Modern Judaism and Religious Tolerance
On the Paradoxical Phenomenon of “Exclusivism in Enlightenment”

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Abstract
Some of the recent studies on EU immigration issues point to the emergence of a phenomenon that may be termed “Exclusivism in Enlightenment” among anti-immigrationists, which is different from conventional exclusivism based on race or nationalism. Because of their belief in liberal values, today’s anti-immigrationists are inclined to reject people who do not share these values with them (such as Muslims, who do not accept the ideas of gender equality, separation of church and state, and freedom of expression).

In the modern age, Jews in Europe were directly exposed to criticism by liberalists. While liberal intellectuals in Europe affirmed granting civil rights to Jews, they were against Judaism itself because of its incompatibility with liberalism. In response to this bias against Judaism, Moses Mendelssohn, often called the father of modern Judaism, advocated the idea that equality in civil status and Jewish traditions could be maintained at the same time as Jewish traditions. Mendelssohn stood firmly against those who demanded that Jews change their religious lifestyles as a condition for being granted legal equality.

Keywords: religious tolerance, Enlightenment, civil rights, Kant, Moses Mendelssohn

1. Introduction
In Europe, renewed attention is now being paid to the issue of religious tolerance, triggered by such incidents as the banning of Muslim headscarves in public schools and the Muhammad cartoon controversy. The issue of religious tolerance, which originally arose from civil society in the modern age in Europe, has always been closely associated with the issue of the assimilation of immigrants and religious minorities into European society. While today’s discussion on religious tolerance is focused on Muslims, Jews were the major subject of such discussion from at least the end of the 18th century until World War II.

The idea of religious tolerance can be summarized in the statement that “you must not reject or expel people of different religious backgrounds on the grounds of their religious
beliefs.” Behind this message is a notion that religious doctrines should no longer be subjected to discussion. Still, if we are to define to what extent religious tolerance is granted, it is inevitable that we must focus our attention on religious doctrines. For example, some of the recent studies on EU immigration issues point to the emergence of a phenomenon that may be termed “Exclusivism in Enlightenment” among anti-immigrationists, which is different from conventional exclusivism based on race or nationalism. Because of their belief in liberal values, today’s anti-immigrationists are inclined to reject people who do not share these values with them (such as Muslims, who don’t accept the notions of gender equality, separation of church and state, and freedom of expression). In this case, whether religious tolerance is extended or not is determined by whether the particular persons are qualified for EU citizenship.

The term “Exclusivism in Enlightenment” was first used by Jiro Mizushima, a researcher specializing in modern politics of the Netherlands. 1) As a notable case of such exclusivism, Mizushima points to the rapid emergence of the new right-wing party in the Netherlands in 2002. This party, the Pim Fortuyn List, directed open criticism at immigrants, which was seen as a taboo in a country where tolerant, multicultural policies have traditionally been administered. The party was founded by Pim Fortuyn, a well-known figure for his wide-ranging, outspoken critiques and straightforward remarks who started his career as a university researcher in the field of sociology. In voicing criticism against Muslims, the Pim Fortuyn List took an approach largely different from the one adopted conventionally by other extreme right-wingers. Fortuyn sharply criticized Muslims, not from a racist or nationalist standpoint, but in terms of liberal values stemming from the Western Enlightenment: he called Islam an outdated religion on the grounds of Muslims’ denial of liberal values. According to Mizushima, Fortuyn defended women’s rights to abortion and gay rights, and supported euthanasia and even drug use. In this sense, his stance was close to that of libertarians, marking a sharp contrast to France’s extreme right-wing party, the Front national (FN), which places special importance on traditional family values. The approach adopted by Fortuyn was to first speak highly of “liberal” and “libertarian” values, and to then use these values as grounds for criticizing the “outdated” Muslim religion and rejecting immigrants. According to Mizushima, Fortuyn’s political movement “was a new form of the New Right seen only in post-industrial, developed nations, which may be termed the ‘post-modern New Right’.”2)

Fortuyn was assassinated days before the Netherlands general election in May 2002. Despite (or because of) this shocking incident, the Pim Fortuyn List made major gains in the election and became the second largest party in the country, eventually joining the coalition government. After the death of Fortuyn, however, the party suffered from repeated internal conflicts and rapidly lost influence because, in substance, it was controlled by Fortuyn alone. Still, the emergence of a populist party in the Netherlands, a nation that had traditionally pursued tolerant policies, made a significant impact on society as the party created a mood
in which it became acceptable to openly criticize immigrants. In fact, cases of intolerance arose one after another in the Netherlands, a supposedly tolerant country. Still fresh in our minds is the episode triggered by the assassination of a Dutch film director, Theo Van Gogh, who was killed by a young Dutch Moroccan offended by his movie about the abuse of Muslim women. Van Gogh’s assassination was immediately followed by a high incidence of assault and harassment against Muslims in the Netherlands.

What we fear most, as indicated by Mizushima, is that “the EU is unlikely to have any logical argument against the New Right when they criticize Muslims on the grounds of their lack of sense of democracy and human rights, values traditionally championed by Europeans.”3) Of course, it is not socially acceptable in the EU to openly embrace a national identity based on nationalism. Still, now that the scope of citizenship has been enlarged to encompass the entirety of Europe, it is feared that European identity, even if it has liberalism at its core, may eventually come to function as a higher-level national identity.

On careful consideration, it is apparent that liberal criticism of religion is nothing new: it was directed at European Jews in the modern age. Liberal values stemming from the Enlightenment provided Jews with opportunities to obtain civil rights, on the one hand, while Jews were often forced to change or even abandon aspects of their religious lifestyles as a condition for being granted civil rights, on the other. Paradoxically, the framework for understanding religion formed in modern-age Europe with a view to realizing a harmonious, tolerant society embracing religious freedom was also used as a rationale for exclusion. In order to reexamine this paradox, we must consider from a renewed viewpoint how modern Judaism was associated with religious tolerance. Moses Mendelssohn, known as the father of modern Judaism, was very sensitive to this paradox. In one of his primary works on religious philosophy, *Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum (Jerusalem, or On Religious Power and Judaism, 1783)*, he attempted to demonstrate that the ideas of the Enlightenment and Jewish traditions were compatible with each other. However, his view was received with skepticism. While liberal intellectuals affirmed the granting of civil rights to Jews, they were against Judaism itself for its alleged incompatibility with liberalism.

This paper will discuss various aspects of modern Judaism centering on Mendelssohn’s thought, and will consider the paradoxical phenomenon of “Exclusivism in Enlightenment” seen in the theory of religious tolerance in Europe in terms of the long history behind it. First, I will outline the religious climate in Europe in the modern age before Mendelssohn’s time, and will then examine Mendelssohn’s thought around the time he authored *Jerusalem* in 1783.
First, I will briefly look back on the situation of religious tolerance in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. While it is held that the thought of religious reformers and humanists such as Desiderius Erasmus, as well as Christian mystics, contributed to the development of the theory of religious tolerance, the set of ideas known as the theory of natural law was also of critical importance. By arguing that moral principles are innately embedded in human nature, this theory gave birth to a platform commonly shared by people of different religious and cultural backgrounds. Jean Bodin and Hugo Grotius were leading proponents of this theory. The theory of natural law also played a very important role in Mendelssohn’s view on tolerance, as will be discussed later.

With the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in 1685, some 500,000 Huguenots left France and fled to surrounding Protestant countries. Prussia was among the first countries to take action when the Great Elector, Frederick William, declared acceptance of a huge number of the Huguenot refugees only eleven days after the Edict of Nantes was revoked. The revocation of the Edict triggered heated discussion throughout Europe on matters relating to religious tolerance and religious freedom. In the course of these discussions, “religious tolerance” and “religious freedom” became symbolic keywords representing the situation in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, inspiring a number of philosophers to write books on these themes. For example, John Locke’s *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689) argues that no state or church should have the right of compulsion over human souls and insists on tolerance for all religions. Pierre Bayle, on the other hand, maintains the same argument, but unlike Locke, he is of the opinion that tolerance should be granted even to atheists. In Germany, Christian Thomasius pioneered the discussion on the tolerance issue.

In this way, the notion of tolerance was gradually put into practice. The Netherlands, which had accepted religious refugees of various backgrounds, became the first state to adopt the principle of religious tolerance. It was followed by England, which, after the Glorious Revolution, offered tolerance also to non-conformists on condition of their affirming loyalty to the King and denying the Pope. The concept of tolerance was taken to the United States of America and incorporated into the “Bill of Rights” (First Amendment), and later, fueled the French Revolution.

In Germany, Brandenburg-Prussia accepted a limited number of religious refugees. This was not because they embraced an attitude of tolerance, however, but was done rather for commercial and financial reasons. Though Frederick II of Prussia is often described as an Enlightenment figure who advocated religious tolerance, a significant gap exists between his writings about the ideal of tolerance and the way he actually ruled the state. Particularly apparent was the difference between the treatment of Huguenots, who were considered to be heretics but belonged to the same Christian community, and that of Jews.
The settlement of Jews in Berlin began in May 1671 when the Great Elector Frederick William permitted fifty wealthy Jewish families expelled from Austria to settle in Berlin. In September 1671, some of the Jewish families were issued *Schutzbriefe* (certificates of protection). However, Jews were forced to live a harsh life in Berlin, while Huguenots who were granted settlement permits around the same time received much more favorable treatment. In 1730, Frederick William I of Prussia enacted a law known as the “general privilege and regulations to be observed concerning the Jews in his Majesty's dominions,” which was amended by Frederick the Great (Frederick II of Prussia) in 1750 to impose further restrictions on the rights of Jews. Under the revised general privilege and regulations, Jews were divided into six ranks in terms of their ability to contribute to the economic well-being of the state.5)

Only a handful of “general privileged Jews” belonged to the first rank. They were granted the freedom to choose where to live and the right to own real estate, and all of their children were entitled to inherit the property. Those in the second rank were “ordinary protected Jews,” who were allowed to live in specified districts. Only their first sons were permitted to succeed to their fathers’ posts. Their second and third sons were also entitled to protection, but only if they had enough property. “Extraordinary protected Jews” were in the third rank. Their privileges were limited to themselves only, and could not be inherited by their children. Physicians and craftsmen belonged to this rank. Public servants in the Jewish colony constituted the group of the fourth rank. They were granted the same rights as “extraordinary protected Jews,” except that they were not permitted to engage in commercial activities. The fifth rank consisted of Jews who did not have *Schutzbriefe* but were mercifully allowed to live in Berlin. They were mainly the children of “ordinary protected Jews” who could not inherit their fathers’ privileges, as well as children of “extraordinary protected Jews” and public servants of the Jewish colony. Finally, the sixth rank was composed of servants employed by the Jews with *Schutzbriefe*. They were permitted to stay in Berlin only for the period of their employment.

When Mendelssohn immigrated to Berlin at the age of 14 in 1743, following his mentor, Rabbi David Fränkel, he did not belong to any of the six ranks. However, he could not remain exempt from the regulations. In 1750, when he was 21 years old, he became employed as a home tutor by the Bernhards, a family qualified to live in Berlin as “ordinary protected Jews,” probably to avoid being expelled from Berlin. Mendelssohn, as an employee of ordinary protected Jews, was then classified in the lowest-status rank. It was not until 1763 that he was granted the rights of the third rank as an “extraordinary protected Jew.” He never acquired the status of “ordinary protected Jew” in his lifetime.

In the Habsburg Monarchy, Joseph II issued the well-known *Toleranzpatent* (Edict of Tolerance) for Jews in 1781. Compared with Frederick II of Prussia, Joseph II was more favorable towards Jews, but he did not accept Jews as they were. The main aim of the Edict of Tolerance was, despite its name, the forced assimilation of Jews; it therefore laid upon
them more duties than rights, the most important of which was the obligation to serve in the military. This means that Joseph requested Jews to give up their religious/ethnic background. In this sense, the edict entailed the risk of eliminating not only the Jewish community per se, but also their religious and cultural traditions. As Simon Dubnow, a Russian historian specialized in Jewish history, indicates, Joseph did not keep it a secret that the ultimate goal of the Edict of Tolerance was to eliminate the ethnic and religious backgrounds specific to Jews. When issuing the Edict of Tolerance, Joseph made a remark to the effect that if the state law conflicted with any Jewish religious practices, then Jews had to either abandon the practice or be expelled from the state.

3. Civil Rights of Jews (1): The Case of England

Mendelssohn wrote Jerusalem inspired by the discussion that took place in Germany on the civil rights of Jews. However, let me first examine the situation in England before going into detail about the case of Germany. The idea of granting equal rights to all citizens was first propounded by Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, and the first work to discuss this idea in terms of Jews was John Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). Locke's argument in A Letter Concerning Toleration is based on the notion that civil rights should be independent of any religious affiliation, and from this viewpoint Locke points to the case of Jews. Of course, the main purpose of A Letter Concerning Toleration was not to discuss the issue of the civil rights of Jews; its main theme is “the mutual toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion,” and to provide grounds for this argument, Locke discusses the issue of tolerance in regard to Muslims and Jews in a supplementary manner. Locke's view on the civil rights of Jews is clearly shown in the following excerpt from A Letter Concerning Toleration:

“If we may openly speak the truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither pagan, nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, because of his religion. The Gospel commands no such thing. The church, ‘which judgeth not those that are without,’ Cor. v. 11, wants it not. And the commonwealth, which embraces indifferently all men that are honest, peaceable, and industrious, requires it not. Shall we suffer a pagan to deal and trade with us, and shall we not suffer him to pray unto and worship God? If we allow the Jews to have private houses and dwellings amongst us, why should we not allow them to have synagogues? Is their doctrine more false, their worship more abominable, or is the civil peace more endangered, by their meeting in public, than in their private houses? But if these may be granted to Jews and Pagans, surely the condition of any Christians ought not to be worse than theirs, in a Christian commonwealth.”
In this connection, it should be noted that when the issue of whether or not to accept Jews in a state was discussed, it was taken for granted that the state was a secular one, separated from any particular religion. In other words, Jews were allowed to publicly offer personal opinions only in societies in which the idea of “the secularity of the state” and a relative view of religions, especially Christianity, prevailed.

In *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Locke shows his outstanding foresight, correctly predicting the direction history would take for hundreds of years to come, but unfortunately this work did not at all contribute to the improvement of the social status of Jews in England. In considering the issue of the civil rights of Jews in England, attention should be paid to the work published by John Toland in 1714, *Reasons for Naturalizing the Jews in Great Britain and Ireland on the Same Foot with all other Nations* (hereafter *Theory of Naturalization*). Toland was one of the leading figures in the debates concerning Deism, and was known widely as the author of “Christianity is not mysterious.” Toland’s view discussed in *Theory of Naturalization* is deeply associated with the controversy over England’s immigration policy. In those days, the Whig Party and the Tory Party were in opposition over the acceptance of immigrants and the naturalization of foreigners: while the Whig Party was affirmative in accepting immigrants, the Tory Party took the opposite view. In the discussion on whether an increase in immigrants would be beneficial to the nation’s economy or not, there was a conflict of opinions over the acceptance of Jews as foreigners.10)

Toland argued for accepting immigrants. As indicated by Jacob Katz, an authority on anti-Semitism,11) Toland’s research interest was mainly the naturalization of Jews into English society, not the civil rights of Jews. Traditionally, England granted the same rights to both native-born and naturalized subjects. Toland thought that this principle should be applied to Jews born in England as well as Jews born in foreign countries and later naturalized.

Another point that should be highlighted is that the argument supporting the naturalization of Jews shown in *Theory of Naturalization* was backed by the recognition of the commonality of human nature. In this sense, this work could be seen as having inspired Christian Dohm to write *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden* (On the Civil Improvement of the Jews) in 1781 (hereafter *Civil Improvement*). When Dohm tried to support the civil rights of Jews, he, too, based his argument on the notion of universal personhood. Though both Toland and Dohm used the notion of universal personhood as the basis for their arguments, there was a significant change in the social environments of their respective discussions, from the 18th century notion of “Jews as foreigners” to the notion of “Jews as citizens” which came to prevail in the 19th century.12)

Now, let me discuss the case of Germany. Dohm’s *Civil Improvement* made a considerable impact on the controversy as to whether or not civil rights should be granted to Jews in German-speaking regions. In this work, Dohm argues that Jews should be granted equal civil rights and specifies in detail the conditions that should be met by both Jews and the states in accepting Jews as citizens. In fact, inspired by Dohm’s work, Joseph II of the Habsburg Monarchy abolished the poll tax on Jews in 1781 and issued the Edict of Tolerance in the following year.

In the case of Toland, the word “naturalization” is key to his discussion, while the keyword of Dohm’s work is “improvement.” However, this word implies that Jews are inferior people and thus need to be improved. Although Mendelssohn highly esteemed Dohm’s work, he felt uncomfortable with Dohm’s use of the word “improvement” and instead used the expression “bürgerliche Aufnahme,” meaning civil admission or civil acceptance (JubA, VIII 2, 6).

In response to the publication of Dohm’s *Civil Improvement*, which was realized through the cooperation of Mendelssohn, and the issuance of the Edict of Tolerance by Joseph II, Mendelssohn published a German translation of a book written by Manasseh Ben Israel, *Vindiciae Judaeorum* (Vindication of The Jews) in 1782 (the translation itself was undertaken by Marcus Herz, a common friend of Mendelssohn and Kant), and wrote a long preface entitled *Preface to Manasseh Ben Israel’s Vindiciae Judaeorum* (hereafter *Preface*). In a sense, the *Preface* can be seen to have been written as a supplement to Dohm’s *Civil Improvement*.

By publishing his *Preface*, Mendelssohn aimed to accelerate the momentum toward granting civil rights to Jews which had been created by Dohm, on the one hand, and to correct the misunderstanding of the idea of the “emancipation of Jews” which can be also seen in *Civil Improvement*, on the other.

In the *Preface*, Mendelssohn publicly presented his views in support of extending civil rights to Jews for the first time, which, as mentioned by Jacob Katz,¹³ marked a major departure from Mendelssohn’s earlier works. The works authored in German by Mendelssohn during the first half of his life dealt with aesthetic and metaphysical matters irrelevant to Judaism. In the latter half of his life, however, he wrote books out of the necessity to publicly explain his continued attachment to Judaism, in response to the call of Johann Caspar Lavater to convert to Christianity. Still, in the controversy with Lavater in 1769, Mendelssohn did not yet assert his own opinion; rather, he begged the rulers to have mercy on Jews, just as Court Jews had done before him. In fact, Mendelssohn wrote to Lavater as follows:

“I am a member of a suppressed people who must implore the ruling nation for patronage and protection, which it did not receive everywhere, and was nowhere without certain restrictions. Liberties which are granted to every other people are denied to my brothers
of faith. My brothers are content if they are granted silent approval of their existence and are protected. They must take this approval and protection as no small kindness of the nation which accepts them under bearable conditions..." (JubA, VII, 14-15)

However, in his 1782 Preface, Mendelssohn changed his tone. Here, he insists that Jews have every reason to request civil rights as human beings. For example, he thanks God for having him live in the age when the rights of Jews as human beings are valued, and presents his view on Dohm as follows:

“He [Dohm] maintains that everyone is entitled to human rights simply by virtue of being human. The same reasoning also applies to us [Jews], which is fortunate for us, because it indicates that an unyielding pursuit of human rights inevitably involves a pursuit of Jews’ human rights as well. This 18th-century intellectual [Dohm] saw people simply as human beings, without regard to the difference of views. (JubA VIII 2, 5)”

Since the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, religious tolerance had been granted only to the three Christian sects—Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists—within the territory of the Holy Roman Empire. Because of this fact, Mendelssohn emphasized that Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s Nathan the Wise, Dohm’s Civil Improvement, and the Edict of Tolerance by Joseph II together served as a driving force in expanding the scope of tolerance toward Jews. At the same time, however, Mendelssohn was fully aware that what he was seeing was a mere possibility of Jews being treated as equal citizens, and he didn’t consider Prussia or the Habsburg Monarchy as ideal states ready to accept Jews as citizens. This notion sharply distinguishes Mendelssohn from Naftali Haltwig Wessely, who, like Mendelssohn, was an advocate of the Jewish Enlightenment, and David Friedländer, active in the age after Mendelssohn, as the latter two maintained that these states were fully prepared for the immediate acceptance of Jews. Recognizing that no such ideal states existed, Mendelssohn had to rely on the theory of natural law when insisting that Jews were entitled to civil rights.

In his Preface, Mendelssohn discussed three issues to be addressed in order to realize the civil liberties of Jews.

The first issue dealt with the removal of the prejudice against Jews. Active in the age when the idea of universal personhood was valued, Mendelssohn was sensitive to the change in the nature of prejudice against Jews. While the ridiculous religious rumors such as tales of Jews sacrificing infants to celebrate Passover became the things of the past, other more secular prejudices became prevalent, such as blaming Jews for “a lack of moral feeling, taste, and good manners; the inability to engage in arts, sciences, and useful occupations, principally in the service of war and the state...” (JubA, VIII 2, 6)14 Because of these prejudices, Jews were alleged to be inferior in moral and cultural terms and unable to contribute to the state
in any way, and were therefore considered undeserving of civil rights. In opposition to this reasoning, Mendelssohn insisted that Jews had been unable to enhance their occupational, artistic, and scientific skills due to the lack of means and opportunities to do so, for which Jews should not be held responsible: “We are excluded from all arts, sciences, and useful occupations and activities of mankind; all the means to useful improvement are closed to us, and our lack of applied knowledge is made the cause of our continued oppression. Our hands are tied and we are rebuked for not using them.” (ibid.)

It should be noted that in this remark, Mendelssohn does not associate the lack of occupational, artistic, and scientific skills with the idea of universal personhood. The need to improve Jews’ occupational and cultural skills does not mean that they need improvement as human beings. As discussed by David Sorkin, an authority on the Jewish Enlightenment, Mendelssohn squarely challenged the argument that Jews had to abandon their religious/ethnic backgrounds before being accepted as citizens. All individuals are inherently entitled to civil rights, and for this reason, Mendelssohn placed importance on the theory of natural law.

The second issue Mendelssohn discussed in his Preface dealt with the relationship between the economic activities of Jews, especially commercial activities, and civil liberties. In those days, Jews were blamed for not being engaged in productive activities and thus for being unable to contribute to the prosperity of the state. In response to this kind of criticism, Mendelssohn argued that people could contribute to the prosperity of a state only when they were granted liberties in both economic and religious terms, and pointed to the case of the Netherlands. To criticism based on the physiocratic thought, he tried to protect the freedom of occupation for Jews by stating “Not only making (Machen) but also doing (Thun) is productive.” (JubA, VIII 2, 13) In this case, “doing” means processing and distributing products.

Finally, let me discuss the third, most important issue addressed in the Preface, the autonomy of religious communities and civil liberties. How much autonomy should be granted to religious communities in dealing with civil matters? In the opinion of Dohm, Jewish religious communities should maintain their autonomy, even when dealing with civil matters. Mendelssohn, on the other hand, indicates that judges who belong to a higher level of society should be responsible for final decisions on civil matters in that society (JubA, VIII 2, 17).

While requesting that the Christian community take into consideration the traditional legal interpretations of Jews, Mendelssohn was of the opinion that the final decision on legal matters should be made not by the Jewish community, but by the ruling state—that is, by the Christian community. Let us ask, what is the background of this opinion? In Mendelssohn’s time, those who were against granting civil rights to Jews argued that because Jews complied with the rules of their own religious community, conferring civil rights on them might lead to the establishment of another state within the state. In the face of such criticism, Mendelssohn was opposed to the Jewish religious community having autonomy equal to that of a state.
Regarding the Jewish community’s autonomy, Dohm insisted that its religious community should have the right of excommunication, to which Mendelssohn presented an opposing view on the grounds that excommunication is incompatible with the original purpose of religion. He writes, “Every society, it seems to me, has the right to be exclusive, the only exception being any churchly society, for exclusiveness is diametrically opposed to such a society’s purpose.” (JubA, VIII 2, 21) Mendelssohn maintained that the opinions and beliefs conceived in the realm of religion were not bound by any social contract, and therefore were not subject to any rights or obligations, and that no religious community had any legal rights to exercise coercive power. For Mendelssohn, the main purpose of religion, after all, is not forcing people to do something, but enlightening and guiding them. He writes:

“True, divine religion does not arrogate to itself any power over opinions and propositions; it neither confers nor assumes any claim to earthly goods or any right to enjoyment, possession, or property; it knows no power other than the power to convince by reasoning and to make one happy through convictions held. True, divine religion needs neither arms nor fingers to be effective. It is all mind and heart.” (JubA, VIII 2, 18)

However, Mendelssohn’s criticism of churchly authority was interpreted by contemporary Christians also as criticism against Judaism. They understood his argument in the Preface only in terms of Enlightenment liberalism, and pointed out that there was a discrepancy between his view on ideal religions and the reality of Judaism. Believing in the superiority of Christianity to Judaism in terms of liberalism, they also considered Mendelssohn’s Preface to show sympathy with Christianity, and blamed him for continuing to adhere to Judaism. One such leading critic was August Friedrich Cranz, a writer in Berlin. In the Preface, Mendelssohn emphasized that Jews had a tradition of criticizing exclusive authority by referring to King Solomon’s remark about being tolerant to pagans (1 Kings 8:41 and the following passages) but this point was never understood.

5. Liberalists’ Understanding of Judaism – The Case of August Friedrich Cranz

Cranz published a pamphlet entitled The Searching for Light and Right in a Letter to Mr. Moses Mendelssohn occasioned by his remarkable Preface to Manasseh Ben Israel in 1782. He deliberately published the pamphlet anonymously, with a view to drawing greater public attention to it and urging Mendelssohn to respond to it. Furthermore, at the end of the text, he added “written in Vienna by S,” in anticipation that the pamphlet would be considered to have been written by Joseph Baron von Sonnenfels, a renowned statesman active in Vienna. In those days, it was a well-known fact that Sonnenfels respected Mendelssohn.
This pamphlet was designed to provoke anew the discussion that had taken place between Mendelssohn and Lavater earlier, although in a more moderate manner. In other words, Cranz attempted to encourage Mendelssohn to state why he, an Enlightenment thinker who placed so much value on reason, remained attached to Judaism in spite of its ecclesiastical power and repressive nature. Specifically, Cranz urged Mendelssohn to make clear what he meant by “loyalty to the faith of my fathers,” the words Mendelssohn wrote to Lavater, and asked Mendelssohn to offer his view on the Jewish faith.

Cranz attempted to define the Jewish faith in both broad and narrow senses. In his opinion, the Jewish faith is, in a broad sense, similar to the Christian faith, as both worship one God, comply with the fulfilled Mosaic law, and aim to unite all races under the Messiah. On the other hand, the Jewish faith, in a narrow sense, can be seen as representing the mechanism of Church Law, armed with the system of excommunication.

By presenting these views, Cranz tried to tactfully guide Mendelssohn to an expected conclusion. Let me outline the flow of Cranz’s reasoning. In a broad sense, no inherent difference exists between Judaism and Christianity, which does not conflict with universal reason. In a narrow sense, however, Church Law in Judaism functions as a mechanism to separate Jews from other races, which is contradictory to universal reason. This indicates that Mendelssohn, as he places importance on reason, is deemed to embrace the faith in a broad sense. Because no fundamental difference exists between Judaism and Christianity in a broad sense, therefore, it can be concluded that Mendelssohn already belongs to the Christian community.

Cranz further argues that if Mendelssohn still refuses to convert to Christianity, then he must carry out reforms to remove from Judaism the factors pertaining to Church Law. But if such reforms were to be conducted, what would be left of Judaism, and, in this case, what good reason would there be to remain attached to Judaism? He writes: “From this latter special faith (in a narrow sense), my dear Mr. Mendelssohn, you have torn yourself away in your remarkable Preface by plainly depriving the Synagogue of its principal force, denying as you do its right to exclude from the community of the holy those who fall away from the faith of their fathers and to invoke the ban and the curse upon heretics.” (JubA, VIII 2, 77) Cranz goes on:

“Armed church Law has always been one of the principle foundation stones of Judaism and a main tenet of the belief system of your fathers. My dear Mr. Mendelssohn, to what extent can you remain steadfast in the faith of your fathers, when in taking issue with the church law given by Moses on the basis of revelation, you remove one of its foundation stones and shake the entire building? The public has been aroused by you and has the right to expect enlightenment and instruction on this most important point.” (JubA, VIII 2, 80)
In the latter half of the pamphlet, Cranz, though sharing Mendelssohn’s view that civil rights should be granted to Jews, indicates that Judaism itself is partially responsible for the isolation of Jews from mainstream society. These arguments forced Mendelssohn to make clear why he thought Judaism was not an obstacle preventing Jews from obtaining civil rights.

6. The Defense of Judaism in Jerusalem

Cranz’s criticism prompted Mendelssohn to write Jerusalem, his primary work in the field of religious philosophy. As shown by its subtitle, On Religious Power and Judaism, this work consists of two parts: in the first, Mendelssohn articulates the distinction between church and state and then criticizes ecclesiastical power; in the second part, he discusses Judaism, especially the raison d’être of its Torah legislation from the viewpoint of religious philosophy. In other words, Mendelssohn responds to the criticism against Judaism for its being a coercive and repressive religion in the first part, and for its being a narrow and exclusive religion in the second part.

In the first part of Jerusalem, Mendelssohn denies the principle of state religion and emphasizes that neither state nor religion should be allowed to coercively infringe upon the freedom of conscience, writing: “Neither state nor church is authorized to judge in religious matters.” (JubA, VIII 2, 139) Here, Mendelssohn discusses the possibility of Jews being granted equal civil rights in a secular, neutral state, and tries to argue that Judaism is not a political corporation subject to coercive power, but a religious association comprised of free individuals.

The first part of Jerusalem was written in order to deepen the discussion he began in the Preface. Mendelssohn stresses here that society formed by religion, namely, the church, has no coercive power, and he articulates the distinction between church and state. Unlike the state, religion is not bound by social contracts and therefore its role is limited to persuading and guiding people, not constraining them.

“The state gives orders and coerces, religion teaches and persuades. The state prescribes laws, religion commandments. The state has physical power and uses it when necessary; the power of religion is love and beneficence. The one abandons the disobedient and expels him; the other receives him in its bosom and seeks to instruct, or at least to console him, even during the last moments of his earthly life, and not entirely in vain.” (JubA, VIII 2, 28)

I would now like to take a look at the second part of Jerusalem. The overriding characteristic of this part is Mendelssohn’s effort to consider the raison d’être of Torah legislation, which was thought to be special and exclusive, from a philosophical point of view. While the Ten Commandments of Moses give moral guidance only, Torah legislation provides
instructions for every aspect of Jewish life, including rituals, married life, dietary manners, and punishments. Therefore, Torah legislation has been repeatedly criticized for lacking universal validity and being applicable only within Jewish society. Mendelssohn attempted to respond to the criticism that Judaism maintained legislation valid only within Jewish society and was, therefore, exclusive of other religions.

To be specific, Mendelssohn first indicates that the content of Judaism can be divided into “eternal truths” that everyone can reasonably understand, and “historical truths” that were revealed to Jews at certain times in certain places, and then tries to demonstrate that both types of truths are compatible. In this understanding, Torah legislation, which provides behavioral guidance, is regarded as belonging to the category of “historical truths.” The distinction between “eternal truths” and “historical truths” corresponds to that between reason and revelation. In Mendelssohn’s opinion, it was not doctrine but legislation (rules dictating action) that was revealed to Jews, as shown in his remark that Judaism is not a “revealed religion” but a “revealed legislation (law).” (JubA, VIII 2, 164) In other words, by limiting the scope of Torah legislation only to behavioral matters, Mendelssohn maintains that the theoretical aspect of Judaism has universal validity, while its practice is specifically applicable to the Jewish community only. Though I mentioned above that Torah legislation belongs to the classification of “historical truths,” it is not entirely separate from “eternal truths,” as, according to Mendelssohn, it serves as a cue for reminding people of eternal truths in religion. He writes, “All laws refer to, or are based upon, eternal truths of reason, or remind us of them, and rouse us to ponder them.” (JubA, VIII 2, 166) Here, it is important to note that Torah legislation does not order people to have faith in God, but orders them to perform symbolic acts so as to be reminded of eternal truths. This line of thinking leads to an understanding of Judaism in terms of “freedom in doctrine” and “conformity in action.”

Mendelssohn stresses that God did not reveal the legislation to Jews in an exclusive manner, saying, “Judaism boasts of no exclusive revelation of eternal truths that are indispensable to salvation.” (JubA, VIII 2, 164) As the revelation in Judaism is not an exclusive one, there is no reason to fear Judaism itself. This is Mendelssohn’s answer to the criticism of the idea of the Jews as a chosen people. Still, a question remains: Why was Torah legislation revealed only to Jews? Mendelssohn’s answer to this question is that God wanted diversity in the first place. He writes, “Diversity (Mannigfaltigkeit) is evidently the plan and purpose of Providence” (JubA, VIII 2, 202), and: “A union of faiths (Glaubensvereinigung) is not tolerance; it is diametrically opposed to true tolerance.” (JubA, VIII 2, 203) In this way, Mendelssohn defines the relationship between special revelation and general revelation.
7. Liberalists’ Understanding of Judaism – The Case of Immanuel Kant

In *Jerusalem*, Mendelssohn attempted to show that Judaism is compatible with a secular state in which Jews should be granted civil rights. Even after publishing *Jerusalem*, however, Mendelssohn was still targeted by the same criticism as the one directed at him after publishing the *Preface*. Those who saw only Mendelssohn’s liberalist views in *Jerusalem* questioned why Mendelssohn defended Jewish Torah legislation (especially the part of the legislation pertaining to rituals) while also criticizing the right of coercion held by religious communities in the first part of the book. Kant also raised this question in his evaluation of Mendelssohn’s work.

For example, Kant held in high esteem the inspiring message expressed in *Jerusalem* that all religions should be based on unlimited freedom of conscience, and wrote the following in a letter to Mendelssohn dated August 16, 1783:

> Herr Friedländer will tell you how much I admired the penetration, subtlety, and wisdom of your *Jerusalem*. I regard this book as the proclamation of a great reform that is slowly impending, a reform that is in store not only for your own people but for other nations as well. You have managed to unite with your religion a degree of freedom of conscience that one would hardly have thought possible and of which no other religion can boast. You have at the same time thoroughly and clearly shown it necessary that every religion have unrestricted freedom of conscience, so that finally even the Church will have to consider how to rid itself of everything that burdens and oppresses conscience, and mankind will finally be united with regard to the essential point of religion. For all religious propositions that burden our conscience are based on history, that is, on making salvation contingent on belief in the truth of those historical propositions. (X, 325)²⁹

At the same time, however, Kant argues that Judaism should be viewed not as a religion but as a mere legal system or even as a secular state, and therefore its legislation is only a coercive law that requires superficial obedience, not based on moral conscience. He repeatedly presents this view in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1794) and *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798). Following is an excerpt from *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*:

> The Jewish faith, as originally established, was only a collection of merely statutory laws supporting a political state; for whatever moral additions were appended to it, whether originally or only later, do not in any way belong to Judaism as such. Strictly speaking Judaism is not a religion at all but simply the union of a number of individuals who, since they belonged to a particular stock, established themselves into a community under
purely political laws, hence not into a church; Judaism was rather meant to be a purely secular state. (VI, 125)30)

Many of the people who chose to see only liberalistic views in Mendelssohn’s works, including Kant and Cranz as mentioned above, had a deistic view of religion (in a broad sense). They denied all religious factors that were beyond reasonable understanding, and criticized historical and positive religions from the viewpoint of “reasonable religion.” However, they did not deny religion itself. Therefore, they had to make a compromise with historical religion, and often treated Judaism as an antithesis in their attempt to reach a compromise between “reasonable religion” and Christianity. This indicates that deists in Christian society did not dare to apply their methodology equally to Christianity and Judaism.31)

For Kant, historical religion is an intermediary form of religion on its way to perfection as “moral religion.” In evaluating historical religion from the viewpoint of “reasonable religion,” Kant tried to establish a hierarchy of religions with Christianity at the top. He describes Christianity as a “moral religion (and, of all the public religions so far as known, the Christian alone is of this type)” (VI, 51-52),32) which means that Christianity is in the position closest to pure moral religion. On the other hand, Kant maintains that Judaism, in comparison with Christianity, is not a religion in a pure sense, and should be understood in terms of politics and legal structures.

In other words, Kant did not appreciate the worth of Judaism as (moral) religion. This notion led to the argument that because Judaism is not a religion, it may well vanish on its way to perfection as pure moral religion. This is the theme of Kant’s Die Euthanasie des Judentums (The Euthanasia of Judaism), in which he writes, “The euthanasia of Judaism is pure moral religion, freed from all the ancient statutory teachings.” (VII, 53)33) In this case, what should be euthanized is Torah legislation.

In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant refers to Notes Regarding the Characteristics of the Jews published by Lazarus Ben David in 1793. Ben David was an active thinker of the Jewish Enlightenment and belonged to the generation of Mendelssohn’s disciples. Unlike Mendelssohn, however, Ben David regarded the ritual Torah not as one of the characteristics of Judaism but as one of its old defects. Needless to say, Ben David, by denying the old Torah legislation, was not simply insisting that Judaism should be assimilated into Christianity, but Kant, inspired by the work of Ben David, developed the understanding that because the ritual element is less prominent in Christianity than it is in Judaism, Jews, if on their way to embrace the value of moral religion, were ready to accept Christianity. Behind this understanding was his belief that all religions should abolish ecclesiastical rituals in a phased manner. He writes:

So we can consider the proposal of Ben Davie [Ben David], a highly intelligent Jew, to adopt publicly the religion of Jesus (...), a most fortunate one. Moreover it is the only
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plan which, if carried out, would leave the Jews a distinctive faith and yet quickly call attention to them as an educated and civilized people who are ready for all the rights of citizenship and whose faith could also be sanctioned by the government. If this were to happen, the Jews would have to be left free, in their interpretation of the Scriptures (the Torah and the Gospels), to distinguish the way in which Jesus spoke as a Jew to Jews from the way he spoke as a moral teacher to human beings in general. (ibid.)

Kant holds that in order for Jews to be assimilated into German society they should part with Torah legislation, and blames Mendelssohn for defending the Torah and thus abandoning any hope of reducing the burden weighing on Jews. (ibid.) However, what would be left of Judaism if they were to part with the Torah? Here, the same question arises as the one we saw when examining the argument of Cranz. While Kant affirmed the granting of equal civil rights to Jews, he did not understand Judaism as a religion.

8. Conclusion: The Enlightenment and Religion

In Mendelssohn's time, those who affirmed granting civil rights to Jews did not necessarily understand Judaism itself. They shared the notion that Jews' adherence to the Torah—the “old” part of their religion—was an obstacle to their participation in civil society. However, Mendelssohn believed that Jews should be able to enjoy equal civil status and maintain their religious traditions at the same time, and stood firmly against those who called for changes in Jewish religious practices as a precondition for granting Jews legal equality.

As discussed earlier, Mendelssohn was consistently opposed to the view that Jews should be reborn before being granted civil rights, because arguments calling for rebirth or improvement of Jews implicitly forces Jews to abandon their own religious and cultural traditions. As shown in Sorkin's discussion, Mendelssohn did not think that reform of Judaism itself was a prerequisite for the emancipation of Jews. He was confident that Jewish thought would be perfectly compatible with Enlightenment “reason.” This marks a sharp distinction between Mendelssohn and more radical Jewish reformists of later periods.

In his paper entitled On the Question: What Does Enlightenment Mean? (1784) appearing in Berlinische Monatsschrift, Mendelssohn maintained that the reform of Jews should be limited to the improvement of skills to enhance the convenience of social life, which he calls “culture.” On the other hand, he holds that “Enlightenment reasoning” should not be subject to reform. It seems, however, that as Mendelssohn grew older he was increasingly faced with the clashes between “Enlightenment” and “culture.” While Kant, in a paper entitled Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784) published around the same time, proudly advocates the slogan of Enlightenment, Mendelssohn remains much more restrained in discussing Enlightenment.
The nature of the Jewish Enlightenment partly contributed to Mendelssohn’s conviction of the compatibility between Judaism and the reason of the Age of the Enlightenment. The Jewish Enlightenment emerged not only in response to the influence of the European Enlightenment, but also due to factors inherent in Jewish tradition. In those days, advocates of the Jewish Enlightenment believed that the rationalistic traditions intrinsic in Judaism (symbolic of which is Maimonides) were not contradictory to Enlightenment thought. In contrast to Kant’s view of the Enlightenment, which involved criticism of religion, the Jewish Enlightenment was more religion-friendly, which, needless to say, underwent rapid change in the history of assimilated Jews following the age of Mendelssohn.

This paper has discussed how Judaism was perceived from the standpoint of Enlightenment liberalism by examining the views of Kant and Cranz. To avoid misunderstanding, let me assure the reader that I have no intention of identifying Kant with the New Right in the postmodern age. However, we are now required to renew our awareness of the fact that it is more difficult than imagined to part with the view that describes religion as an anachronism when we take the position of Enlightenment liberalism. More problematic is that in this case, certain religions can be considered to be especially obsolete. In discussing the paradoxical phenomenon, “Exclusivism in Enlightenment,” we are faced with the old, yet new question, “Are religion and Enlightenment thought incompatible?” Or, to pose the question in other words: “Are religion and modern thought incompatible?”

Explanatory notes

1. Citations of Kant and Mendelssohn are taken from the Akademie-Ausgabe and the Jubiläums-Ausgabe editions, respectively. Volume and page numbers are given at the end of each citation. To avoid confusion with the Akademie-Ausgabe of Kant’s complete works, citations of Mendelssohn bear the notation “JubA.”

2. English translations of the citations from Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem and Kant’s Religion and Rational Theology and The Conflict of the Faculties are taken from the following published translations:
   The citations from works for which no published English translation is available are taken from previously published research papers.

3. The words given in brackets [ ] in citations have been added by the author to facilitate understanding.

Notes

1) The term “Exclusivism in Enlightenment” was first used by Jiro Mizushima as the title of his presentation at the 30th Conference of the Society for the History of Social Thought held in Okayama in 2005, “Arrival of the Age of ‘Exclusivism in Enlightenment?’: The New
Right and Anti-Immigration in the Netherlands” (The 30th Conference of the Society for the History of Social Thought, Okayama University, November 13, 2005). In writing this section, I was greatly inspired by his presentation and the reference materials distributed at the conference, for which I offer my sincere gratitude. Mizushima’s other papers I referred to are: “The Currents of the New Right in Japan and Europe: From ‘Hope’ at the End of the Century to ‘Anxiety’ at the Beginning of the Century?” *Seikatu Keizai Seisaku* (Economic Policy Institute for Quality Life), September 2002, No. 68; and “The Rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty and the Netherlands: the First Referendum in the modern history of the Netherlands.” *Seikatu Keizai Seisaku*, (Economic Policy Institute for Quality Life), September 2005, No. 104.

Masanori Naito, who has long been engaged in research on harmonious coexistence of Europe and Islam, uses the term “intolerance by freedom” in the same meaning as “Exclusivism in Enlightenment.” Using this term, Naito describes the recent situation in the Netherlands in which respect of free will is not used to promote tolerance to others, but is used as a rationale to allow intolerance by would-be liberals, whether consciously or unconsciously. For example, he points to the Liberal VVD Party of the Netherlands in “The Netherlands: Intolerance Because of Freedom – Rejection and Emergence of Immigrants and Refugees” (in Japanese) (Asahi Shimbun Newspaper evening edition, June 5, 2006, p. 4). See also Naito, Masanori, *Age of Islam War: How We Can Break the Chains of Violence* (in Japanese) (Japan Broadcast Publishing), 2006.


8) As mentioned above, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* does not treat the issue of tolerance to Jews as a main theme. However, it can be easily imagined that the interactions between Locke and local Jewish people during his exile in the Netherlands greatly helped him to develop an open-minded attitude toward them.

9) *John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus*, p. 51.

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12) Ibid., pp. 86-87.
13) Ibid., pp. 87-88.
17) Taking socio-historical context into consideration, it was inevitable that Mendelssohn based his discussion on the theory of natural law. In this sense, the criticism against Mendelssohn's Enlightenment thought for its dependence on the theory of natural law may be considered to lack an overall perspective. Such critics include Johann Georg Hamann, active in Mendelssohn's time, and more recently, Isaiah Berlin.
20) Ibid., p. 473.
24) Ibid., p. 45.
26) Ibid., p. 97.
27) Ibid., p. 138.
28) Ibid.
32) Kant, Immanuel. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, p. 95.