ruling midpoint, where political ideas are constantly negotiable and the sources for political preferences come from many places. We also live with a global consciousness, in which Christianity’s cultural resources are no longer a matter of course, and ideas and influences flow across national borders and cultures. The question for us is what does this mean for religious politics today? I can see two basic possibilities:

- We can either work towards a **secularist solution**, according to which the political sphere requires a limitation of the religious life in principle to the private sphere – leaving the public sphere as free of religion as humanly possible. Or we can work towards a **politics of recognition**, which acknowledges the actual existence of religious practices and ideas in the public sphere and therefore recognises that the borders between the political system and the religious life are constantly negotiable, depending on the character of the religious cultures in any given society at any given time.

  The former is the French model for a joint-state secularism (*laïcité*), which forbids religious symbols (from cross to veil) in the public sphere, including the teaching of religious studies in the public schools. The latter has been the common European model, in which society makes legal compacts with specific faith communities (e.g. in Italy, Spain or Austria) or undertakes other legal regulations of its relationship to religious groups as recognised and approved faith communities.

As we have seen, Denmark has followed the second model. When Article 4 of the Danish Constitution was passed in 1849, it said: “The Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Established Church of Denmark, and, as such, it shall be supported by the State.” The thinking was that the new democracy recognised the actual existence of a huge majority church, and thus the Constitution promised a church order in Article 66: “The constitution of the Established Church shall be laid down by Statute.” This so-called “promissory clause” has never been made good. Similarly, the Constitution promises in Article 69: “Rules for religious
bodies dissenting from the Established Church shall be laid down by Statute,” but nor has this clause been made good in the form of an overall law on religious communities. Over time 104 such communities of very varied type and size have been “recognised” and “approved”. Despite all differences and obscurities the State of Denmark has thus recognised certain religious cultures as reciprocal collaborators.\(^{19}\)

In this respect the Constitution contains specific clauses relating to freedom of religion and freedom of speech:

Article 67: “The citizens shall be entitled to form congregations for the worship of God in a manner consistent with their convictions, provided that nothing at variance with good morals or public order shall be taught or done.”

Article 77: “Any person shall be entitled to publish his thoughts in printing, in writing, and in speech, provided that he may be held answerable in a court of justice. Censorship and other preventive measures shall never again be introduced.”

These are clear principles, which open up for individual religious choice. No one beforehand can censor either religions or statements for or against religions. But as Professor of Law Henning Koch points out elsewhere in this book the use of these two freedoms comes with a legal responsibility, for the purpose of maintaining public law and order.

When we look back at the effect of the Muhammed-cartoons on Denmark’s reputation, we can wonder at the absence of the legal system in the debate. For the Penal Code Section 140 states:

“Those who publicly mock or insult the doctrines or worship of any religious community that is legal in this country, shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment for up to four months.”

This so-called “blasphemy law” protects neither God nor Jesus nor prophets from insults, but it protects religious groups. In similar fashion Section 266b penalises statements that “…threaten, insult or degrade a group of persons on account of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin, belief or sexual orientation,” with up to 2 years imprisonment. Individuals are also protected against violation of honour (Section 267), against spying and photographing in a “not freely accessible place” (Section 264a), against threats on their “life, health or well-being” (Section 266), or appeals to “acts of violence and vandalism” (Section 266a), and so on.\(^{20}\)

How then to balance the right to practise religion without public mockery against the right to freedom of speech? It is clear that legally neither freedom of religion nor freedom of
speech is unlimited. But freedom of speech ensures that religions can be criticised both for their claims to truth and for their socio-ethical consequences. Criticism of religions is allowed (and in my opinion is even beneficial), just as it is allowed to criticise the ethics of a religion for being paternalistic, oppressive to women and so on. But it is not allowed to summarily insult the creed of a religious group in order to cast odium on it.

The question now is whether the blasphemy law can be reasonably applied against *Jyllands-Posten*. On 29th September 2005 the paper’s cultural editor wrote that Muslims must also learn that in a secular democracy with freedom of speech one must be ready to live with “scorn, mockery and ridicule.” It is in this context that the Muhammed-cartoons were published the following day. It seems natural to me that a Danish court should test the claim that the Muhammed-cartoons were published precisely in order to insult and ridicule Muslims in Denmark (and elsewhere). As I write, this is being considered by the public prosecutor.

The argument for not proceeding with such a case is that the precedents are few and far between; the last conviction in Denmark for blasphemy was as far back as 1938. But there is another reason. Professor Henning Koch has pointed out that since the prohibition against depicting Muhammed does not exist in the Koran but only in the Hadiths, it can hardly be regarded as an insult of central “doctrines”. Against this, one could argue that the case is not just about what the Koran says (which would correspond to a Protestant scripture principle), but rather about what is important for Islam as it is lived in Denmark. Section 140 deals precisely with protecting “the doctrines or worship of any religious community that is legal in this country.” Add to this the fact that the pictures were not neutral depictions of Muhammed but caricatures which identified the prophet with Islamic terrorism and were thus calculated to mock and deride certain groups of believers among the Danish people, and I cannot understand why such a case has not been brought.

The argument for doing so is that a case would be held within the framework of official Denmark. And such an answer from official Denmark we have yet to hear. Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has rightly pointed out that according to the Constitution he cannot as Prime Minister censor the press and that therefore he cannot apologise for *Jyllands-Posten’s* editorial choices, for which he has no responsibility. On the other hand as a statesman he could have deplored the publication on behalf of official Denmark, and not just as a private person. He could have listened to the many experienced diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who are used to moving in other cultures than the Euro-American. He could have expressed a willingness to protect a minority from political rhetoric aimed at immigrants, one that has been allowed to grow even among parliamentary politicians in a party supporting the government. In other words the Prime Minister could have responded within the framework of the politics of recognition instead of pursuing a policy that pretends that a religious minority is no concern of the state. It is this policy of blindness to religion that has
been perceived as arrogance and disrespect of other nations, obviously against the Prime Minister's own intentions.

In the same way we can ask whether the misinformation that a delegation from the Islamic Faith Community in Copenhagen has spread in Muslim circles in Egypt and elsewhere is not covered by the Section 129b of the Penal Code, which states: “Whoever damages the interests of the country by consciously and untruthfully publicly ascribing to the government or any other public authority an act which it has not undertaken shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment up to 2 years.” It is perfectly possible that this law, which deals solely with misinformation regarding the government and public authorities, cannot be applied to the misinformation in respect of a newspaper, Jyllands-Posten. But if that is the case, we might ask whether parliament should not legislate against such actions that threaten public law and order. Admittedly it would only be “symbolic legislation”, but even that can be beneficial if the overall aim of the law is to maintain law and order.

The effects of the Muhammed-cartoons can only be described as quite out of all proportion, and many parties have contributed to the escalation of the conflict. What can be learned from it all is that everything which belongs within the life of society, including religions and cultures, must be part of the political dialogue. But dialogue in itself is not enough; the legal system is also required to set limits on hate speech from whatever side. There is no need of a law for the benefit of Muslims – or against them for that matter. What is needed are laws that demonstrate the politics of recognition in relation to all the practising religions in Denmark, a politics of recognition which of course at the same time must make demands on those groups who ask for society's respect.

Legally we need not a lex islamica, but a law on right and reason. Morally we do not call for agreement on our various views of life or our preferences, but merely for a proper tone in which to conduct the public debate.

Notes

1) See Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (1967). Berger was one of the first to discover that even though religion is no longer a a matter of course (as it was in pre-modern society), the religious traditions continue, even with renewed vitality, see A Rumor of Angels: Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural (1970); a brief diagnostical overview can be found in “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview” in Peter L. Berger: The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999, 1-18.


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5) “Religion in der Öffentlichkeit,” 137.


12) Weimarer Ausgabe vol. 49, 434 (not included in Luther's Works)


14) On the entire development see John Witte, Jr., Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation (Cambridge University Press 2002), which examines the programme for reorganising society that followed on from the reformation.


19) See the overview in Hans Raun Iversen, “Religionsfrihed og religionslighed i Danmark,” in For Folkekirkenes skyld – at forny for at bevare, Frederiksberg: Unitas 2004, 33-59. Iversen here points to a number of inconsistencies and inequalities in Danish legislation on religion, e.g., between the 12 “recognised” faith communities (before 1969) and the 92 “approved” faith communities (since 1969).

20) The link between the blasphemy law and the sections against hate speech has been pointed out by Lisbet Christoffersen in “Blasfemisk blindhed,” Biskop for herren – and så mange andre. Festskrift til Kjeld Holms 60-årsdag, eds. Anna Ehlers et al, Frederiksberg: ANIS 2005, 189-211.

21) In continuation of which the public prosecutor on 15th March 2006 rejected a case on the grounds among others that the prohibition against images of Muhammed is not universal within Islam; that a number of the cartoons must be designated as neutral, and that the cartoon which shows a bomb in Muhammed’s turban can be interpreted in several ways, including a socio-ethical criticism of the use that is made of Muhammed within areas of radicalised Islam. At the same time the public prosecutor upheld in his conclusion that Sections 140 and 266b of the Penal Code do set limits to freedom of speech as regards religious and ethical subjects.