PROCEEDINGS of
**The Third International Symposium
on Jewish Studies**

Judaism in Modern Era
Interpretative Studies of Ancient and Current Texts
—— Edited by Ada Taggar Cohen

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The Third International Symposium on Jewish Studies

Judaism in Modern Era
Interpretative Studies of Ancient and Current Texts

Held on August 19th 2018
At the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Organized in collaboration with
The Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (CISMOR),
The Faculty of Theology, Doshisha University, Kyoto
and
The Faculty of Humanities, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Edited by Ada Taggar Cohen

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Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions
（**CISMOR**）

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Introduction

The development of Jewish Studies over the last decades is quite amazing. In many universities in North America and Canada, not to speak of European countries and even East Europe, we find programs dedicated to the study of Judaism in different periods of its history.[1] In this regard Japan is lagging behind and Jewish Studies have not yet reached the universities shores in general.[2] The only university in Japan that houses a vibrant research center as well as an active program on Jewish Studies is Doshisha University in Kyoto.

At Doshisha University we have been fortunate in being able to open a program on Jewish Studies at the School of Theology, which has been developing and prospering for the last fifteen years of its existence, creating a welcoming atmosphere for young scholars some of whom have contributed to this volume.[3] In the years since the establishment of the program and the start of the CISMOR research center, academic exchanges between Doshisha University's School of Theology and The Hebrew University's Faculty of Humanities have enabled us to exchange scholars as well as hold joint conferences and workshops. This volume of articles is the third to be published and the outcome of a symposium on Jewish Studies in historical perspective.

This volume contains the majority of the papers presented at the symposium held in Jerusalem on August 19th 2018. Unfortunately, four participants were unable to submit their papers. The participants came from Japan and the USA and joined the Israeli scholars, with whom the first symposium was held in 2011. They include well-established scholars as well as young researchers still in the final stages of their doctoral degree.

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[1] For North America see Judith Baskin "Jewish Studies in North American Colleges and Universities: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* 32.4 (Summer, 2014), 9-26. For Europe see the website of EAJS (=European Association of Jewish Studies), which offers information on institutions and scholars in the field of Jewish Studies URL: https://www.eurojewishstudies.org/directory/advanced-search/?type=institution (Feb. 5th, 2019).

[2] In Asia, China has been showing a leap in that direction with Prof. Xu Xin the leading scholar of Judaic studies at the center and program of studies at Nanjing University. Also see the summary of Sino-Judaic Institute URL: http://www.sino-judaic.org/index.php?page=jewish_studies_situation (Feb. 5th, 2019).

[3] Speaking of Jewish Studies in Japan in general, a new association of Jewish Studies was established in Kyoto of which participants in the symposium from Japan, are all members: *The Kyoto Association of Jewish Thought* (established 2009 in Kyoto). Prof. Masato Goda is its current president. URL: https://sites.google.com/site/kyotojewish/en (Feb. 5th, 2019).

The articles range from research on the Hebrew Bible, through medieval Jewish scholarship and up to contemporary interpretations of Jewish thought. The methodological approaches are also varied: comparative religion, linguistic textual readings, philosophical interpretations as well as the historical study of modern political Judaism. These all however come under the discipline of Jewish Studies, even if in other contexts they may very well belong to other disciplines. Jewish Studies today is clearly an interdisciplinary field of research.

In this volume I have chosen to divide the articles into five parts, not on a chronological basis but rather by proximity of topic, and period of writers discussed.

Part I: I chose to start with the article of Paul Mendes-Flohr, who wrote on the beginning of Jewish Studies in Germany, and the academic approach to the cultural heritage of the Jews, known as *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. Being a secular study, it enabled non-Jewish scholars in many languages to engage in this field. Its development from the 19th century study of mainly biblical interpretation, shifted to focusing on Judaism as a "living faith". It is thus today, according to him, divided into two disciplines, one of "History of Judaism" and the other, "Jewish Studies". Mendes-Flohr then leaves us at the end of his discussion with questions regarding the future of Jewish Studies. The second article, by David Cohen, offers a philosophical approach to the concept of the creation through the study of the writings of Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik, an American Jewish Orthodox scholar. Cohen discloses the universal essence of biblical ethics in Soloveitchik's exploration of the creation in Genesis. Thus he shows how philosophical interpretations enable Jewish sources to be understood as part of universal ethics.

Part II includes three articles. The first, by Zev Harvey, looks at similar attitudes to the development of the Hebrew language of two Jewish intellectuals, separated by more than eight centuries: Mimonides and Ḥayyim Naḥman Bialik. Both these great intellectuals and interpreters of Jewish cultural assets, chose to give precedence to the usage of the Hebrew language by native speakers. The second paper by Ada Taggar Cohen takes the two cultures of the ancient Israelites in the Hebrew Bible (historically existed in the first part of the first millennium), and the culture of the Hittites (historically existed more than half a century

earlier). This article offers a glance at the concept of holiness in these two cultures and how that concept shaped their social understanding. The third article, by Tetsu Kitamura, consists of a study discussing the fact that the second name of Jerusalem, "Zion", the most important city for the prophet Ezekiel, is not used by him. Kitamura suggests an explanation based on his understanding of the prophet's denial of the theological concept of Zion as the future domain and abode of the seed of the house of David.

Part **III** comprises two articles of philosophical discussions that treat two different kinds of Jewish texts. The first article, by Joel Swanson, puts to the test a modern conceptual dichotomy posed by the philosopher Stéphane Mosès, who distinguishes 'normative modernity' from 'critical modernity'. Studying interpretations of Psalm 115 by two modern Jewish writers, the philosopher Franz Rosenzweig, who interpreted the text as a universal message, and the Yiddish poet Jacob Glatstein, who offers an ethnocentric interpretation of the text centered on Jewish reality after the Holocaust, Swanson suggests in a thorough discussion, that caution is required regarding the above two strict dichotomies. The second article, by Tzvi Schoenberg, discusses the concept of language in early Hasidism, by studying the use of language in *Maggid Devarav le-Ya'akov* by Rabbi Dov Ber, the Maggid of Miedzyrzec. Schoenberg points specifically to the Maggid's theology through studying the Maggid's perception of the Hebrew terms *yesh* and *ayin*. He argues that "within the Maggid's entire corpus of teachings, even the speech of everyday life, if spoken with the proper intentionality, can participate in the ontological constitution of the differentiated world, and can connect this fallen world to the undifferentiated state." Thus *ayin* is not defined in opposition to human language, but as "in-between" in all human speech.

Part **IV** includes two articles regarding the study of the work of the philosopher Martin Buber. The first one, by Fumio Ono, offers an interpretation of Buber's "anarchism" in light of Buber's encounter with revolutionary ideas. He asserts that "Buber inherited anarchist thought from mysticism, socialism, and communism," and thus suggests that anarchist elements in Buber's thinking are "a hidden communication between socialism/communism and *I-Thou.*" The second article, by Kotaro Hiraoka, looks at the way Martin Buber has been influenced by the reading of the "Testament of the Ba'al Shem-Tov," in understanding

"Jewish Renaissance", where he finds a verbal form hinting to the way Buber started his interpretation of the idea of "holiness".

Part V consists of two articles, the only connection between them is their being relate to modern Jewish Studies. The first article, by Anri Ishiguro, looks at the acceptance of Zionism in the United States during the last part of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries, among Reform Movement leaders. While presenting the way Reform Judaism in America rejected the idea of Zionism for American Jews, she indicates how that was interpreted regarding the idea of modern Judaism in general. Using Kaufmann Kohler's progressive ideas, Ishiguro shows the ambiguity of the concept of modernity for him, by also pointing to his attitude toward modern Jewish women. The volume closes with the paper by Masato Goda, who for many years has been translating the French philosopher Levinas and other French Jewish philosophers, into Japanese. His paper reveals the way Jewish French philosophers reacted to the work of their colleagues on modern philosophy while adhering to the earlier Jewish philosopher Spinoza.

The main reason for closing with these two articles, is that they are evidence for what was said in the opening article by Mendes-Flohr. The field of research of Jewish Studies is a secular one that opened the Jewish heritage to diverse scholars in many languages around the world.

The volume ends with the list of contributors' affiliations, the original symposium's list of participants, together with a photo of the participants that was taken at the end of the symposium. Last is attached the poster of the symposium's program.

Ada Taggar Cohen, Editor
Kyoto, February, 2019

Opening Words to the Symposium Delivered on August 19, 2018

Ada Taggar Cohen
Director of CISMOR, Graduate School of Theology
Doshisha University

Dear Colleagues and Friends,

I am really happy to greet you all, coming from Japan, the USA and Israel to take part in this third occasion of the symposium on Jewish Studies held in cooperation between the Hebrew University and Doshisha. I regret not being able to be with you this time, but since I hope we will continue this symposium as a future "tradition", I hope to be with you on the following occasion.

The academic agreement between the faculties of the two universities including CISMOR, was upgraded into a full-flagged agreement between the two universities in 2009, and since then a large number of activities including visits of scholars in both directions took place. At this stage an additional students' exchange agreement is being prepared between the two universities, and I was actually supposed to pick up the copies for signature at Doshisha. But this time the copies will have to travel by airmail I suppose.

Our symposium today is covering different areas of Jewish Studies, starting with the biblical texts and reaching our modern times. The division of the sessions was made with consideration of periods defined in academic research, although I am not sure whether it will indeed be so. I am sure, though, that all papers will be interesting and illuminating, and that reading them after publication will be a great pleasure to all.

I wish to thank first and foremost our colleagues and great friends Prof. Paul Mendes-Flohr and Prof. Zev Harvey for their cooperation in organizing this symposium, and for inviting the participants from the Hebrew University and Chicago University; more so to Prof. Uzi Rebhun, Vice Dean of the Humanities, who is by now a good friend, for enabling and supporting the organization of the day, hosting us at the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry. I deeply thank Dr. Kotaro Hiraoka, who invited and organized the participation of the scholars from Japan in the symposium today.

May I wish you all an interesting and enjoyable day.

Uzi Rebhun
Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Humanities
Shlomo Argov Chair in Israel-Diaspora Relations
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

It is a great honor for me to welcome you to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This is the oldest university in Israel. In fact, our university was established many years before statehood. In 2018, we celebrated the centennial of the laying of the foundation stones of this academic institution, which was formally opened in 1925. The festive cornerstone-laying ceremony was attended by key figures of the British Mandate Government that ruled Palestine at that time, including Lord Balfour and Herbert Samuel (the High Commissioner of Palestine), as well as leaders of world Jewry such as Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who would become Israel's first president.

The idea of establishing a Hebrew university in the Land of Israel was central in Zionism, the Jewish national movement. It was intended to be a symbol of Jewish redemption in its historical homeland. Ever since, the university has struggled to find the appropriate equilibrium between being a leading research institute of the highest order and fulfilling a responsibility and concern for the needs of Jews, the land, and the city of Jerusalem. At the same time, it also sought to serve as a solution for many young Jews who were rejected, because of their Jewishness, for enrollment in many universities across the European continent. These aspirations were decisively expressed in the speech delivered by Weizmann in 1918 at the cornerstone-laying ceremony on July 24, 1918:

> "The University…is to teach everything the mind of men embraces…a modern university is not only to produce highly trained professional men but to give ample opportunity to those capable of and ready to devote themselves to scientific research…our university will thus become the home of those hundreds of talent young Jews, in whom the spirit for learning and critical enquiry, have been engrained by heredity throughout ages, and who in the great multitude of cases, are at present compelled to satisfy this their burning need, amid unjewish, very often unfriendly surroundings.… The claim that the University should be a Hebrew one, rests upon the values the Jews have transmitted to the world from this land… The Hebrew University while trying to maintain the highest scientific level

must in the same time be rendered accessible to all classes of the people....".[1]

From its beginnings, the Hebrew University has given Jewish studies a pivotal position. The scientific research and teaching in various fields such as Bible, Jewish history, Jewish thought, and Hebrew literature has made the university a world center in these fields. Here in Jerusalem, scholars have developed new innovating schools of thought that have accompanied Jewish research to this day. Over the years, many world-renowned scholars have joined the Hebrew University, many having immigrated from Europe before and after World War II, as well as from the United States. Their students would become the university's core faculty in Jewish studies. The Hebrew University, along with its many unique libraries and archives, has become a magnet for scholars in Jewish studies from around the globe. As part of the University's recent efforts to strengthen its international relations, including those with the Far East, we cherish our ongoing collaboration with Doshisha University of Kyoto, Japan, and are grateful for the achievement of holding the Third Symposium on Jewish Studies, focusing today on "Judaism in Modern Era—Interpretative Studies of Ancient and Current Texts."

I wish you most fruitful and stimulating discussions.

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[1] Benjamin Z. Kedar, "Laying the Foundation Stones of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 24th July, 1918," in *The History of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem* (Eds. Shaul Katz and Michael Heyd; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000), 110-119.

The Academic Study of Judaism in Historical Perspective

Paul Mendes-Flohr

From its modest beginnings in Berlin in 1819, *Wissenschaft des Judentums* has burgeoned into a scholarly field of study pursued by a vast cadre of scholars. Now constituting a global community, these scholars continue to draw their inspiration from the determined pioneers of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany. Beyond setting the highest standards of philological and historiographical research, German *Wissenschaft des Judentums* had a seminal role in creating a modern Jewish discourse in which cultural memory, bearing the stamp of historical scholarship, supplements traditional Jewish learning. The secular character of the academic study of Judaism initially pursued in German and subsequently in other vernacular languages (e.g., French, Dutch, Italian, Hebrew, Russian, Spanish, Yiddish – and now even Japanese), greatly facilitated exchange with non-Jewish scholars, and thereby encouraging mutual understanding and respect. Indeed, one of the overarching objectives of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* was to demonstrate that not only the Hebrew Bible but also post-biblical Judaism and Jewry played a vital role in the shaping of European culture. Hence, the Jews sought political emancipation and integration into the social and cultural life of Europe not as alien, "Asiatic" interlopers, but rather by virtue of their ramified contributions to Europe's spiritual patrimony. Hence, the votaries of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* argued, that the study of Judaism should be granted an honored place in the curriculum of a modern, educated individual. Accordingly, in the preface to his monograph of 1832 on the history of Jewish homiletic literature — Leopold Zunz (1794-1886) appealed to the German universities to embrace the academic study of Judaism: "If emancipation and scholarship are not to be mere words, not some tawdry bit of fancy goods for sale, but the fountainhead of morality which we have found again after a long period of wandering in the wilderness, then they must fecundate institutions – high ranking educational institutions."[1]   The cause of Jewish scholarship

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[1] Leopold Zunz, *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden, historisch entwickelt* (Berlin: A. Asher, 1832), ix.

and emancipation thus went hand and hand. In this regard, Jewish Studies – as the luminaries of nineteenth-century *Wissenschaft des Judentums* adamantly insisted – should not be relegated to the particular intellectual and theological interests of the Jewish community or assigned to what in the United States is called "ethnic studies."

The critical historical study of post-biblical Jewish literature, particularly the sacred texts of rabbinic Judaism was the hallmark of the founding generation of *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. They thereby sought to herald the integration of Jews into the modern cognitive landscape marked by the concept of *Wissenschaft* – the assumption that scientific, objective criteria should be applied to examine all cultural phenomena, including religious literature. In doing so, Leopold Zunz and his colleagues implicitly promoted a radical transformation of Jewish self-understanding. Historical knowledge would perforce entail critical reflections on Jewish tradition, the theological presuppositions of its sacred texts and religious practices. The attendant epistemological and existential challenge posed by historical scholarship was eloquently anticipated by Moses Mendelssohn when he addressed in his defense of Judaism as a revealed religion, *Jerusalem* (1783), the question raised by his friend Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781): To what kind of certainty does religious belief belong? Is it to be classified with the meta-historical, timeless truths of reason or the accidental "truths" of history? As Lessing famously put the issue:

> Contingent historical truths can never serve as proof for necessary truths of reason […] To jump from that historical truth [of Christ's resurrection] to an entirely different class of truths is to ask me to alter all my metaphysical and moral concepts accordingly […] This is the ugly, wide ditch over which I cannot leap however often and earnestly I try.[2]

Like Lessing, Mendelssohn understood this "ugly, wide ditch" (*der garstige breite Graben*) to constitute not just an epistemological quandary but also a theological challenge of far-reaching existential significance. How was he to reconcile his abiding fidelity to the Torah as the revealed, timeless truth of God's Word, and his commitment to rational, enlightened culture? *Wissenschaft des Judentums* served to deepen Lessing's ditch.

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[2] G. E. Lessing, "Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft," in: G. E. Lessing, *Schriften*, eds. Franz Lachmann and Franz Muncker (vol. XIII; Stuttgart: G. J. Göschen, 1886–1924), 5 ff.

The scholarly interest of nineteenth-century *Wissenschaft des Judentums* was, on the whole, limited to the study of biblical and post-biblical religious literature. Although there were notable exceptions – as attested to by the multi-volume works on the history of the Jews by Isaac Marcus Jost (1793–1860) and Heinrich Graetz (1817–1891) – the thematic and thus disciplinary scope of modern Jewish scholarship was comprehensively expanded with the emergence of the Zionist movement at the fin-de-siècle. On the pages of the November 1901 issue of *Die Welt*, the official organ of the World Zionist Movement, the twenty-three-year-old Martin Buber (1878-1965) issued a passionate call to revise the scholarly agenda of "*Jüdische Wissenschaft*." In consonance with the Zionist attention to the contemporary needs of the Jews as a people, he held, Jewish scholarship should address a broad range of secular subjects such as the anthropology, demography, economics, and folklore of the Jewish people. Indeed, every aspect of Jewish life and civilization were to be studied: "First in knowing what one loves. Second in investigating the exigent needs of our people […]."[3] The disciplinary and ideological transformation of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* was not solely the urgent concern of Zionists, however. Even anti-Zionist German Jews acknowledged the need to redirect *Wissenschaft des Judentums* to focus on Judaism as a "living faith." Led by the likes of the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), a liberal advocate of the spiritual renewal of Judaism, held that this objective required a rejection of the methodological perspective that had hitherto informed the scholarly study of Judaism. Adhering to the then regnant model of historiographical study, the founding generations of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* would study Jewish philosophy and rabbinic literature in light of the specific temporal and cultural context in which they took shape. Nineteenth-century *Wissenschaft des Judentums* thus perforce subscribed to an antiquarian bias that the texts one studied belong to the past. This presupposition, which has come to be known as historicism, deeply troubled Zionists and liberal Jews alike.

Both the Zionists and Liberals were bent on sponsoring a Jewish Renaissance, buoyed by pedagogical and cultural programs to inspire a renewal of Jewish literacy and spiritual life. By its alignment with the envisioned renaissance, it was hoped that Jewish Studies would overcome the seemingly inherent relativism of its historical methods. Indeed, Jewish Studies was to play a decisive role in the German Jewish Renaissance. In the early years of Nazi Germany, Jewish Studies was to gain a particular significance. In those dark years, the dissemination and the organized study of works of Jewish Studies

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[3] Martin Buber, "Jüdische Wissenschaft," *Die Welt* 45 (1901): 2.

served to strengthen Jewish self-esteem and communal solidarity.

As noted in the aforementioned article by the young Martin Buber, the twentieth-century was inaugurated by a radical break with the apologetic impulse that informed the thematic and methodological purview of *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. With the ever increasingly pressing political and social distress of European Jewry, Zionists and Jewish socialists urged that scholarly attention be accored to all aspects of the quotidian realities of the Jewish people. The project launched by Zunz and his colleagues was no longer confined to philological disciplines but now embraced multiple disciplines and scholarly agendas. The shift is reflected in the contemporary distinction between the History of Judaism and Jewish studies, a disciplinary divide that in Germany is referred to as *Judaistik* and *Jüdische Studien* respectively. Accordingly, it is now said that the academic study of Judaism and Jewish civilization is not a discipline but a field of study, which entails multiple disciplines and diverse methodological considerations. These distinctions became more rigorously pronounced with the incorporation of the field into the formal curriculum of the universities – which was with few exceptions denied *Wissenschaft des Judentums* prior to the Second World War and the Shoah. Within the institutional setting of the university, the study of Judaism and Jewish civilization partake in the regnant disciplinary and methodological discourse regarding the challenge of feminism, postcolonial hermeneutics et cetera.

Increasingly, the academic study of Judaism has been called upon to address the overarching question of the shifting Jewish conceptions of what the ancient Greeks proudly called *paideia* – education – as molding the ideal member of the polis and of sharing the community's ideal of "the beautiful and good" (*kalos kagathos*). What does it mean to be an educated citizen of the modern, post-Enlightenment Jewish community? What are the values and worldviews that constitute an educated Jew? Who are now the agents and exemplars of Judaism's paideia, the *talmid chacham* or the historian, the rabbinic sage or the professor? Are they parallel or competing *Vorbilder*? Are they simply alternative, divergent exemplars of Jewish memory and practice? Can the two, dwell side-by-side, alternating reconcilable modes of Jewish expression? Or is there an irreconcilable cognitive and axiological conflict between them? As Gabriel Motzkin has observed, "the invention" of critical historiography entailed "the reinvention of memory." Is the divide between the historian's construction of memory and religious memory unbridgeable? Can *Wissenschaft des Judentums* but only deepen Lessing's "wide, ugly ditch"? Or perhaps the ditch could simply be circumvented by the creation of a new cultural memory that could accommodate the spiritual and intellectual sensibilities of

both religious and secular Jews.

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A World Founded on Chesed:
The Source and Content of the Ethical-Halachic Life
"עולם חסד יבנה" (Psalms 89:3)

David J. Leitner Cohen

1 Introduction

Throughout his writings Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik uses and discusses terms including "ethics," "morality," "Halachic morality" and "ethical norms." While each of these terms deserve a closer look, and sometimes used interchangeably, in this paper I will disentangle the *source* of ethics as contrasted with the *content* of ethics in Soloveitchik's thought. I argue that while these two things can be compatible with one another, this is not always the case when working within a Halachic framework. The universal nature of ethics demands that we at least attempt to understand the relation between the particularity of Halachah and the generalizability of ethics.

In what follows I will examine Soloveitchik's use of ethics in two ways. I will first ask if ethics can be compatible with Halachah and examine Soloveitchik's account of the Creation and its moral implications in order to reach an understanding about the gap between the source of ethics and the content of ethics.[1] This will illustrate the universality of ethics as being compatible with Halachah. From there I turn to Soloveitchik's reading of the *Guide to the perplexed* where I show that for Soloveitchik, there are particular ethical actions that are derived from a specific covenant with the divine, *Torah* as ethical-content giving.[2]

2 Universal Revelation as an Ethical Binder

Throughout his writings, Soloveitchik alludes many times and in various forms to the account of the creation of Adam and Eve in Genesis 1 and 2. While this account seems to

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[1] Joseph B. Soloveitchik, *Family Redeemed: Essays On Family Relationships*, ed. by David Shatz, and Joel B. Wolowelsky (New York: Toras HoRav Foundation, 2000).

[2] Joseph B. Soloveitchik, *Maimonides: Between Philosophy and Halachah: Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's Lectures on the Guide of the Perplexed*, ed. by Lawrence J. Kaplan with Foreword by Dov Schwartz (Brooklyn: Ktav; Jerusalem:Urim Publications, 2016).

derive from his familiarity with the dialectic theological movement of the 1920's, Soloveitchik gives a Jewish interpretation to this account.[3] In a specific analysis of these accounts, Soloveitchik concludes that the difference between the two accounts is due to Adam's transformation from *homo-natura* to *homo-persona*.[4] This transformation bears ethical consequences. While Adam and Eve are still created in *Imago Dei* or *Tzelem Elohim* – "the image of God" – it is God's direct commandment which obliges them to an ethical life (Genesis 2:16), not the essential nature of their being. In this section I will show how the source of ethics as derived from a divine commandment might outweigh the universality of the *homo-natura*, leading to a particular notion of obligatory ethics. By "particular obligatory ethics" I refer to Halachah, since it does not, I argue, oblige the *homo-natura*.

Genesis 1:26-30 describes, according to Soloveitchik the *homo-natura*. The human at this point is in a universal, natural state. He is part of nature, organic and unified with it. As Soloveitchik states:

> The first chapter of Genesis…is concerned mainly not with man, but with the cosmos, organic as well as inorganic… Torah mentions the creation of man since the latter is a part of the universe… man…is not outside the cosmos, not alien to nature...Man is a child of Mother Nature as is the brute and the beast….Indeed, the naturalistic formula of man – the conception of the human being as part of nature – was a truism among *Chazal*.[5]

The naturalness of man is a Jewish philosophical premise according to Soloveitchik. However, while man in that state is still created in *Imago Dei*, he is not yet capable of practicing *Imitatio Dei*, which is a central theme for Soloveitchik because:

> Natural man is contrasted with God, the former's transient existence with the eternity and omnipotence of the Creator.[6]

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[3] See David J. Cohen, "Between the Sacred and the Profane: Jewish Dialectics in Soloveitchik's writings and Dialectic Theology," in *Judaica Petropolitana* 7 (2017), 34-49.

[4] Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "Adam and Eve" in *Family Redeemed: Essays on Family Relationships*, pp. 11-14.

[5] Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "Adam and Eve" in *Family Redeemed: Essays on Family Relationships*, p. 6.

[6] Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "Adam and Eve" in *Family Redeemed: Essays on Family Relationships*, p. 7.

Imitatio Dei for Soloveitchik is the core of ethics and when one lives ethically, she walks in the ways of God and imitates His ways. Though this does not follow directly from the quote above, Soloveitchik adds towards the end of that section:

> Perhaps the central norm in our ethical system is related to *Imago Dei*… it is up to man to either realize or shake off the *Imago Dei.*[7]

So, while they have the capability to live ethically, in the natural world, they do not yet have the Divine imperative and urge to do so. This is because:

> …man and woman of whom chapter one speaks have not made as yet the momentous decision to turn a non-reflective, indistinctive existence into a self-conscious one.[8]

Man and woman, as described in the first chapter of Genesis, still require the properties to live and think ethically beyond their obligation to the natural world. In order to become self-conscious, they must no longer live as one with nature, and must enter into a self-reflective existence. This renders clear Soloveitchik's paradoxical assertion that the most ethical form of existence is man's egocentrism.[9] That is, only when one is capable of thinking outside of oneself, in a reflective mode, she is than able to truly attune to the Divine, mimicking the Divine through an egocentric modality. This is the same Divine mode which sparked the overflow of *Chesed*, resulting in the act of Creation.

What I like to emphasis about the *homo-natura* is, that for Soloveitchik, while there is an inherent ethical capability emerging from man's *Imago Dei*, he is not yet able to be obliged – this will require a transformation. I am not arguing that man is not an ethical being, but rather, that the source of the ethical commandment, the Divine Imperative, adds something more to *Imitatio Dei*. The concept of *Imitatio Dei*, while central, envelopes the potentiality of being, for he is "involved in the process of realization, in whom the element of distinctiveness is about to become reality."[10]

I argue that in order for the *Imago Dei* to be manifested, into an actual ethical

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "Adam and Eve" in *Family Redeemed: Essays on Family Relationships*, pp. 7-8.

[9] Joseph B. Soloveitchik, *Maimonides: Between Philosophy and Halachah*, pp. 200-202.

[10] Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "Adam and Eve" in *Family Redeemed: Essays on Family Relationships*, p. 8.

commitment of *Imitatio Dei*, man needs to "give birth to a *humanus*,"[11] a fully actualized human. This is the theme of Genesis chapter 2, where God calls to man and commands. The source of the ethical is found there.

Chapter 2 of Genesis opens with a summary of the creation of the natural world. "Eleheh toledot haShamaim veHaAretz beHibaraam" (Genesis 2:4, "This is the account of the heavens and earth as they were created"). But soon after, we realize a difference in the way Scripture refers to the Creator of this world. Soloveitchik points to the fact that in chapter 1, God was referred to as "Elohim," and chapter 2 adds another name: "YHWH," the tetragrammaton. The name "Elohim" corresponds well with Soloveitchik description of man in chapter 1, referring to him as *homo-natura*.

Indeed, man is part of nature and God is the might of the entirety of creation. "Elohim" conveys the notion of power, raw and natural. Alluding back to man still being created in *Imago Dei*, it is interesting that Soloveitchik speaks of the nature of that same God: "the image of Elokim is found in the grandeur and might of the cosmic drama; the sanctuary of Elokim is nature."[12] The *homo-natura* corresponds to this image of God. This all changes with the appearance of the tetragrammaton. Soloveitchik understands that through the name YHWH, God communicates directly with man, not through nature. Man no longer relates to God in a non-personal way, he becomes an "I," manifesting as a *persona*. Chapter 2 is then concerned with man rebelling against nature, attempting to find and gain his individuality. Into this existential void God enters and commands him, placing upon him the duties of ethics.

Note that chapter 2 does not refer to God solely as "YHWH," but continues to use the name "Elohim." The combination of "YHWH Elohim" reinforces my argument that the *homo-persona* does not cancel the *homo-natura*, but rather adds to it. Man is still part of nature, but he has a vocation, a calling from God – ethics. Ethics construes the form of Adam's beingness in the world. If, in the primal state, Adam as part of nature strove to know and to understand and to make the most of his life before death, once he becomes a reflective Being, man finds his meaning in an ethical calling. I think this is the meaning of the primal *Imago Dei*, which even the homo–*natura* possesses, the urge to beat death and to know – immortality and omniscience, second only to God for "'Ani 'amarti, Elohim 'atem, ubénei Elyon kulchem" "אֲנִי אָמַרְתִּי אֱלֹהִים אַתֶּם וּבְנֵי עֶלְיוֹן כֻּלְּכֶם" (Pslams

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Joseph B. Soloveitchik. "Adam and Eve" in *Family Redeemed: Essays on Family Relationships*, p. 9. (The spelling Elokim is a Jewish Orthodox way to avoid writing or pronouncing the name of God).

82:6) "I have taken you for divine beings, sons of the most High, all of you" (JPS, 2014).While Soloveitchik does not say this explicitly, I argue that the ethical is actualized because of its source, the Divine.

The *homo-persona* is transformed by God's calling to him in the form of "VaYetazv YHWH Elohim," "and God commanded" (Genesis 2:16). This contrasts with the form seen earlier in Genesis, "Vayomer Elohim" ("and God said"). A simple act of utterance grants ontological validity to the world, but Adam needs something more; his existential crisis is not solved through the *onto*, but rather when given concrete substance, in the form of ethics into already beingness in *Imago Dei*. The direct Divine call compels Adam and Eve to live in accordance to a "Divine imperative."[13] Hence the source of the ethical is not only *Imago Dei*, but also the *Imitatio Dei*, set upon them when God commanded them.

In this section I have shown that while man has a universal-general disposition to ethics, he is not completed with this natural-universal form. A closer reading of Soloveitchik's account of the Creation shows his understanding that one needs an imperative to lead man away from a mere ontological existence. A direct Divine command compels man to live and think ethically and self-reflectively, a form that did not exist naturally in the beginning. Can this Divine imperative be what the particular commandments of Halachah demand? I will examine this question in the next section.

3   Covenantal Ethics and Particular Halachic Actions

Soloveitchik, in his reading of Maimonides' *Guide to the Perplexed*, presents a narrated interpretation to the *Guide*. He attempts to set Maimonides as an ethical thinker, while at the same time noting the discrepancies between his Halachic writings, the *Mishneh Torah*, and the *Guide*, which Soloveitchik posits as a more philosophical version of the *Mishneh Torah*'s theologically-minded content. In so doing, Soloveitchik homologizes between the *Guide* and the *Mishneh Torah*. That is, the *Guide* provides philosophical tools to naturally extrapolate ethical norms, and the *Mishneh Torah* provides concrete ethical actions.

Soloveitchik's reading of Maimonides, I argue, leads us to understanding that there are concrete ethical duties deriving from the *Torah*. For Soloveitchik, the source is the Divine, and the content encompasses all fields of life. Let us look at the three prophetic

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[13] Joseph B. Soloveitchik. "Adam and Eve," in *Family Redeemed: Essays on Family Relationships*, pp. 11-14.

stages; the first level is ethical-individual (or ethical-intellectual), second is the prophetic moment, and the third is the public-ethical (teaching level), compelling the prophet to go out into the world and share that knowledge as an **ethical** maxim. Thus, the *Guide* is a prerequisite to the *Mishneh Torah*, insofar as it teaches a scientific method to know God, hence the ability to love God, leading the potential prophet to want to live ethically as a result of this cycle of increased knowledge of the Divine. The *Mishneh Torah* then provides explicit instruction to assist her in carrying out her ethical desire, which already has a strong philosophical-theological foundation.

Philosophy and prophecy for Soloveitchik both stem from the desire to know God, but prophecy adds the ability to comprehend Him. Prophecy is the intellectual component of Halachah. The *Guide*'s moto, as Soloveitchik states "ויקרא בשם ה׳ אל עולם" is then not an act bound in a temporal event, but rather a call which compels the prophet once he reaches a certain level of understanding.

Ethics, as Soloveitchik understands it, seems to be the desired deriving force for the Jewish Halachic personal. Man has the capacity to look at the world and derive a desire to understand God. But his only available basis for this are God's attributes per Maimonides. Soloveitchik, strongly influenced by his reading of Maimonides, argues that one can know God through the world and that God is accessible, in contrast to the classic medieval view of divine knowledge as inaccessible. But there is a price to knowing God intellectually in this way – one is compelled to practice *Imitatio dei*, and live an ethical life in the form of Halachah. In his reading of the *Guide*, Soloveitchik thus asserts humanity's desire to know something beyond itself, just as we saw earlier in his account of the Creation – this time through his reading of the *Guide*. Both lead him to the same conclusion – that man possesses a divine imperative towards ethics.

Referring both to the account of the Creation and to Soloveitchik's reading of the *Guide*, the entire world (as seen through the *Torah*) is a world of ethics. We can find this notion expressed elsewhere within Jewish Scripture and thought, and attempt to extrapolate Soloveitchik's likely interpretations thereof.

Within Psalms, the world is described as " 'olam chesed yibaneh" ("a world founded on *chesed*", Psalms 89:3). The entire world works through and with *chesed*. *Chesed*, I argue, can be interchanged with "ethics" insomuch as both are all-encompassing ways of being. Just as ethics is a complete lifestyle. So, in Psalms *chesed* is the complete world – the world from which Soloveitchik sees ethics as being derived. Moreover, for Soloveitchik we might reasonably (yet hypothetically) extrapolate

that "אסתכל באורייתא וברא עלמא"[14] ("The Divine, Blessed be He, looked in the Torah and created the world") is not merely an obscure Midrashic teaching, but a call to an ethical command through looking and understanding the world God created. In this sense, the entire world is the Levinasian face of the other, where one assumes an ethical responsibility towards the other. Though first, as seen above, Adam must turn into an "I" to the divine "Thou." This is a reciprocal process: a human who sees the world desires knowledge of God, leading her to seek more. God than meets this person, granting her prophetic insight, which than at the highest level – such as Abraham and Moses – compels them to become a teacher of ethical norms and actions. The *Torah* is the ultimate product. Thus, while one lives according to ethical norms, they all derive from the *Torah*. This is the third stage of prophecy, teaching, considered to be the ultimate development of man's ethical development.

Looking back at the universal state of Adam before God's command to him in chapter 2, the first stage of prophecy can be equated with Adam in chapter 1. Man looks at the natural world, and seeks to *know*, but true knowledge beyond that of nature is ethical in content. The second prophetic stage is required for this: the prophetic-ecstatic, wherein God is revealed to the seeker of knowledge. We see this in His Self-revelation as "YHWH-Elohim." This offers man personal knowledge of God to which he can relate, but more so, it is an ethical call, enabling him, to practice *Imitatio Dei*. Why is a third stage of prophecy necessary? What could be beyond revelation of God and an ethical call to man? I argue that Soloveitchik's need to conceptualize a third stage stems from the impossibility of confining ethics to the inter-personal relationship with the Divine. A public is required, as we discovered earlier. Ethics are manifested through teaching (and continued personal praxis, of course), but only after man has connected fully with God – this is the egocentrism which Soloveitchik desires, as the fully developed stage of ethics.

Soloveitchik's simultaneous concern with the stages of prophecy in the *Guide* might not be coincidental. As discussed earlier, the second stage, the prophetic moment, is granted by the free will and *chesed* of God, endowing the prophet with true access to Divine understanding, leading her to the desire to teach – carrying the new ethical understanding to the public, in the form of *Torah*. In this understanding, the *Mishneh Torah* is itself a product of second-stage prophecy and represents an iteration of third-stage prophecy.

Referring back to the Zoharic quote, Soloveitchik, in his explication of ethics

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[14] *Zohar*, *Parashat Teruma*, (קס"א, א). Though Soloveitchik did not refer to this saying explicitly, I think it encompasses his general direction in commentary to the *Guide*.

through the *Torah*, reverses the saying "אסתכל באורייתא וברא עלמא." While God looks at the *Torah* and creates an ethical sustained world, man looks at the world and from it stems the *Torah* and an understanding of the Divine. He calls for one to look at the world and act ethically through this observation. According to Soloveitchik, when one acts ethically with the *Torah* as one's basis, one is driven to discover ethical truth in the form of Halachah.

4   Analysis and Conclusions

Throughout this paper I have explored the relationship between the source of ethics and the content of ethics according to Soloveitchik. Since the source of ethics – the Divine, and His creation, man – are universal, so too the content of ethics might be at times universal. Jewish ethics is therefore not necessarily constrained to Halachah alone, but might be compatible with other forms of philosophy that account for the universals which Halachah takes as its basis. Halacha, I argue, in the mode Soloveitchik describes it is a form of lifelong ethical and intellectual endeavor.

The *source* of ethics as discussed in this paper is of central importance to my conclusions. We can summarize two concluding points of analysis resulting from Soloveitchik's exploration of the Creation. Firstly, in Genesis 1, Adam has a general disposition towards ethics because of his creation in *Imago Dei*. This effectively means that Adam, before the covenant, could achieve living an ethical life, even without a Divine calling. However, this ability to act and live ethically, does something more according to Soloveitchik: *Imago Dei* leaves Adam with a yearning for knowledge. In turn, this search for knowledge and individuality ends in a reflexive and individual modality of life after God's commandment. Secondly, God personally commands and addresses Adam. This places on Adam a divine imperative to act ethically. Adam now knows *how* to be an ethical human because he is called to ethical action by an ethical Divine. He is imbued with the potential for full human, i.e. ethical, development.

This brings together both the form and content of the ethical into a new light. While Adam in the primal state, before God's direct calling, had some ethical-universal disposition, as he was part of nature, he did not yet have the full developmental scope. The *Torah* provides, per Soloveitchik, the Divine imperative as well as the ethical disposition and yearning for knowledge. Whether it begins with looking at nature, per the Maimonedian prophet and Adam before him, or with noticing God, or with engagement with the *Torah*, knowledge of the Divine teaches and compels the Jew to live ethically.

Thus, the source and content of the ethical merge through Halachah.

However, we must take into account that there are differences between the content of the ethical and the source. While in the context of Halachah they are equated, this is not the case in non-Halachic and/or non-Jewish systems. As seen in Soloveitchik's analysis of the account of the Creation, Adam was ethical before the divine imperative, but only as part of nature. That is to say that, Adam had a natural-ethical relationship with the world as nature, not a Divine particular system with legal implications. Was he less ethical than a Halachic person? I argue that within that context, he was not. Halachic ethical accountability requires a covenantal agreement: the *Torah*. The content of his ethical acts might have been limited, but only in comparison to what Halachah demands.

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Maimonides and Bialik on Spoken Hebrew

Zev Harvey

Maimonides (1138-1204) was a preeminent jurist, philosopher, and physician. He was not, however, a specialist in every imaginable scholarly discipline. Unlike Judah Halevi, Abraham ibn Ezra, and Spinoza, he was not very interested in grammar *per se*. Nonetheless, he did address himself to the nature of the Hebrew language on several occasions.

In his first major work, his *Commentary on the Mishnah*, written in Arabic and completed in Egypt in 1168 when he was 30, he discussed the nature of language in general and Hebrew in particular. Commenting on Mishnah *Terumot* 1:1, he addressed an old topic that has preoccupied contemporary linguists and in particular Hebrew linguists in Israel. What determines correct usage in a language – the science of grammar or the practice of native speakers?

The Mishnaic text under discussion concerns the laws of the heave offerings (*terumot*) in the Temple service. The word תרומה (*terumah* "heave offering, contribution"), derives from the root רום (*resh, vav, mem*), "to lift, raise, heave". The "ת" (*tav*) at the beginning of the word is not part of the root. However, the Rabbis, in *Terumot* 1:1 and elsewhere, commonly use the verb תָּרַם (*taram* "to offer a heave offering, to contribute″*), formed from the root *tav*, *resh*, *mem*, and thus turned the non-radical ת (*tav*) into a radical. *Terumot* 1:1 reads: "Five may not give a heave offering [לֹא יִתְרֹמוּ]," etc., where the verb *yitromu* is derived from the root תרמ (*tav, resh, mem*). Medieval grammarians criticized this usage, considering it incorrect. Hebrew does not know the root תרמ (*tav*, *resh*, *mem*), they insisted. If one wants to say in correct Hebrew "to offer a heave offering" or "to contribute," one should say לקח תרומה (*laqaḥ terumah* "took a *terumah*"; e.g., Exodus 25:2-3), נתן תרומה (*natan terumah* "gave a *terumah*"; e.g., Leviticus 7:32), or הרים תרומה (*herim terumah* "raised a *terumah*"; e.g., Numbers 18:19, 24, 26, 28).

The famed 10th-century Andalusian grammarian, Rabbi Menaḥem ben Saruq, criticized this Mishnaic usage. He asked sarcastically in the preface to his biblical dictionary, the *Maḥberet* ("the Composition"), written in Hebrew: "Can people who

know Hebrew אנשי הלשון (*anshe ha-lashon*) take the word תרומה (*terumah*) and make out of it a verb תרמתי (*taramti*)? Can one turn תחינה (*teḥinah* "supplication") into תחנתי (*taḥanti*), תקוה (*tiqvah* "hope") into תקותי (*taqavti*), תשובה (*teshubah* "return"] into תשבתי(*tashabti*), תקומה (*tequmah* "uprising") into תקמתי (*taqamti*), תנופה (*tenufah* "wave") into תנפתי (*tanafti*), or תאוה (*taʾavah* "lust") into תאותי (*taʾavti*)? Should not one rather say: הרימתי (*harimoti* "I lifted, raised, heaved, contributed"), חנותי (*ḥanoti* "I supplicated"), קויתי (*qivviti* "I hoped"), שבתי (*shabti* "I returned"), קמתי (*qamti* "I rose up"), הניפתי (*hanifoti* "I waved"), אִוִּיתי (*ivviti* "I lusted")?!" The Rabbis in the Mishnah, concludes the grammarian, used ungrammatical Hebrew.[1]

Maimonides rejected this argument. In his Commentary on *Terumot* 1:1, he writes: "They [i.e, the Rabbis] say throughout the Mishnah: *taram, torem,* and *yitrom* ["he offered, offers, and will offer a heave offering"]. Latter-day grammarians [*ahl al-lughah*] criticize this usage. They say that the root [*al-aṣl*] is: *herim, marim,* and *yarim*." In other words, according to the latter-day grammarians, one does not say *yitrom terumah* but *yarim terumah*. This, they argue, is correct grammar as attested in the Bible (e.g., Numbers 18:19, 24, 26, 28). How can Maimonides defend the Mishnaic Rabbis against the Bible?

Maimonides replies unhesitatingly. "This is not truly a difficulty for the principle [or 'root': *al-aṣl*] in every language is what the speakers of that language spoke… The Rabbis of the Mishnah were definitely Hebrew speakers living in their land, that is, *al-shām* [= the Land of Israel and its vicinity], and they were reported as using the verb *taram* and its conjugated forms. This is proof [*dalīl*] that this usage is possible in the language, and the term is a Hebrew term. In this way shall you reply to those latter-day critics who think that the language of the Mishnah is not pure, and that [the Rabbis] made up incorrect verbs from sundry words. The principle of which I have informed you is firmly established among the perfect scholars [*al-ʿulumāʾ al-kāmilīn*] who speak of universal matters pertaining to language in general [i.e., all languages; *al-lughāt kuluhā*]."[2]

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[1] Menaḥem ben Saruq, *Maḥberet Menaḥem*, H. P. Filipowski (ed,) (London: Hebrew Antiquarian Society, 1854), 12; A. Sáenz-Badillos (ed.) (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1986), 20.

[2] Maimonides, *Perush ha-Mishnah*, Arabic text and Hebrew translation, ed., J. Qafiḥ (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1963), *Terumot* 1:1, 269. It is not clear if Maimonides considered biblical and Mishnaic Hebrew to be the same language. He explained that he decided to write his *Mishneh Torah* in Mishnaic Hebrew (*lughat al-mishnah*), not biblical Hebrew (*lisān kutub al-tanzīl*), since the latter has become today too "constricting" (*taḍīqu*) for adequate legal exposition (*Sefer ha-Miṣvot*, Arabic text and Hebrew translation, ed., J. Qafiḥ (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1971), introduction, 2).

Maimonides makes clear that he is not arguing with the Bible, but with "latter-day" authors. The principle is clear: with regard to any language, the usage of native speakers in their land is the criterion of correctness.

The great modern Hebrew poet, Ḥayyim Naḥman Bialik (1873-1934), in a Hebrew lecture delivered in Odessa in 1918, praised Maimonides' defense of the Mishnaic rabbis, and summed it up as follows: "Grammar determines its laws according to speech [הדקדוק קובע את חֻקיו על פי הדבור (*ha-diqduq qobeaʿ et huqqav ʿal pi ha-dibbur*)] and not the contrary." Referring to the Mishnaic derivation of *taram* from *terumah*, Bialik writes: "Only in a living language, a spoken language, is there room for such words, which have no justification in the [historical] language. The living language turns an appendage into a root, and the neighbor becomes the landlord."[3] The living spoken language takes the ת (*tav*) of תרומה (*termuah*), which was not part of the original root (רום), and magically upgrades it into the initial letter of the new root: תרמ. The ת (*tav*) is metamorphosed from an appendage into a root, from a neighbor into a landlord.

Returning to Maimonides' comments, one may ask: who are the "perfect scholars" he mentions? I do not know. I suspect that his "principle" that correctness in language is determined by the usage of native speakers is to some extent indebted to Sibawayhi (760-796), who insisted that correct Arabic usage is determined by *al-ʿarab*, the genuine or authentic native speakers of Arabic.[4] However, Sibawayhi was an Arabic grammarian, much as Menaḥem ben Saruq was a Hebrew grammarian. He was not one of the "perfect scholars" who speak about "all languages." Thus, it seems more likely that Maimonides had primarily in mind the views of a philosopher of language, like Alfarabi (872-950), although I am not at present able to identify the text he may have had in mind.[5]

Maimonides' view about correctness in language is extraordinary. Medieval Arabic authors, including both Sibawayhi and Alfarabi, typically held that the test of correctness is not the *native* speaker but the *unadulterated* or *uncontaminated* native speaker. The

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[3] Bialik, "ʿAl ha-Piyyuṭ," ed. R. Shiniak, *Peʿamim* 119 (2009): 65.

[4] See Aryeh Levin, *Arabic Linguistic Thought and Dialectology* (Jerusalem: Institute of Asian and African Studies, 1998), 204-243.

[5] On Maimonides' philosophy of language and Alfarabi, see Aviram Ravitsky, "Maimonides' Theory of Language: Philosophy and Halakhah" (in Hebrew), *Tarbiẕ* 76 (2007): 185-231. Bernard Septimus conjectured that Maimonides had in mind here Alfarabi's *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, but did not cite explicit passages from the book. See his "Maimonides on Language," in Aviva Doron (ed.), *The Culture of Spanish Jewry* (Tel-Aviv: Levinsky College, 1994), 48. Cf. Irene E. Zwiep, *Mother of Reason and Revelation* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1997), 240-252. She does not attempt to identify the "perfect scholars," but does suggest (on pp. 248-249) that Maimonides' view is partly similar to that of Saadia Gaon.

Bedouin were thought to be a reliable source of correct Arabic usage because they lived apart from foreign influences, were unspoiled by them, and thus *preserved* correct Arabic.[6] Maimonides, however, seems to hold that the test of correctness is not the uncontaminated speaker who preserves an original Hebrew but the native speaker today. The native speaker is the criterion of what is *possible* in the language. Thus, regarding the verb תָּרַם (*taram*), Maimonides defended the usage of the Mishnah not on the grounds that it preserves biblical Hebrew, but on the grounds that its deviation from biblical Hebrew was accepted by native Hebrew speakers in *al-shām*. From an empirical or behavioristic point of view, Maimonides' position appears similar to that of Sibawahi and Alfarabi, but from a conceptual point of view it is radically different from it: he privileges the new over the old, while they privilege the old over the new. Maimonides does not claim to be original in his reliance on the usage of native speakers as the standard for correctness, for he cites the "principle" of the "perfect scholars." I presume that there was in fact a text by one of the "perfect scholars" that adumbrated Maimonides' view, but this text may be lost or unedited. In terms of the known Arabic and Hebrew literature, Maimonides' view may be unprecedented. It also may be unprecedented in Greek and Roman literature philological literature.

One final question may be raised concerning Maimonides' view. When he sets down the rule that the practice of native speakers in their land is the criterion of correct usage in any language, does he mean *any* native speaker or only the *educated* ones. The Rabbis of the Mishnah were of course highly educated. I suspect that Maimonides did not think that every unconventional usage by uneducated native speakers should be considered legitimate, but only the usages of educated native speakers. Moreover, Maimonides' reference to the fact that the Rabbis' use of the forms *taram*, *torem*, and *yitrom* is found "throughout the Mishnah" seems to indicate that he had in mind only usages that were widely accepted.

To give examples from contemporary Israeli Hebrew, the frequently heard phrase *ha-nashim yihyu* (הנשים יהיו using the masculine form of the verb) instead of the historically grammatical *ha-nashim tihyenah* (הנשים תהיינה "the women will be") is

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[6] See Levin, *Arabic Linguistic Thought*, 207: Sibawayhi consulted Bedouin whose Arabic was "reliable" or "trustworthy." In his *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1979), II, 133-135, pp. 145-147; translated in Muhammad Ali Khalidi (ed.), *Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14-15, Alfarabi argues that the standard of correctness in language is the usage of the inhabitants of the wilderness, not that of city dwellers, for the former are wild, tough, and not easily influenced, while the latter are compliant and wont to adopt "error." As sources of un-erroneous Arabic, he cites the rude tribes of Qays, Tamīm, Asad, Ṭayy, and also Hudhayl.

commonly used today by educated speakers and thus may be considered legitimate, whereas the frequently heard phrase *ani yaggid* (אני יגיד using the 3rd-person form of the verb) instead of the historically grammatical *ani aggid* (אני אגיד "I will tell") is not commonly used today by educated speakers and thus may be rejected as an error.

Maimonides certainly did not hold that any and every neologism is automatically legitimate. He held that the criterion of correct usage is not the grammar book, but the practice of native speakers in their land. He relied more on the Rabbis of the Mishnah than on the latter-day grammarians. As Bialik aptly paraphrased him, "Grammar determines its laws according to speech and not the contrary."

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Religious Restrictions in the Bible and Hittite Cultures:
On Holiness in Both Cultures

Ada Taggar Cohen

Introduction

I have chosen the topic of "Holiness" as it has wide implications from the time of Ancient Israel up to Modern Judaism of the present day. I intend to discuss the relationship between holiness and identity, and would even phrase this as the relationship between "social groups where holiness is their identifying tool". Throughout the discussion I will refer to two Ancient societies, Israel and the Hittites, and conclude by pointing out certain characteristics that have been carried on into Judaism of the modern era.

In a short article published in 1992, Fernando Uricoechaea offered a concise review of Durkheim's analysis of society and the sacred.[1] His review focused on the fact that "interdiction *bestows* the sacred element to the definition. The social character of the sacred is then, quite evident. The religious character of an object is not something inherent in it but, instead, superimposed on it" (p. 160).

In the Hebrew Bible we find that the priests who are the closest physically to the divine entity must obey specific instructions, according to the books of Exodus and especially Leviticus and Numbers, concerning the required level of purity. Fulfilling this demand for purity enables them to become "holy קדוש/ים". In the book of Numbers this seems to involve two kinds of groups, the priests and the Levites (Nu 8 and 18). Purity thus is suggestive of holiness, and the status of holiness is achieved by ritualized actions.

I will first discuss the terminology related to holiness in both cultures and then point to its place in social activities, mainly in regard to cultic performances. This article uses the terms holy and sacred as equal in meaning.

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[1] Fernando Uricoechea, "Durkheim's Conception of Religious Life: A Critique," *Archives des Sciences Sociales des Religions* 79 (1992), 155-166. URL: http://assr.revues.org/23052.

1   The Term "Holiness"

In both cultures the term presents an important point of departure for the discussion. In both Hittite and Israelite cultures there are words that scholars tend to translate as either "to clean/to cleanse" or "to purify" or as "being in a state of purification"; the result of these action(s) is that something becomes "sacred" or "holy" and thus separated from the general sphere. However not everything that is purified is holy. The status of holiness, as will be shown, is decided according to its relation to the divine entity or entities, and the divine relates to an institutional context, and to a social order.

The idea of "purity" has recently received increasing attention with a large number of published studies, especially in relation to its place in ancient societies. I will refer in the following to those related to Biblical and Hittite societies mainly.[2]

1.1   Biblical Hebrew

The Hebrew word for "holy" is *qadoš*, and next to it stands the word *ṭahor* meaning "pure". The two roots *ṭhr* and *qdš* are used as adjectives and as verbal forms, and appear together in the biblical texts relating to cultic activities, and in texts relating to YHWH. While *qdš* separates items (people, tools, lands, time etc.) and its physicality cannot really be seen by humans, *ṭhr* defines the status of items (people as well as objects) as separated from defilement, a status reached by ritual activity, thus actions that can physically be seen by humans.[3] Since these two terms, *qadoš* and *ṭahor*, appear together, it becomes clear that the status of the first is reached after the second is performed as in Lev. 16:19 and 22:4, 7. These two examples demonstrate the priestly context of these terms. However, while the term *qdš* is used in relation to cultic (temple) activity, the term *ṭhr* can be used for any person being cleansed from defilement. The state of *ṭhr* is achieved by an act done using certain materials, such as water in Lev. 14:8; 2Kng 5:14; Ezek. 36:25, or blood in Lev. 14:6.

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[2] For a few of these publications see for example: *How Purity Is Made* (eds. Petra Rösch and Udo Simon; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012). In ANE studies recently Manfred Hutter, "Concepts of Purity in Anatolian Religions," in *Purity and the Forming of Religious Traditions in the Ancient Mediterranean World and Ancient Judaism* (series: *Dynamics in the History of Religions* vol. 3; Brill, 2012), 159-174; Yitzhaq Feder, "The Semantics of Purity in the Ancient Near East: Lexical Meaning as a Projection of Embodied Experience," *JANER* 14 (2014), 87-113; Alice Mouton, "The Sacred in Hittite Anatolia: A Tentative Definition," *History of Religions* 55 (2015), 41-64. *Perspectives on Purity and Purification in the Bible* (eds. Baruch J. Schwartz, *et.al.*; Library of Hebrew Bible/OT Studies 474; New York: T&T Clark, 2008).

[3] As already described by Marry Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (Routledge Classical Edition, reprint of 2007; originally published 1966, with preface by the author of 2002), 10ff.

1.2 The Hittite language

In Hittite we find two words, *parkui-* and *šuppi-*, which are translated as "clean", "pure/ritually pure", "sacred/consecrated/holy".[4] The translation is usually based more on the context than on the exact meaning of the word. The Hittite language is written with Mesopotamian cuneiform signs that are based on Sumerian and Akkadian words used as logograms, and Hittite words written syllabically. Thus, in some cases the interpretation of words is based on the meaning in Sumerian or Akkadian.[5] Interestingly these two adjectives *parkui-* and *šuppi-* seem to correlate with the context in which *qadoš* and *ṭahor* are found. They too are used in verbal forms and while *parkui-* is the act or state of cleansing,[6] *šuppi-* is more about the status of the consecrated, thus the "holy", and is found in the context of cultic (temple) activities. The fact that as in Hebrew *ṭahor* and *qadoš* appear in the same sentence and thus should be translated differently, *parkui-* and *šuppi-* must also have separate meanings and therefore should also be translated differently; thus *šuppi-* cannot be translated as "ritually-pure" but rather as "sacred", "consecrated", and "holy". As Mouton asserts, "sacred" regards objects which are not sacred by nature, but rather achieve the status of sacredness. However, it does relate to the divine world, and in order to achieve the status of sacredness, purification acts need to be carried out. After being purified the object is then dedicated to the deities, at which stage it is sacred.[7]

1.3 Sacredness, Holiness and the Divine

As described above, we can see that both cultures see the "sacred" as something that is in the region/proximity of the deities, and that in order to reach this state there is a need for purification. In the biblical context we have the following instructions for the Israelites: "And Moses went down from the mountain to the people and consecrated (ויקדש) the people. And they washed (ויכבסו) their garments. Also, the priests who come near to the Lord will consecrate themselves (יתקדשו), lest the Lord breaks out against them" (Ex. 19:14, 22 ESVS). The consecration relates to the fact that the Israelites or the

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[4] For *parkui-* see definitions in the Chicago Hittite Dictionary (=CHD) vol. P pp. 163-166. For the use of both see Hutter, ibid.

[5] For more on this point see Ada Taggar-Cohen, "Subtle Citation, Allusion, and Translation: Evidence in Hittite Texts and Some Biblical Implications," in: *Subtle Citation, Allusion, and Translation in the Hebrew Bible*, (ed. Ziony Zevit; Equinox publishing, 2017), 54-72.

[6] In the words of Hutter, ibid., p. 161: " 'purification' consists of "exemption from, being free of" such substances, which have to be washed off, combed off, wiped off, or removed by using incense, etc. From this, we can observe that 'purity' is not an abstract (or spiritual) parameter."

[7] Mouton, ibid, pp. 44-45.

priests are in near proximity to the deity, which is regarded as being in a state of permanent holiness. The consecration of the priests is described in detail in Ex 28-29. It is a detailed ritual activity. In the same way the Levites, secondary in status to the priests and dedicated to work in the Tabernacle, are purified as described in Num. 8. Here, and in other parts of the Book of Numbers, interestingly the Levites are not identified as "holy, sacred" but only "pure". They are the ones who "keep guard over the tabernacle of YHWH", and rather serve the priests who are regarded as "sacred (קדוש)". Thus, in both cultures the physical relation to the divine is the cause of attaining the status of "holy/sacred". In the same way that the Israelite priests are termed "holy", also certain types of Hittite priests are termed "holy", such as *šuppiš* ^{LÚ}SANGA, the holy priest to whom even the Hittite king has to bow.[8]

The holiness of those related to the deity therefore concerns separation in space. The sacred creates a separation between groups in relation to the divine and thus creates the social strata. The deities are at the top of society but separated from it by their holiness. Once they are in contact with humans, the humans have to be in a sacred state, and thus must be consecrated.[9]

2   *Sacred Places*

Places in the Bible and in the Hittite texts are regarded holy to specific gods, especially in relation to the dwelling of the divine. As Jerusalem has been considered the seat of YHWH, thus the capital Ḫattuša is similarly described as the city of the gods, especially the Storm God of Ḫatti and the Sun Goddess of Arinna. Both cities are regarded as holy, and the seat of the deity inside the temple(s) as the holy of holies. The gods come to

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[8] See Ada Taggar-Cohen, *Hittite Priesthood* (Texte der Hethiter 26; Heidelberg: Winter Verlag, 2006), 148-152.

[9] Mouton, ibid, pp. 48ff. describes clearly the different levels of sacredness in the Hittite society. She cites the example of a woman in labor, about to give birth, having the status of sacredness, and that her birthstool had been consecrated too. Mouton identifies the woman as being in a liminal/transitional state. I would like to add that she is indeed in contact with the divine world as life comes from the gods, and she will bring life into the world. Therefore, she is ordered to eat specific food, and her house receives special attention from a priest, who also officiates should the birthstool be broken. Mouton indicates one more interesting point regarding the fact that the opposite of "sacred *šuppi-*" in Hittite is a negative term and not a neutral one that we use "profane". The same is true of Biblical Hebrew, the opposite of "sacred קדוש" is the negative "defiled חלל" (the verb in the *pi'el* form). At the same time something that is sacred can lose its sacredness if it comes into contact with an unclean/defiled object or human being or a contrasting action. This is again true for both cultures. See Mouton, ibid, p. 52-53 for the Hittites. For Biblical terminology see also Michael B. Hundley, "Sacred Spaces, Objects, Offerings, and People in the Priestly Texts: A Reappraisal," *JBL* 132,4 (2013), 749-767.

earth to dwell in their temples to be served by humans. The temples are identified as pure and holy, as in the following prayer from Middle Hittite period:

CTH 375 §2'

> For you Gods, only Ḫattuša is the true pure (*parkui-*) land
>
> For you only in Ḫattuša land we offer you pure, great and finest offerings
>
> For you Gods, only in the land of Ḫattuša we establish fear (of the divine)

Similarly, the prayer of Muršili II to the god Telipinu:

CTH 377 § 5 - KUB 24.2 obv. 18-19

> Only in the land of Ḫatti are you, my god, and the temples considered important. In no other land do they exist. Only in Ḫatti do they give you pure (*parkui-*), sacred (*šuppi-*) festivals and rituals.

Compare with Ps. 20: 2-4

> May he (YHWH) send you help from the sanctuary (קדש)
>
> and give you support from Zion! May he remember all your offerings
>
> and regard with favor your burnt sacrifices! *Selah* (ESVS)

And in Joel 4:17:

> And you shall know that I YHWH your God
>
> Dwell in Zion, My holy mount (הר קדשי).
>
> And Jerusalem shall be holy (קדש).
>
> Nevermore shall strangers pass through it (JPS 1985)

The idea of the city being holy and that strangers may not enter it for the city is considered like a temple – the dwelling of the deity – is also suggested in the Hittite texts. Such is the case regarding Ḫattuša. We know that when the king and queen travel to celebrate the great festival in the city of Ḫattuša they stop before entering the city to bathe, thus to purify themselves before entering the city and the great assembly for the gods.[10] Ḫattuša was a city bursting with temples to different gods, and it seems that

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[10] This appears in the outline of the AN.TAḪ.ŠUM festival that reads for the second day: "Then the king and queen bathe in the *tarnu* house. The king drives up to Hattusa in a (light) cart. In the *halentu* the great assembly (takes place)." See Hans G. Güterbock, "An Outline of the Hittite AN.TAḪ.ŠUM Festival," in *Perspectives on Hittite Civilization: Selected Writings of Hans Gustav Güterbock* (ed. Harry A. Hoffner, Jr.; AS 26, Oriental Institute the University of Chicago,

rituals and festivals took place on a daily basis in that sprawling metropolis.[11] The holy city with its large number of temples needed a large "force" of priests. This is evident from the Hittite text of instructions written to the temple personnel of the city of Ḫattuša.[12] The text includes instructions for the way the personnel, priests and other workers in the temples, are required to carry out their duties, prescribing the ways by which they are to purify themselves and the circumstances under which they are to act. It is specifically indicated in this text that only people who had permission could enter the temples: not everyone could enter the temple, and especially denied entrance were those who were not Hittite. A quote from the text reads as follows:

CTH 246 §6: 6-10

> If, however, to someone a foreign official comes, and if he is one (permitted) of going up [into] the temple, (and) usually crosses the threshold of the gods and of the king, let [that one] too, (=the Temple-Man) [bring] him up, let (him=the official) eat and let (him) drink. If he is however, [an outsid]er, not of the men of Ḫattuša, (and) he steps to the gods, [he shall die! Who]ever brings him into the temple, it is a capital penalty for him.[13]

As can be seen from this legal text, the laws for opening a sacred place to those who are not permitted to enter it entails the death penalty. The closeness of the community with its boundaries being the threshold of the temple and probably a protective wall with guards as indicated in the text itself,[14] creates a defined group of people who are related to the sacred.

This is very much the situation we encounter in biblical texts relating to the priesthood,[15] that are later, in the "Holiness texts" (mainly the Book of Leviticus), applied to all Israel. In Ex. 19: 5-6 we read:

1997), 96.

[11] For more on the city and its gods see Billie Jean Collins, *The Hittites and their World* (Archaeology and Biblical Studies 7; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), 33-36.

[12] See for commentary on the text in length Ada Taggar-Cohen, *Hittite Priesthood*, pp. 33-139.

[13] Ada Taggar-Cohen, *Hittite Priesthood*, p. 73 for the text's translation, and for commentary see on p. 127.

[14] CTH 264 §10/1-10/2 Taggar-Cohen, *Hittite Priesthood*, p. 77.

[15] See especially Nu. 1:51.

ועתה אם שמוע תשמעו בקלי ושמרתם את בריתי והייתם לי סגולה מכל העמים כי לי כל הארץ.
ואתם תהיו לי ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש.

> Now therefore, if you will indeed obey my voice and keep my covenant, you
> shall be my treasured possession among all peoples, for all the earth is mine;
> and you shall be to me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation. (ESVS)

This verse indicates that the fulfillment of the covenantal promise to YHWH will create the Israelites as a special group, a nation (גוי) that will be defined as holy, like priests; and since YHWH is the owner of the land, he will build for them a special kingdom on it. In a similar way other references to the holiness of the Israelites as a group appear in Lev. 26:11-12 where YHWH dictates:

> I will make my dwelling among you, and my soul shall not abhor you.   And I
> will walk among you and will be your God, and you shall be my people.
> (ESVS)

And Lev. 19: 1
> Speak to all the congregation of the people of Israel and say to them,
> You shall be holy, for I YHWH your God am holy. (ESVS)

The holiness of the entire nation of the Israelites becomes equivalent to the priesthood, and thus some of the restrictions demanded from the priests, especially regarding food to be consumed, are applied to all the Israelites. This will be discussed in the next section.

3   Food Restrictions

3.1 The Priesthood is in proximity to the divine and thus each time a priest enters the sacred place he must become sacred; the Hebrew verb is the root *qdš* in the Hitpaʿel form התקדשו / יתקדשו. We can see this in the commands to the priests in Ex. 29:44: "I will consecrate the tent of meeting and the altar. Aaron, also and his sons, I will consecrate to serve me as priests." (=Ex. 40:13). The sacredness of the priests also enables them, or even instructs them, to eat from the sacred food, the same food which is served to the deity. Similarly, Ex. 22:30 dictates: "You shall be consecrated to me (ואנשי קדש תהיון לי). Therefore, you shall not eat any flesh that is torn by beasts in the field; you shall throw it

to the dogs". (ESVS)

The biblical texts in the Book of Genesis fully inform us regarding the prohibition of eating food which is not cooked (the prohibition of eating food with blood[16]), as well as the specific dietary rules in Lev. 11. This is following the previous chapters in Leviticus indicating the food restrictions for the priesthood.

3.2 The Hittite texts suggest a similar concept of food prohibition, although the prohibited food is not clearly indicated as in the biblical texts. From the Hittite festival texts, we learn that the priests eat the sacrificial food, and they eat it on the spot inside the temple. The legal instructions to the priesthood indicate as follows:

CTH 264 §6/1 60-62

> Keep up in the temple everything including bread, beer and wine. Let no one leave for himself the divine thick bread (or) the thin bread of the god. Let no one pour out beer (or) wine off the libation vessel.

CTH 264 § 6/2 1-5

> If on that day [you are able] to eat and dri[nk the remains], eat and drink! If however, you are not a[ble], eat and drink [it within] three days. The *piantalla*-bread, however, [do not give to your wiv]es, children or female or male slaves. Beer and wine, you shall in no way [distribute] at the threshold of the gods.

This can be compared with the command of Moses to the Aaronide priests in Ex. 29:32-33:

> "And Aaron and his sons shall eat the flesh of the ram and the bread that is in the basket in the entrance of the tent of meeting. They shall eat those things with which atonement was made at their ordination and consecration, but an outsider shall not eat of them, because they are holy."17

Holiness clearly separates classes within the society and identifies them. In Hittite society the priests and the king are regarded as holy in their activity before the gods.

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[16] Gen 9:4 "But you shall not eat flesh with its life, that is, its blood." And Lev 7: 26-27.
[17] See also the prohibitions to the priestly in Lev. 22: 10, 12.

Thus says the Hittite prayer of Kantuzzili who is assumed to have been a king and a priest:

CTH 373 §3-§4[18]

> §3' (obv. 11'-14') And the more I grew up, the more I attested my god's mercy and wisdom in everything. Never did I swear by my god, and never did I then break the oath. What is holy (*šuppi-*) to my god and is not right for me to eat, I have never eaten and I did not thereby defile my body.

> §4' (obv. 15'-19') Never did I separate an ox from the pen, and never did I separate (lit. ditto) a sheep from the fold. I found myself bread, but I never ate it by myself; I found myself water, but I never drank it by myself. Were I now, to recover, would I not recover on account of you, O god? Were I to regain my strength, would I not regain my strength at your word, O god?

This passage shows that Kantuzzili had a special relationship with his god, eating the same food the deity ate, and thus keeping himself holy. His prayer offers a glimpse at the Hittites' way of thinking in regard to their relations with their gods. If they kept doing what the gods wanted, they would be rewarded in life. If they became sick or were offended in life, it meant the god(s) disapproved of their actions. The actions that Kantuzzili's complaint describes, shows that he followed the commandments of the divine world, and therefore did not understand why he was being punished by sickness.

4   *Conclusion*

In both the cultures of Ancient Israel and the Hittites, the idea of the holy separated a specific class that was regarded holy and apart from the general populace. The holiness status involved certain ways of purification in correlation with a special relationship and proximity to the divine world. The holiness of the gods was regarded permanent (since they lived for eternity), while the holiness of humans depended on specific ritual activity in proximity to a divine entity or entities. Holiness thus created a separate social class with a separate code of conduct, and residing in a specific place, which was also identified as holy. Holiness creates restrictions and thus prohibitions influencing or

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[18] The translation is by Itamar Singer, *Hittite Prayers* (Ed. H. A. Hoffner, Jr.; WAW SBL Series 11; Atlanta: SBL Press, 2002), 32.

impacting all ways of life for those belonging to the group. It thus defines the group as well as its individuals.

The idea of being a special community that is seen as holy by its members accompanied ancient Israelites going into exile, returning, and continues until this day. One of the main forces creating holiness is indeed the commandments, creating a certain relationship between the human and the supernatural or divine entities. Judaism issuing from biblical legal prohibitions that were actually shared by other communities in ANE such as the Hittites, assimilated the holiness of the Sabbath thus forming a society bound to ritual related to time and space, but which separated it from other communities around them. I'd like to quote Ahad Ha'am who said:

מי שמרגיש בלבו קשר אמיתי עם חיי האומה בכל הדורות, הוא לא יוכל בשום אופן – אפילו אם אינו מודה לא בעולם הבא ולא במדינת היהודים – לצייר לו מציאות של עם ישראל בלי שבת מלכתא. **אפשר לומר בלי שום הפרזה, כי יותר משישראל שמרו את השבת – שמרה השבת אותם.**[19]

>"It is possible to say without exaggeration that more than Israel observed the Sabbath – The Sabbath kept them". The religious restrictions created by the Sabbath's laws formed the "holiness" through which the community defined itself.

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[19] The article of Ahad Ha'am was published in the Hebrew monthly Hashiloach vol. 3/6 May 1898. URL: https://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=7147 (2019/1).

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The Lack of Zion in the Book of Ezekiel

Tetsu Kitamura

1   Introduction

This paper will reflect on the meaning of the "Lack of Zion" in the Book of Ezekiel. "Zion" is an important word and another name standing for Jerusalem, alluding to its temple and holy place, but this name never appears in the Book of Ezekiel. This phenomenon is strange because the attack on Jerusalem and the destruction of the temple is so important in the Book of Ezekiel that this tale is told repeatedly. For example, "Zion" appears around 50 times in the Book of Isaiah and 20 times in the Book of Jeremiah, and is described frequently together with the name Jerusalem in the Book of Lamentations. In this paper, while recognizing the importance of "Zion" in the Hebrew Bible, the characteristics of the Book of Ezekiel will be discussed focusing on the lack of the mention of the name "Zion" in Ezekiel's prophecy.

2   "Zion" in the Hebrew Bible

Firstly, the main meaning of the word Zion, it's theological concept and historical tradition are presented.[1] The word "Zion" (ציון) seems to have been the name of a fortress in Jerusalem during the period before David captured it (1Sam 5:7) as well as the name of the temple mount (Ps 78:68-69), the Jerusalem temple itself, and lastly the people of Israel (Is 51:16).

2.1   The Theological concept represented by the word Zion can be described as follows: **A.** Enthronement after Victory: The term evokes a whole range of concepts having to do with kingship, might, justice, and faithfulness of YHWH and the security and beatitude of those privileged to lodge on his sacred mountain and to witness the divine enthronement upon it. **B.** The Election of Zion and David: YHWH chose Zion as the site of his royal palace, the temple, the place where he found rest. It is probable that the idea

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[1] The description follows the entry on Zion in *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*, vol. 6, ed., D. N. Freedman (Doubleday: New York, 1992), 1098−1102.

expressed in the royal theology that the house of David was chosen for kingship, is at the origin of the idea of Zion's election. **C.** Visions of Peace: The paradoxical consequence of YHWH's great victory in his holy city is an end to war and the inauguration of a reign of peace.

2.2 Historical concepts of the Zion Traditions can be seen in: **A.** Israelite Antecedents. The history of Zion traditions is difficult to trace because the dates of so many of its key texts are uncertain. One of its sources probably lies in the traditions of the ark, the full name of which seems to have been "the ark of the covenant of the Lord of Hosts enthroned on the cherubim." **B.** Canaanite Antecedents. The Shilonite Ark tradition cannot explain the sense of Zion as the inviolable mountain home of YHWH. One antecedent of this aspect of the Zion tradition would seem to lie in some traditions of Mt. Sinai, which were transferred to Zion. **C.** Zion in the Monarchy and the Second Temple Period. With David's conquest of Jerusalem, the tradition of Zion undoubtedly became an essential component of the Israelite religious tradition. After the fall of Judah and the torching of the temple in 587 B.C.E., Zion became a poignant symbol of national disgrace, of the contradiction between the great royal city of promise and memory and the pitiful ruins of the present era.

3   The Lack of Zion in the Book of Ezekiel

Scholarly comments on the lack of the mention of Zion in *Ezekiel* are as follows: Walther Zimmerli commented that the three tradition streams, Exodus, David and Zion are mixed together in Ezekiel, and that the Zion tradition is remarkably apparent with the striking peculiarity that the name Zion is avoided throughout the text.[2]

According to D. I. Block, Ezekiel is problematic for students of Zion theology for several reasons.[3] **A.** The word Zion is missing in it. **B.** The kingship of YHWH, whose enthronement features prominently in Zion theology, receives little attention in Ezekiel's ministry. **C.** While Ezekiel perceives Jerusalem as the center of the universe, its position has little resemblance to the role of Zion in Zion theology. **D.** While Zion theology binds the election of Zion, as the seat of YHWH's throne, closely with the election of David,

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[2] W. Zimmerli, *Ezekiel 1: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel* eds., Frank Moore Cross and Klaus Baltzer with the assistance of Leonard Jay Greenspoon (translated by Ronald E. Clements; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 41.
[3] D. I. Block, "Zion Theology in the Book of Ezekiel," in *Beyond the River Chebar: Studies in Kingship and Eschatology in the Book of Ezekiel* (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2013), 1.

Ezekiel never links these motifs. **E.** Although Ezekiel's restoration oracles include visions of final peace, this peace bears no direct links with Zion theology. **F.** While Ezekiel's vision of the reconstituted nation focuses on a city to the south of a very high mountain (40:2), the heart of the city is taken up with the temple. However, Ezekiel avoids naming this city by either its historical designation (Jerusalem) or by its theological name (Zion). This city bears no resemblance whatsoever to the Jerusalem of Zion theology.[4]

Block answers his own question: "what has happened to traditional Zion theology in the preaching of Ezekiel?" saying: "that it is inconceivable that he was ignorant of the Zion traditions."[5] Block adds that the most likely answer is to be found in the theological crisis to which Ezekiel responds. Block introduces the crises, for example, YHWH's eternal covenant with David and YHWH's residence in Jerusalem, the place he had chosen for his name to dwell. These are related to what scholars conventionally refer to as Zion theology.[6]

Finally, let me touch upon T. Renz's article,[7] which is an important essay comparing and contrasting Zion theology in Ezekiel.[8] Renz states that in the Book of Ezekiel, focusing on God's presence and focusing on Zion are presented as exclusive alternatives, and that Ezekiel went back to the roots of the Zion tradition imbedded in the ancient Near Eastern holy mountain beliefs and earlier Israelite traditions, in order to modify and develop the tradition, in the face of the needs of the exilic and post exilic "people of God."[9] Renz says that although the term "Zion" is never used in the Book of Ezekiel, motifs usually associated with Zion frequently appear in it. He then introduces four categories[10] of how these motifs are to be used.[11]

A. The first category concerning the Temple and the City of Jerusalem[12]

Vv 5:5-6 in the Book of Ezekiel confirm the tradition of Jerusalem as the center of the earth and therefore Zion should be the place from which order is established and maintained in the world. Yet rebellion against God's ordinances is found at the very heart

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-6.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] Thomas Renz, "The Use of the Zion Tradition in the Book of Ezekiel," in *Zion, City of Our God*, eds. R. S. Hess and G. W. Henham, (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdemans, 1999), 77-103.
[8] J. T. Strong, "The God that Ezekiel inherited," in *The God Ezekiel Creats*, eds. P. M. Joyce and D. Rom-Shiloni (Bloomsbury T&T Clark: London, 2015), 27 n.12.
[9] Renz, *op.cit.*, p. 77. "People of God" is thus termed by Renz.
[10] In this article, only the main 3 categories will be introduced.
[11] Renz, *op.cit.*, p. 86.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 86-91.

of his reign. What used to be the center from which God's order was established is now the center of chaos and consequently will be the center of judgement in the restoration of order. Chapter 20, which narrates the history of Israel from an exilic perspective, skips the entire part of the history related to the possession of the land and Zion, yet culminates in a vision of the acceptable sacrifice "on the high mountain of Israel." This points to a re-creation rather than to a restoration of the Zion tradition.

B. The second category concerning the Restoration and the New Sanctuary[13]

Significantly, the new sanctuary is never described as a continuation of this old sanctuary which has been desecrated. The old sanctuary is not rebuilt and desacralized. Zion will not be the center from which the land is reordered and restored. Chapter 47-48 trace the relationship between the new sanctuary and the land. Here the Zion tradition projects the idea of a sacred stream which flows from the sanctuary and is an instrument of regeneration and transformation of the land. The marvelous trees on either side of the river (47: 7,12) recall the Eden narrative. The last verses of the book (48: 30-35) underline the importance of the new city to which is given a new name summarizing the characteristic feature of this new city "YHWH is there," but none of the chapters 40-48 mention either Jerusalem or Zion by name.

C. The third category concerns the God of Israel[14]

A positive affirmation of an earthly place of God's throne is to be found only in the last temple vision, which takes up Zion language by speaking of YHWH's footstool (43:7). Surprisingly, two designations of God often used in connection with the Zion tradition are completely absent from the book. Namely, "El 'Elyon" and "YHWH Ṣebaoth." The absence of "YHWH Ṣebaoth" especially can hardly be accidental, all the more so as it has been observed that "YHWH Ṣebaoth" is often used in the Book of Ezekiel as well, however with the designation "Adonai YHWH" which is not very common outside the Book of Ezekiel.

To conclude, Renz asserts that from beginning to end, the Zion tradition remains valid in the Book of Ezekiel as a description of the consequences of God's presence for the people. With the emphasis in the book being on God and Israel's dependence on the provision of God, the Zion tradition could hardly have been avoided. In any case it is worth noting that the Zion tradition does not seem to provide a basis for restoration. In some aspects, it can be claimed that the Zion tradition functions more in a descriptive way rather than authoritatively.

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[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 91-95.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 95-98.

4   Regression and Progression of Israel beyond "Zion"

So far, we have confirmed the tradition of "Zion" and the viewpoints of scholars concerning the lack of Zion in the Book of Ezekiel. The overall opinion is that the tradition of Zion is still very much alive in the Ezekiel prophecy although the specific name cannot be found. In opposition to this opinion, I would argue that the ideology and idea of "Zion" was actually rejected in the Book of Ezekiel, and that Ezekiel tried to create a New Israel standing beyond "Zion."

In previous research, scholars pointed out the importance of the tradition of Zion, but they could not explain the reason why its name is absent from the book. Since it is quite clear that Ezekiel knew the Zion tradition and used its language, its absence has to present a shift in the conception of Jerusalem in Ezekiel's theology. I suggest the following interpretation.

First of all regarding the terms "Holy Mountain" and the "Sacred Stream" which are understood to be typical motifs of the tradition of "Zion." F. M. Cross pointed out that the setting of the "Devine Mountain and Cosmic River" is not an attribution of Zion but rather derives from a Canaanite Myth.[15] It goes back to the archaic world view which prevailed before the tradition of Zion was created and before the formation of Israel.[16]

Next, I would like to point out the characteristics that constitute New Israel as described in the final part of the Book of Ezekiel. Israel, in chap. 47, is made up of the 12 tribes as described in the Book of Numbers. This differs from the Kingdom described in the Book of 1Kings chap. 4. In addition, in Ezekiel chap. 47 the land is distributed between the 12 tribes, similarly to the description in the Book of Numbers and in the book of Joshua. This description implies returning to the situation as it was before the establishment of the monarchy. In the same way, the leader of the New Israel is not a King (Melek מלך) but a Prince (Nasi נשיא); Nasi is the word used to describe the leader in the Book of Numbers. Ezekiel's portrayal of the distribution of the land as well as the kind of leadership shows a return to the roots or to the original society of Israel.

Consequently, the image of New Israel in the Book of Ezekiel chapters 40-48 goes beyond the framework of "Zion Ideology," which is closely related to the kingdom of David and instead returns to pre-monarchical times. The tradition of Zion is not needed in the Book of Ezekiel for establishing New Israel; returning to Israel that has no attribution to "Zion", better fits Ezekiel's thought. The bones which will constitute New

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[15] F. M. Cross, *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1973), 38.
[16] *Ibid*., p. 37.

Israel (chap. 37) do not contain "Zion" in their components.[17] When Ezekiel re-creates Israel as the house of YHWH, he reforms it from the house of David, and from its sinful past. The basic mythical components of the religious concepts of the holiness of Jerusalem are maintained but without the developed ideology of Zion that has been desecrated.

5   *Conclusion: The Meaning of "the Lack of Zion" in the Book of Ezekiel*

In this short paper, the meaning of "Zion" tradition and scholarly opinions concerning the lack of Zion in the Book of Ezekiel have been discussed. Secondly, through my understanding of the restoration wished for Israel by Ezekiel, I have offered my interpretation, that the lack of Zion emphasizes the wish of Ezekiel to go back to Israel's roots before the establishment of Zion as the monarchy of David's house. Furthermore, Ezekiel does not just turn back to the past but rather creates a new one which is symbolized with a new name "YHWH is there."

At present, my opinion is just a tentative assumption and needs to be examined further. Nevertheless, it has the potential to question the traditional understanding of the history of Israel.

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[17] It is true that the name of "David" which is usually connected with the ideology of Zion can be found in ch. 37 vv. 24-25. Nevertheless, he is also called "Shepherd (Roʿeh רועה)" and "Prince (Nasi נשיא)". He is also called "King (Melek מלך)", but this was just the symbol of unification of the divided countries (Israel and Judah), not related to Zion. The emphasis of David as the former is perfectly clear when we check the meaning of "David" in chap. 34 vv. 23-24 in which he is just called "Shepherd (Roʿeh רעה)," and "Prince (Nasi נשיא)," but not "King (Melek מלך)."

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Speech and Silence:
Two Modern Readings of Psalm 115

Joel Swanson

1   Introduction

In a lecture delivered at the Catholic Institute of Paris in January 2006, French-Israeli scholar Stéphane Mosès delineated a conceptual dichotomy that has since proven influential upon the field of modern Jewish thought.[1] According to Mosès, twentieth century Jewish philosophy and literature may be divided between "normative modernity" and "critical modernity."[2] The former category is defined by thinkers such as Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, and Emmanuel Levinas, who believe in the binding weight of Jewish tradition and whose works "return to traditional texts, but in a form comprehensible to people today" (246). For thinkers of normative modernity, the Jewish textual tradition continues to impose binding, normative judgments; the task of the modern Jewish philosopher is to use the exegetical tools of European philosophy as a hermeneutic lens to understand and apply traditional Jewish texts in a modern context.

In contrast, the category of critical modernity is defined by those who believe "we have lost the continuity of the past," so that Jewish texts and traditions no longer hold any normative theological, ethical, or prescriptive weight for the modern Jew, but now constitute only "a *shattered* past that is no longer capable of inspiring in us judgments of evident value" (247). Thinkers of critical modernity maintain many of the forms and structures of traditional Jewish texts, but empty these texts of their normative theological content, using the very emptiness of these formal structures to highlight the inability of Jewish texts to speak directly to the modern Jew (247-248). These writers and philosophers, who include Walter Benjamin, Franz Kafka, Paul Celan, and Edmond

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[1] Hammerschlag, Sarah. Introduction to Stéphane Mosès's "Normative Modernity and Critical Modernity," in *Modern French Jewish Thought: Writings on Religion and Politics*, ed. Sarah Hammerschlag (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2018), 245.

[2] See: Mosès, Stéphane. "Normative Modernity and Critical Modernity," translated Sarah Hammerschlag, in *Modern French Jewish Thought: Writings on Religion and Politics*, ed. Sarah Hammerschlag. (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2018), 245-253. In the following passage Mosès's book will be indicated by quotation marks from these pages.

Jabès, maintain a lineal connection to Jewish tradition, through their employment of the literary forms of traditional Jewish texts, but this is a connection that highlights the disjunction and alienation of the modern Jew (247). Mosès's model has become highly influential in modern Jewish thought, and his concept of "critical modernity" provides a means to situate thinkers such as Jacques Derrida who seem quite alienated from traditional forms of Jewish liturgy within the framework of modern Jewish thought.[3]

An exploration of two modern readings of the same Biblical prooftext of Ps. 115, in German Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig's magnum opus *The Star of Redemption* and Polish-born's "Dead Men Don't Praise God," appears to offer a test case for applying Mosès's conceptual distinction. Rosenzweig uses his reading of Ps. 115 to construct a prescriptive ethical vision for the modern Jew, and it functions as a synecdoche for his entire philosophical project, demonstrating how he begins with the individual, metaethical Self and from there grounds a new theory of a universal ethical ideal. Glatstein, in contrast, uses the formal literary structure of Ps. 115 to highlight the inability of God to speak directly to the Jew after the world-historical catastrophe of the Shoah. Glatstein's poem subverts the *peshat* meaning of Ps. 115, turning what seems at first to be a hymn of praise to God into a hymn of the impossibility of such praises after the gas chambers. On the surface, Rosenzweig's prescriptive ethical reading of Ps. 115 would appear to provide a paradigmatic example of normative modernity, while Glatstein's ironic literary reading offers an illustration of critical modernity.

In examining these readings of Ps.115, I wish to suggest that they trouble Mosès's strict dichotomy between normative and critical modernity. Such an interpretation demonstrates that Rosenzweig was unable to fully escape the shadow of philosophical universalism even as he returned to traditional Jewish sources, while Glatstein's work evinces concern for the continuation and expansion of the Jewish textual tradition in a post-Shoah landscape. In so doing, I wish to suggest that the works of many twentieth century Jewish thinkers display evidence of both normative and critical modernity, and that the conceptual distinction between these two polarities may not map neatly onto the works of many Jewish philosophers and writers.

2   *Franz Rosenzweig's Reading of Psalm 115: The I and We and Universalism*

For Franz Rosenzweig, writing at a time of great cultural vibrancy for German Jews, a

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3 Hammerschlag, Sarah, Introduction to Stéphane Mosès's "Normative Modernity and Critical Modernity," 245.

reading of Ps. 115 became a way of unifying his defense of Jewish cultural particularity with a universal vision of redemption that would one day encompass all of humanity. Rosenzweig's philosophy began with a revalorization of the place of the singular, contingent individual, which he believed that the Western metaphysical tradition, "from Ionia to Jena,"[4] had forgotten in its focus on universal ethical ideals that transcended all human particularities. For Rosenzweig, our individual contingency emerges when we confront the possibility of our own death, for death is the sole experience that cannot be subsumed into the totalizing systems of Western philosophy. Ps. 115 is a rare psalm that confronts the reality of human death. By acknowledging the irremissibility of mortality, Ps. 115 provides Rosenzweig with the source material he needs to unify individual human contingency with his ultimately universalist vision. This is a vision that demonstrates that Rosenzweig's grounding of Jewish philosophy upon individual human contingency does not mean a complete abandonment of the universalist vision of post-Hegelian philosophy, but rather a rearticulation of this universalism on new textual grounds.

Rosenzweig's reading of this psalm thus makes the penultimate verse crucial to the overall message. In this verse, the psalmists remind us that, "The dead praise not the Lord" (v. 17).[5] Here we see that the psalmists understood that it was only through this dawning awareness of our mortality that our praise of God may hold personal meaning. This foreshadowing of our fundamental solitude, the "lonely prayer of a lonely soul," introduces considerable tension into the beginning of Ps. 115, reminding us of our ineradicable individuality even as the psalm begins by speaking in the collective voice of the Jewish people.[6] The psalm, as Rosenzweig notes, "is the only one of all the Psalms that begins and ends with a powerfully underscored We."[7] Yet the paradox here is that this We cannot yet be all-inclusive, for the psalm remains dialogical. Ps. 115 begins with a direct address from the people Israel, the We, to God, a declaration of "Not unto us, O Lord." (v. 1) Thus the psalm establishes a dialogue between man and God, and any dialogue necessarily implies a They as well as a We. The We is defined as much by who it excludes as by who it includes.

Indeed, Rosenzweig argues that the content of the psalm objectifies those whom it

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[4] Rosenzweig, Franz. *The Star of Redemption*, trans. Barbara E. Galli. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 18.
[5] All English translations of Ps. 115 in this paper are taken from the Jewish Publication Society's 1917 English language edition of the Tanakh.
[6] Rosenzweig, p. 286.
[7] Ibid, 269.

excludes, writing that "because the Psalm anticipates that the We's will be beside God, it sees the You's instinctively with God's eye, so that they become They's."[8] This is why in Rosenzweig's reading of Ps. 115, "the We's are not 'We all'," for the very concept of We itself remains elusive.[9] As long as the community defines itself through this limited, subjective We, Redemption must remain out of reach. Thus, does Rosenzweig destabilize our common understanding of Ps. 115, pointing to the tension between the psalm's opening in a moment of exultant community, and the fact that it quickly retreats back into the solitude of human finitude. What first appears as a song of exultation becomes far more ambivalent.

Through his reading of Ps. 115, one of the six psalms of *hallel* recited in the synagogue on major Jewish holidays, Rosenzweig also invokes for his readers an association with Jewish community, a reminder of the shared Jewish liturgy, this "tiny cycle of the year,"[10] that unites the Jewish people across the generations. The annual cycle of the Jewish liturgical calendar inculcates a uniquely Jewish phenomenological experience of time, which thrusts the Jew outside of the solitude of his individual historical moment and unites him with the past and future of his people, a people existing outside of linear historical temporality, "in defiance of all world history."[11] This is the paradox of the psalm. By invoking our ineluctable human mortality, Ps. 115: 1 reminds us of our individual contingency, yet through its association with shared rituals of Jewish prayer, it also builds a larger community.

In the ninth verse of the psalm, when the singular self begins to unite with his people in the liturgical community constituted by Jewish ritual life, Rosenzweig discusses "hopeful trust" as "the fundamental word where the anticipation of the future takes place,"[12] for it is only this trust that enables us to confront the unspeakable terror of our own mortality. In a world in which we are painfully mortal and vulnerable, trust in our fellow human beings becomes the shield that protects us from the existential sting of our finitude as an embodied, physical being, by ensuring that we become part of a community that will continue long after our death. Rosenzweig contrasts "the illusory trust of the You's," that false trust of those who still hold onto an unbridgeable division between Self and Other and so cannot speak in one unified voice, with "the trust of the

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[8] Ibid, 270.
[9] Ibid*, 270.
[10] Ibid, 327.
[11] Ibid, 427.
[12] Ibid, 270.

We's in the God."[13] This latter trust, the trust of individuals who have come to speak in one shared voice, is the hope of Redemption, "the sure trust in the imminent future of the Messiah and his Kingdom despite all delay."[14] Verses nine through thirteen, which distinguish between the people of Israel, the "house of Aaron," and finally "ye that fear the Lord," represent the vision of this messianic promise of Redemption as it unfolds for all of humanity. This messianic vision comes through a vision of three distinct earthly communities.

The first of the communities described in the psalm is Israel, "God's firstborn son, under the heart of his love," who have been consecrated to dwell beyond temporal history as the eternal people.[15] The second is the Christians, "conceived in a priestly role for the way leading through the world and time of the You's."[16] The role of the Christians is to carry the eternal message of Revelation out from the nation of Israel and into history, to spread the word of revelation across the earth and across national borders. Israel exists outside of worldly history, and thus can never be more than a minority community, but Christians speak to all who want to join them, creating a community of word and not of blood. The third group that anticipates the promise of Revelation is the proselytes, those who fear the Eternal One" and who therefore constitute the remainder of "the old messianic community of humankind," that is, the "We all," that We which is inclusive of all of humanity and therefore need not speak of a You.[17]

Rosenzweig's appeal to Christianity thus enables us to challenge his placement entirely within the framework of normative modernity. Stéphane Mosès argues that in Rosenzweig, "in a philosophical discourse very close to that of the great German idealist systems, the contents of the most ancient Jewish tradition are unveiled and developed."[18] Here Mosès adumbrates a distinction between form and content, suggesting that the philosophy of normative modernity articulates "fidelity to the contents of the Jewish tradition" through the rhetorical form of modern post-idealist philosophy, the "philosophical language of modernity."[19] For Mosès, then, the defining characteristic of normative modernity is the expression of the contents of Jewish tradition within the formal discursive vocabulary bequeathed to us by modern idealist philosophy. Yet

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[13] Ibid, 270.
[14] Ibid, 385.
[15] Ibid, 270.
[16] Ibid, 270.
[17] Ibid, 270.
[18] Mosès, pp. 246-247.
[19] Ibid, 246.

Rosenzweig's reading of Ps.115 challenges Mosès's strict form-content distinction, revealing that he is not merely dependent upon German idealism for the formal discursive structure of his philosophy, but for elements of the content as well. Elements within Rosenzweig's philosophy remain indebted to a post-Hegelian philosophical universalism that cannot be located entirely within "the most ancient Jewish tradition,"[20] but instead require recourse to the outside Christian tradition, as his Hegelian reading of Christianity makes clear. Rosenzweig's vision of the Christian Church as a historical entity represented his strategy for incorporating the Hegelian model of history into his new philosophical system. By defining the Church as the body that would carry the message generated by the transhistorical community of Israel out into history, Rosenzweig assimilated Hegel's teleological view of history without forcing the Jews back into linear time.

Moreover, Rosenzweig's appropriation of Ps. 115 troubles Mosès's dichotomy between form and content. The texts of the psalms do not merely support the philosophical content of Rosenzweig's ethical thought; rather, the very poetic form is essential to his project. He writes:

> It is not prophecy that is the particular form where Redemption can become the content of Revelation; rather, this must be a form belonging entirely to Redemption, which consequently expresses the event not-yet-having-taken-place and yet still-to-come-one-day. But this is the form of the communal song of the community. The community is not, is not yet, everyone; its We is still limited, it remains simultaneously bound to a You; but—yet—it claims to be everybody. This "yet" is the world of the Psalms. It makes the Psalms the songbook of the community, although they all express themselves in the form of the I.[21]

As "the songbook of the community" that nonetheless expresses itself through the voice of the I, the voice of the individual poet, the poetic structure of the psalms models a form of universal community built upon the individual contingent self. Just as Rosenzweig wants to ground a new philosophical universalism upon the contingent individual, rather than upon the denial of this individual as in philosophical idealism, so too does he see the psalm as an expression of a singular poet who comes to speak on behalf of the entire

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[20] Ibid, 247.
[21] Rosenzweig, p. 268.

liturgical community. Because this redemptive liturgical community does not yet encompass all of humanity, as it will in messianic time, the psalms must speak in a dialogical form that divides the I from the You. But as a liturgical text recited by the Jewish people together in the synagogue, these psalms also anticipate a redemptive future where there will be no remaining division between You and I, where the We will no longer be limited. By offering a glimpse of the union of metaethical, contingent individual with universal human community that will take place in redemptive time, the liturgical reading of the psalm offers a prolepsis of Rosenzweig's universal vision. What is essential here is that Rosenzweig questions a strict distinction between form and content. The narrative voice expressed within the liturgical poetry of the psalms, a voice which uses the perspective of the individual, subjective I to sing a song of praise for the entire community, models the content of Rosenzweig's ethical vision, a vision which also grounds a new universalism upon the individual subject.

By dividing humanity into three distinct communities of Jew, Christian, and unredeemed world, Rosenzweig's psalmist may finally begin to speak of us, the unified We All of the redeemed future. Once again, the psalmist here begins with the particular nation of Israel, promising that God "will bless the house of Israel," but then expands outwards, promising to "bless the house of Aaron," and then to "bless them that fear the Lord, both small and great" (v. 12-13). This leads into the fourteenth verse, which promises that God will "increase you more and more, you and your children" (v. 14). Rosenzweig reads these verses as blessings over the miracle of childbirth, of growing a family "from one generation to the next," for the act of bearing and raising children makes a promise of continuity for the community and therefore represents a commitment to the future.[22] Ps. 115 states that God "made heaven and earth," but the psalm distinguishes between the heavens, which belong to God, and the earth, which God "hath given to the children of men" (v. 16). Rosenzweig reads this reference to "the children of men" in Verse 16 as a reminder that the earth is given "to the children of men and not to the community of Israel."[23] When God speaks of these children, he speaks of all the children of the earth, and not merely of the covenantal community of the Jews. Israel "knows it is unique," but at the same time "in the act of loving, it knows it is a child of men."[24] Here the psalm that began in the I, becomes a plea for an ethics that transcends national boundaries.

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[22] Ibid, 270.
[23] Ibid, 271.
[24] Ibid, 271.

This universal ethical vision is actualized through the love we feel for the neighbor beside us, who functions as both an entirely irreducible Self and as a representative for all of humanity. We are called to love the neighbor in their immediate proximity, and this love becomes our way of expressing love for all God's creation. The neighbor becomes the receptacle for the "overflowing drive to love" that we feel toward God, but that we may never fully express.[25] We see the divine in the neighbor beside us, "because God has created in his image that which is common between him and the neighbor."[26] The ethical demands placed upon us by the face of the neighbor originate in the face of the Self, for we mirror each other in our creaturely states, as created beings who reflect the divine image. We relate to the neighbor in our mutual creatureliness, and in so doing we come to love every created being on earth. Love for the neighbor lets us anticipate Redemption within the constraints of historical time.

Thus, by the time the psalm reaches the penultimate verse that speaks of death and silence, the metaethical Self that stepped out of the All of metaphysical idealism and into the terror of death is now met by the love we feel for the Other beside us, a love "as strong as death."[27] But love refuses to meet death on the same ground, for they live in different relations with time and history. Love has neither a past nor future, but "knows only the present, it lives only out of the present, aspires only to the present."[28] We cannot love what is past or future, because these would only be images within our own mind, memories filtered through our own experience. The true contingent reality of the Other stands before us only in this present moment. Love for the neighbor transforms historical time into the eternal present. Our creaturely love does not so much overcome death as neutralize its existential shudder, refocusing us on this present moment that becomes an eternity. Thus, may Rosenzweig proclaim, "death is the ultimate point and the fulfilled end of Creation – and love is as strong as it is."[29]

This is why the final verse of Ps. 115 begins with a triumphant cry of "But!" preceding the We (v. 18). This exultant *but* immediately follows a verse about death and silence, a solemn vow that the life that has died may no longer join its voice with the community in the song of Redemption. Death is the end of the subjective individual Self, and therefore "never again does life that has died join its voice in the songs of praise of

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[25] Ibid, 259.
[26] Ibid, 278.
[27] Ibid, 169.
[28] Ibid, 169.
[29] Ibid, 217.

Redemption."[30] This individual death is existentially shattering, but it cannot be the final word. In the final cry of "But!" the chorus of the community "intensifies to the immense unison of the We which pulls with all the united voices all future eternity into the present 'now' of the moment."[31] The dead may not praise God, but in the act of love for the Other, the We is refocused from the past tense of death into the eternal present of love. The love that establishes the We is premised on beholding the Other in this one singular moment, a moment drawn out from the unending progression of history, unconcerned with past or future. The community of We lives in the eternal present, and "before this triumphant cry of eternity, death is hurled down into the nothing. Life becomes immortal in the eternal song of praise of Redemption."[32] The promise of future Redemption is a promise of the universal. Rosenzweig's reading of Ps. 115 sketches a vision of the covenantal community that comes to encompass all of humanity in an immortal song of praise to God.

Rather than merely using the language of German idealism to express the Jewish tradition, as Stéphane Mosès argues Rosenzweig is doing, he is in fact attempting to bridge Judaism with philosophy, marshaling Jewish sources in the service of an ultimately universalist vision. Mosès sees Rosenzweig's work as presenting "an orthodox content of the Jewish tradition," [33] but it may represent a bridge between the particularism of Jewish orthodoxy and the universalism of post-idealist philosophy, a bridge achieved in the eternal worship of God.

3   Jacob Glatstein's Reading of Psalm 115

If Rosenzweig uses the cultural association between Ps. 115 and Jewish liturgical life for an ultimately universalist vision, then Yiddish poet Jacob Glatstein uses this same psalm for very different ends. Born at the end of the nineteenth century in the Polish city of Lublin, Glatstein fled to New York City in 1914 to escape rising anti-Semitism in his native country. Yet he continued to identify with the Jews of Poland, and when he returned to Lublin in 1934 to visit his ailing mother, he experienced a presentiment of the catastrophe that was to claim the lives of his entire family and decimate the community in which he was raised.[34] Against this historical backdrop, Glatstein appropriates the

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[30] Ibid, 271.
[31] Ibid, 271.
[32] Ibid, 271.
[33] Mosès, p. 246.
[34] Whitman, Ruth. "The Man and His Work," in Glatstein, Jacob. *The Selected Poems of Jacob*

penultimate verse of Ps 115 in his poem "Dead Men Don't Praise God."[35] Rosenzweig found in his vision of universal human community a path beyond the mortality expressed in this verse of the psalm, when the psalmist laments that "the dead praise not the Lord" (Ps. 115:17), but Glatstein can find nothing but a negation of the possibility that the murdered Jews of Lublin will ever again praise God, and this becomes a negation of the possibility of all living Jewish worship after the Shoah. In this way, Glatstein appears to offer an emblematic example of critical modernity, as a writer whose literary appropriation of Ps. 115 "subverts the original sense from top to bottom, but maintains the form."[36]

Glatstein's poem begins and ends with the same verse, a verse that draws a parallel between the Revelation to the Jews at Sinai and the destruction of the Jews of Lublin through the mirrored literary structure of a chiasmus:

> We received the Torah on Sinai
> and in Lublin we gave it back.
> Dead men don't praise God,
> The Torah was given to the living.37

By starting and ending the poem with these same lines, Glatstein shows that this event constitutes both the origin and the conclusion of the Jewish people. If it was the act of God giving the Torah to the Israelites gathered at Sinai that bound the Jews together as a people, then by extension the giving back of the Torah at Lublin constitutes the ending of the Jewish people. Glatstein reinforces the dreadful symmetry between the Sinai and Lublin in the next line, declaring, "just as we all stood together at the giving of the Torah, so did we all die together at Lublin."[38] Here Glatstein follows the logic of Ps. 115 to its awful conclusion. If the dead cannot praise God, then no Jew may praise God after the Shoah.

While Rosenzweig uses the dialogical structure of Ps. 115 to emphasize the unending relationship between finite man and infinite God, Glatstein uses this same

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Glatstein, translated and with an introduction by Ruth Whitman. (New York: October House, 1972), 13-15.
[35] Glatstein, Jacob. "Dead Men Don't Praise God," in Glatstein, Jacob. *The Selected Poems of Jacob Glatstein*, translated and with an introduction by Ruth Whitman. (New York: October House, 1972), 68-70.
[36] Mosès, p. 247.
[37] Glatstein, "Dead Men Don't Praise God," pp. 68, 70.
[38] Ibid, 68.

dialogical structure to emphasize his belief that the Shoah constitutes the last moment of this covenantal dialogue. If the giving of the Torah was the first word in the great dialogue between the Jew and his God, then the Jew's act of giving it back at Lublin constitutes the last. Glatstein frames the giving back of the Torah as a free, willful choice made by the Jews at Lublin. Indeed, God is stripped of agency at an even greater level than are His people. Nowhere is God depicted as acting; when Glatstein describes the giving of the Torah to the Jewish people, he phrases it as, "we received the Torah on Sinai," making the Jewish people into the grammatical subject of the phrase.[39] Glatstein's God is reduced to listening in passive silence as His people reject His Torah.

This rejection of the Torah is conducted not just by each individual Jew, but by the Jews as a collective people. Just as Rosenzweig highlights the psalm's beginning in the grammatical voice of a "We," so too does Glatstein begin his poem with this same first person plural pronoun, but here the We collectively responds to God by refusing to listen to Him any longer. Glatstein alludes to the famous *midrashic* tradition that the soul of every Jew yet to be born was present at Sinai to receive the Torah,[40] yet here he inverts this tradition, stating that every Jew who had already died participated equally in the rejection of the Torah at Lublin:

> Our whole imagined people
> stood at Mount Sinai
> and received the Torah.
> The dead, the living, the unborn,
> every soul among us answered…
> And just as we all stood together
> at the giving of the Torah,
> so did we all die together in Lublin…
> even Moses, who so much didn't want to die
> when his time came,
> now died again.
> And his brother, Aaron,
> and King David
> and the Rambam, the Vilna Gaon,
> and Mahram and Marshal

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[39] Ibid, 68, 70.
[40] *Midrash Tanhuma*, *Nitzavim* 3.

the Seer and Abraham Geiger.[41]

By citing this long list of distinguished Jewish personages throughout history, from the prophet Moses all the way to the nineteenth century German reformist rabbi Abraham Geiger, Glatstein demonstrates that the Jews continue to exist together as a collective people, even in their annihilation. This functions as an ironic, cruel reversal of Rosenzweig's reading of Ps. 115. For Rosenzweig, death marks us in our most singular individuality, and it is the act of coming together as a community that enables us to overcome death through building communal structures that will outlast us. For Glatstein, in contrast, it is death that marks the Jewish people as a unified community sharing the same fate, and in the final destruction of the Jews in the gas chambers, their collective destiny is reaffirmed. As Glatstein intones, "your whole imagined people vanished in the gas chambers of Lublin."[42]

And yet Glatstein refuses to end on such a tragic note. Instead, he concludes in the voice of a young child, who functions as a representative of the survival of the Jewish people even after Auschwitz. Here Glatstein is perhaps closer to Rosenzweig then he first appears. Just as Rosenzweig uses the image of the "child of men"[43] to affirm the continuity of the Jewish people across the generations, so does Glatstein use the figure of this child to maintain faith in the survival of the Jewish community, even if this is a faith marked by its own impossibility. At the end of his poem, Glatstein tells us of "the saddest boy of all generations" who "also stood on Mount Sinai."[44] This unnamed boy identifies his personal fate with the fate of the Jewish people as a whole, so that "you were never absent, you could never be missing. When we were, you were. And when we vanished, you vanished with us" (p. 69). This little child is not only identified with the Jewish people as a collective, but with the Torah itself; Glatstein describes the boy as "the quiet, tiny, forlorn given-back Torah" (p. 70). If the Jewish child incarnates Torah in the world, then so long as such a child remains alive, the Torah continues to speak.

Thus does Glatstein give the final words of the poem to this child himself, and these words constitute a continuation and an expansion of the Jewish textual tradition. The poem concludes with the same four lines with which it began, but unlike at the beginning, here they are attributed to the little boy. This boy stands "on top of Mount Sinai" (p. 70)

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[41] Glatstein, "Dead Men Don't Praise God," pp. 68-70.
[42] Ibid, 70.
[43] Rosenzweig, p. 271.
[44] Glatstein, "Dead Men Don't Praise God," pp. 68-70. The quotes from the poem to follow are from these same pages.

and intones:

> We received the Torah on Sinai
> and in Lublin we gave it back.
> Dead men don't praise God.
> The Torah was given to the living. (p. 70)

Here, at the climax of the poem, the suffering boy himself becomes the poet, and so his voice at the summit of Sinai forms a new verse in the Jewish poetic tradition that dates back to the original covenant with God, also established at Sinai. If for Rosenzweig, children express the future of the Jewish people, then Glatstein appears to write his own poem into this lineage. At the height of his despair, Glatstein refuses to abandon hope that some kernel of Jewish tradition may survive the Shoah and be reborn in the form of a new Jewish child, a child whose poetic words mark the survival of the Jewish textual tradition.

Here we see how Glatstein's poem challenges Mosès's conception of critical modernity, even as it appears to instantiate it. The category of critical modernity depends upon a strict division between form and content, so that works of critical modernity recapitulate the forms of Jewish textuality while emptying them of their traditional content.[45] But just like Rosenzweig, Glatstein troubles this distinction, suggesting that the poetic form of the Jewish textual tradition is an integral part of its content. If, as Glatstein states, the Jewish child is synonymous with Torah,[46] then the poetic voice of this child becomes a part of the content of the tradition, and the very act of writing poetry after Auschwitz imbues this tradition with new content. The choice to write poetry that interrogates the content of the psalm becomes a way of continuing and expanding the Jewish textual tradition, even if this is a continuation marked by the theological emptiness of the post-Shoah landscape.

As David Stern demonstrates, for the ancient rabbis engaged in *midrashic* interpretation, distinctions between theological content and literary form break down, for the very act of engaging in the literary form of *midrash* was seen as an act of worship. Rabbinic *midrash* "*was* a literature of interpretation… its literary character was intrinsically bound up with its exegetical dimension."[47] In this way, we might see

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[45] Mosès, pp. 247-248.
[46] Glatstein, "Dead Men Don't Praise God," p. 70.
[47] Stern, David. *Midrash and Theory: Ancient Jewish Exegesis and Contemporary Literary*

Glatstein's poem as an act that continues this *midrashic* tradition, using the poem's interrogation of the literary form of Ps. 115 as a means of maintaining an engagement with the discursive content of Jewish tradition after the historical rupture of the Shoah. Glatstein's work thereby helps to interrogate the strict delineation between form and content upon which the concept of critical modernity is premised. After all, if the young child incarnates Torah in the world, then the survival of a single Jewish child means the textual tradition has not been killed entirely. And if this tradition remains alive, even in broken form, then a work like Glatstein's poem contributes to the tradition, finding new meanings in ancient texts.

4 Conclusion

Reading Rosenzweig and Glatstein together allows us both to deepen and interrogate Stéphane Mosès's distinction between normative and critical modernity; such a reading suggests that elements of both categories are identifiable in many modern Jewish writers, even if they appear to fully instantiate one category or the other. These texts help to demonstrate that the categories of normative and critical modernity remain productive as heuristic tools for discussing the complicated relationship that modern Jewish thinkers maintain to their own tradition, even while also demonstrating the difficulty of classifying such thinkers entirely within one category. Perhaps for many modern Jewish thinkers, the very inability either to fully inhabit or to fully forsake a binding, normative relationship to Jewish tradition most characterizes the state of the Jew in modernity.

For Rosenzweig, writing at a time when a German-Jewish cultural synthesis still seemed possible, Ps. 115 provided a prooftext for a universal ethical vision, a way to incorporate Jewish liturgical practices into a universal vision of redemption without sacrificing Jewish particularity. Universalist, post-idealist philosophy did not merely provide Rosenzweig with a discursive vocabulary through which to express distinctly Jewish ideas, as Stéphane Mosès argues.[48] Rather, it provides kernels of philosophical content that remain in his philosophy. Though Rosenzweig adamantly rejected the impersonal abstractions of Hegelian idealism, and sought to reground philosophy upon the lived experiences of the concrete, contingent individual facing the terror of his own mortality, he ultimately used Ps. 115 to affirm universalism at a higher level.

Glatstein's reading of Ps. 115 troubles our understanding of the original text,

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Studies. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 8.
[48] Mosès, pp. 246-247.

reminding us that this hymn of praise conceals within it a lamentation. The sixteenth verse of the psalm states, "the heavens are the heavens of the Lord, but the earth hath He given to the children of men." In the psalm, these words appear as a statement of God's love and beneficence in creating the world for man to live in, but for Glatstein, the verse acquires a cruel irony. To say that God has given the earth to the children of men may mean God has abandoned His people to the boundless cruelty of man, a statement of divine absence. If God is absent from the earth, all that remains is to reread and reinterpret the Jewish textual tradition, a tradition that resides not with God in the heavens, but within this cruel world given to man.

Yet if the Jewish textual tradition resides within the world of man, then it is up to mortal humans to add to its contents and to reinterpret it in modernity. It is just such a modern reinterpretation that Glatstein models in his poem. While normative Jewish liturgical worship may be dead after the Shoah, Glatstein deepens our understanding of the contents of the Jewish textual tradition through a rereading of Ps. 115 that may be seen as a sort of modern *midrash*, an attempt to use the literary form of the Biblical canon to inject new content into Jewish tradition. Glatstein's poem is a poem of death, and yet it is also a poem of life.

And this may be the final irony in Glatstein's ironic poem. In showing just how freely modern Jewish writers can reinterpret their own textual tradition, perhaps Glatstein's elegy for the end of the Jewish people and their covenant shows there is still life in this tradition after all.

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Preliminary Remarks on Ordinary Language in Maggid Devarav le-Ya'akov

Tzvi Schoenberg

This paper aims at a preliminary discussion of the conception of language in early Hasidism. Specifically, it deals with the teachings of Rabbi Dov Ber, the Maggid of Miedzyrzec, a leading figure in early Hasidism between the years 1760-1772, and focuses on his conception of everyday speech, or non-sacred forms of language. My focus on the Maggid's teachings is part of a larger inquiry into the role language occupies in Jewish Kabbalistic traditions in general and in early Hasidism, in particular. Of specific interest in this respect are broader philosophical questions which found their distinct unique formulation in these traditions, questions which concern the relation between words and meaning, language and reality and speech and action. Such questions have been acknowledged and further addressed, however briefly, by modern scholarship and has been of growing interest in the scholarly discourse of Jewish mysticism. As in any field pertaining in some way to the study of Kabbalah, here too, Gershom Scholem played a dominating role in setting the terms for these questions, though attempts to overcome his terms have been increasingly prominent within the field during the last two or three decades.[1] In this paper, I hope to begin to suggest avenues for philosophical investigations of the nature of language in early Hasidism, focusing on the ontologically creative status of language in its everyday usage.

1   *The Ontological Force of Language in pre-Hasidic Sources*

The question of language is central to Hasidism and to the Maggid's thought, in particular, and I believe that a careful examination of this question may provide a new angle for addressing broader theological and philosophical issues in the Maggid's teachings. We have almost nothing written by the Maggid and his teachings, originally delivered in Yiddish, were edited by his students and further preserved, in Hebrew

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[1] Among these attempts mentioned should be made of Wolfson 1989, Elkayam 1990 and most recently Ben Sasson 2018. These attempts are further discussed later in this paper.

translations, in several collections.[2] This paper focuses on the first published collection, the Maggid Devarav Le-Ya'akov, compiled by R. Shlomo of Lutsk in 1781 in Korets.[3] The aphoristic nature of the teachings of the Maggid make it difficult to identify a consistent theology. This, in part, has to do with the spiritual orientation of the Maggid's thought, which seems to develop in two different vectors. On the one hand, his teachings contain elements which seem to suggest a mystical movement away from the differentiated physical world, towards the divine infinite potentia which is beyond any differentiation; a state which is marked by the Kabbalistic term *ayin* and which can be rendered as 'Nothingness'. But the teachings of the Maggid reveal also a movement in the opposite direction, identified here with the technical term *yesh*, where relation to God is said to take place, above all, within the confines of the differentiated world.

Indeed, the relation between *yesh* and *ayin* has lent itself to a pivotal moment in the theorization of the Maggid's theological claims,[4] proceeded by an extensive discussion in contemporary scholarship on Hasidism.[5] Arguments as to the mystical nature of early Hasidism–understood here as an orientation toward the *ayin* and away from ordinary

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[2] This includes the following: Maggid Devarav le-Ya'aqov: Liqqutei Amarim (Koretz 1781); Liqqutim Yeqarim (Lemberg, 1792); Tsava'at ha-RiBaSH (Zolkiev 1793); The anthology Keter Shem Tov (Zolkiev, 1794); Or Torah (Koretz, 1804; Rpr. New York: 2004); Kitvei Qodesh (Lemberg 1862); Or ha-Emet (Zhitomir, 1900).

[3] References to MDL are according to the Schatz-Uffenheimer edition (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967).

[4] This moment is best known as the Scholem-Buber debate. Committed to his characterization of Jewish mysticism in transcendental terms, Gershom Scholem was keen to establish early Hasidism, and the teachings of the Maggid in particular, as a form of *unio mystica*. To this end, he identified the Hasidic ethos with *devequt* ("cleaving"), a term which marks the tension between experiences bound to the limits of differentiation, and the mystic's desire to transcend such limits. Scholem was sensitive enough to distinguish 'communion' from 'union', remaining in line with his gnostic position that the mystical register which denies that the gap between man and God is fully bridgeable. This follows that communion with God finds expression in one's worldly engagements. But it is precisely here that Scholem's philosophical convictions come at service, as Scholem's notion of communion implies the nullification the ordinary. In the process of mystical contemplation, the ordinary dimension of things is exhausted by the divine vitality inherent in all creation; thereby allowing for *devequt* with God. Scholem's *devequt* anticipated its more radical formulations developed by his students Joseph Weis and Rivka Schatz, who applied the categories of *quietism* and *via passiva* when accounting for the spiritual orientation of early Hasidism. Hasidic mysticism, according to this approach, aims at a renunciation of, and divestment from connection to the physical world. These positions were advanced, in part, against Buber's so-called existential account which viewed Hasidic sensibility as taking the opposite direction. This is articulated primarily in Hasidic tales, where attention is drawn not to the transcendental, but toward ordinary experience and our affirmation thereof. See Scholem 1971, 203-250; Shatz-Uffenheimer 1993, 65-79; Weiss 1985, 43-55.

[5] For a critical survey of the Scholem-Buber debate Cf. Brody 1998, Rosman 2009 and. Idel 1996.

experience [6] –and its appropriation of, or departure from pre-Hasidic Kabbalistic traditions were at the center of this ongoing discourse. But for the most part, the relation, or rather tension between the concepts of *yesh* and *ayin* has been settled as an epistemological concern, considering it as a tension between the limitation of human cognition, bound to the physical world, and the characterization of the *ayin* as preceding, and thereby transcending all differentiation. Assuming the onto-theological characterization of the *ayin*,[7] the question has largely focused on how the Maggid accounts for the incompatibility of human experience, conditioned by the state of difference, and the metaphysical unity of the *ayin* which stands over and against any state of difference.[8] The question that has been asked is how the particularity of finite beings, with their distinguishable properties, is to be reconciled with the *ayin* whose absolute identity leaves no room for such differentiation. This question, to be sure, is at the core of Kabbalistic thought from its very inception, and one might argue that the developments of Kabbalistic speculation pivot around this very issue. But by viewing this question in response to the historical and theological components of pre-Hasidic kabbalah–be it in the way of affirmation of negation[9]–the teachings of the Maggid were submitted to the same presuppositions associated with Kabbalistic speculation. In so doing, the importance of language to the teachings of the Maggid and to his concept of *yesh* and *ayin*, in particular, has been undermined in the study of the Maggid, thereby ignoring a critical dimension in the Maggid's theology.

This dimension is critical because language, for the Maggid, complicates the assumed binary opposition between *yesh* and *ayin*. Language is an activity which

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[6] This was boldly expressed by Shatz-Uffenheimer, for whom the spiritual message par excellence of Hasidism was contemplative prayer. (Cf. Shatz-Uffenheimer 1993, 168).

[7] On the onto-theological problem and its centrality to western thought, see Heidegger 2002, 42-73.

[8] Menachem Lorberbaum is an exception in this regard. My thoughts presented here have considerably benefited from his thorough and novel approach to the question of the *ayin* in the Maggid's teachings (See Lorberbaum 2014). Mentioned should also be made of Lederberg 2011 who attempts to resolve the *yesh* and *ayin* tension by shifting from the ontological to the theological. Lederberg accepts the irreducibility of the *ayin-yesh*, and into this tension he introduces the theological category of joy; the joy that God gains from the sincere desire to attain that which, in principle, is beyond one's reach (Cf. Lederberg 2011, 1151-46). I find Lederberg's category of joy interesting yet somewhat problematic, for it remains loyal to the onto-theological characterization of the *ayin*.

[9] The historical character of the Hasidic reaction to pre-Hasidic Kabbalah is most notably identified with the discourse around Scholem's historiosophical account of Jewish mysticism, further appropriated by his student Joseph Weiss. Mention should also be made of non-essentialist social-historical accounts of Hasidism. Cf. Rosman 2009 and Lieberman 1980, 1-12.

constitutes the definite nature of finite beings.[10] This suggests that the tension between *yesh* and *ayin* is to be viewed not in isolation of language but as rather fundamental to it. More to the point, in the Maggid's theory of language the principle of *ayin* raises the question as to the necessary role of the undifferentiated, here identified as the *ayin*, in the process of differentiation. This is a question important to the Kabbalists, too, but here the challenge is to rethink the identification of *ayin* as the absolute being in relation to which differentiation of finite beings takes place. This means thinking the unity of the *ayin* as the condition underlying the state of differentiation, the actualization of which is language.[11]

The importance of language to the categories of *yesh* and *ayin* draws on a notion central to Kabbalistic traditions, anticipated by pre-Kabbalistic Rabbinic sources,[12] where the Holy Tongue takes a metaphysical role in constituting the existence of particular beings.[13] For many of the Kabbalists this meant that rather than representing the definite meaning of particular beings, the Hebrew letters, having their interplay in any conceivable combination, constitute the very possibility of such a definite meaning. In this respect, the letters of the Holy Tongue and their combinations constitute the fixation and differentiation of things, such that they are endowed with their meaningful distinguishing properties.[14]

The ambiguity between representation of objects and the meaning-constituting role

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[10] I adopt this helpful formulation from Valentin Vološinov's analysis of post-Kantian idealistic positions on language. Cf. Vološinov 1986, 47-51.

[11] The term used in MDL for "differentiation" is שבירה (lit. brokenness) which seems an appropriation of the Lurianic notion of the broken vessels. Thus, the Maggid maintains this twofold understanding of שבירה, differentiated and brokenness; the two are intertwined. (Cf. MDL, 36, 43, 45, 74, 101-103; Or Ha-Emet, fol. 12a. See also Lorberbaum 2014, 178).

[12] Central to these sources is the philosophical commentaries on Sefer Yetsirah, but also earlier Rabbinic and non-Rabbinic sources. See Weiss 2015, Ch. 3-4, for a comprehensive study of the latter.

[13] See Yitzhak Sagie Naor's Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah (Scholem ed.), lines 29-33; Zohar, I:156a; Moshe Cordovero, Pardes Rimonim (Jerusalem; 1962), Part One, fol. 37d; Avraham Azulai, Hesed le-Avraham (Amsterdam; 1685), fol. 13c.

[14] This has been already established by R. Yitzhak Sagie-Naor who considers the Hebrew letters the definite articulation of the divine emanation, actualized in the "separated world". Sagie Naor This is established etymologically by linking the Hebrew *'ot* (lit. 'letter') to the verb *'atha* (lit. 'to come'); the letters mark the differentiated existence which issues ('comes') from the undifferentiated *ein-sof*. Cf. Sagie Naor's Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah (Scholem ed.), lines 29-33, 180-185; Mark Sendor's discussion in his annotated translation of Sagie Naor's commentary (Sendor 1994; vol. 2, pp. 23-24). Mention should also be made of theories of the so-called linguistic emanation which were less 'sefirotic' in orientation, according to whom the complexity of language, lending itself to differentiated existence, originates from the hypostases of the proper name of God. An early expression of such a doctrine is R. Yosef Giqatilia's Ginat Egoz, and is anticipated in Avraham ibn Ezra's Sefer ha-Shem. See Ginat Egoz, Part One.

of language has lent itself to further speculation among scholars. Most notable here is the symbolic characterization of language Gershom Scholem drew from this ambiguity, further considering symbolism the secret dimension by which the mystical register of language is established.[15] The differentiated constitution of things refers language to the undifferentiated 'whole' as its ultimate source of meaning; a tension which implies the necessary duality within language itself. I take this symbolic approach to be part of Scholem's broader argument about the gnostic nature of Kabbalah and which assumes the radical duality of world and that which transcends differentiation. This follows the characterization of the symbolic movement between particular signs and the ineffable 'whole' as fundamental for language in general and mystical language, in particular.[16]

While this duality is most certainly prevalent in Kabbalistic conceptions of language, I believe that questioning Scholem's Idealistic appropriation of it may allow for a better appreciation of the ontological force Kabbalists have attributed to language. Against the referential characterization of symbolic language as ever pointing beyond itself to that which denies its expression, one may consider a more gradual, indeed

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[15] Cf. Scholem 1941, 27-28; Scholem 1972, 59–80. See also Tishby 1964, 11-22; Dan 1985, 46-4; Rotenstreich 1978, 605–9; Huss 1996, 157–76; Elkayam 1990, 4–40. In Scholem's account, language is considered the essence of the universe, insofar as finite beings function as symbols in communicating that which transcends and thereby preconditions their existence. This, to be sure, suggests that language–the Hebrew language, for the Kabbalists–plays a metaphysical role as well, insofar as the constitution of a differentiated realm through the activity of language has its source in the absolute transcendent. But this only means that what really 'holds' finite beings is necessarily incompatible with their differentiated representation. Put differently, Scholem's Kabbalistic symbolism assumes the duality of expressibility and inexpressibility within language itself. This duality results in an irreconcilable tension wherein lies the symbolic activity of the Kabbalists. Scholem's position on symbolic language, and its centrality to Kabbalah, seems to benefit the role he ascribed to gnostic tendencies in Jewish mysticism, considering it the vital force in Kabbalistic thought. (Cf. Biale 1982, 126-147) In this gnostic worldview, language indeed points to an irreconcilable duality in the form of symbolism; a duality which toys with what one might consider a form of cosmic-alienation.

[16] In Valentin Vološinov's account of this approach to language, the unity of consciousness is the grounds for linguistic activity and the symbolic signs, on the other hand, its representable traits: "The whole exists in its parts, but a part is comprehensible only in the whole." (Vološinov's 1986, 11). This recalls Scholem's account where the symbol is "an expressible representation of something which lies beyond the sphere of expression and communication." (Scholem 1941, 27) Surely, this seems a mystical appropriation of neo-Kantian linguistic theories such as Cassirer's, with the only difference that the Scholem's 'whole' is the absolute transcendent which is, therefore, inexpressible. In Scholem's account of Kabbalistic language, the balance between 'part' and 'whole' is replaced by an unbridgeable tension (Cf. Rotenstreich 1978, 606) Thus, echoing the opening lines of Benjamin's 1916 essay on language, Scholem asserts that "the symbol 'signifies' nothing and communicates nothing," thought it nevertheless "makes something transparent which is beyond all expression." (Scholem 1941, 28). Indeed, the idealistic register in Scholem's symbolism was well noticed and criticized, at times, and as I discussed in the following note. (Cf. Biale 1982, 144-146; Rotenstreich 1978; Idel 1998).

emanative, relation wherein the symbolic nature of words is determined by the degree of actualization of their referent.[17] That is, the degree to which specific emanated forms of existence are ontologically differentiated, such that the existence of particular sacred words is part and parcel of the existence of differentiated forms of existence; they are symbolically connected. This suggests that language is possible precisely because the reality in reference to which it is being exercised has ontologically emanated in its differentiated form, such that the particularity of words does not exhaustively collapse into the ultimate *ayin*. The particularity of words exists within the *yesh*.

Taking this consideration one step further, my question is not about the validity of language in reference to the differentiated realms which are said to emanate from the undifferentiated. Rather, my question is about the power language has in constituting that very differentiated reality. As we shall see, this turn in approach will follow the shift from sacred, or liturgical, to everyday language, for our concern here is not a definite emanated reality, the hidden meaning of which is to be disclosed through a specific symbolic language. This, of course, does not imply the neutralization of sacred language, rendering it equal in degree to the ordinary. Instead, the shift to everyday language marks the attempt to constitute a meaningful reality also outside of the sacred realms of liturgical activity, rendering the speech acts of ordinary, everyday life spiritually meaningful. To better appreciate this shift, let us first review some linguistic elements in pre-Hasidic Kabbalah which appear to be at the background of the Maggid's teachings.

The role of letters in constituting the differentiated condition of finite beings was further discussed in sources which were most likely known to the Maggid's circle, like R. Moshe Cordovero's Pardes Rimonim and R. Avraham Azulai's Hesed le'Avraham,[18]

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[17] See the above note and compare Elkayam 1990 who indeed goes in this direction. Challenging Scholem's position on the symbolic nature of the *sefirot*, Elkayam offers what I take to be hierarchical symbolism, where the corresponding relation between the ontological state of the sefirot and their epistemological accessibility determines the symbolic nature of the particular sefirah. (Elkayam 1990, 12-15). Wolfson 1989 takes a similar position when suggesting that the symbolic connection between signifier and signified is much closer than suggested by Scholem; they are two sides of one coin. Words from Scripture can be transformed into symbols precisely because the reality which they symbolize can be so expressed." (Wolfson 1989, 116, n. 43)

[18] For a general account on the importance of Cordovero and Azulai to early Hasidism see: Sack 1986, 229-246; Idel 1995, 11-13; Lorberbaum 2014, 193-195. See also Mayse 2015 who limits the early Hasidic reception of Cordovero to Pardes Rimonim and Tomer Devorah, both of which the Hasidic masters had access to. (Mayse 2015, 25, n. 86) Mention should also be made of the role of Cordovero in the Kabbalistic genealogy, beginning with the Zohar and culminating in the Maggid, in R. Shlomo of Lutsk's introduction to his Maggid Devarav le-Ya'akov (MDL, pp. 1-2). Noteworthy is the interest in Pardes Rimonim in the mid-late 1800's, of which we learn from its reprintings in 1780 and 1786 in Koretz, around the publication of the Maggid Devarav le-Ya'akov collection in Korerz, 1981. (Cf. Gries 2007, 71).

according to which the existence of finite beings is attributed to the inner vitality of the letters. This is concisely articulated by Azulai who, echoing Cordovero,[19] characterizes the relation between the physicality of the letter and its reference to its specific spiritual source, for "each and every letter has a spiritual form and a glorified light (אור נכבד) which emanates from the substance of the (particular) *sefirah*."[20] This symbolic characterization is typical of Kabbalistic accounts and can be traced back to Sefer ha-Bahir and to the Treatise on the Letters by the twelfth century R. Yitzhak ben R. Ya'akov ha-Cohen,[21] the writings of whom were most likely known to Azulai and Cordovero.[22] But the vitality of letters is by no means static, as though constituting a fixed differentiated state, but is rather an ongoing dynamic activity, which is to say, the activity of speech is always an ontologically creative act. This is further suggested through the appropriation of the terms 'spirit', 'voice' and 'speech' of Sefer Yetsirah 1:9, the conceptual representation of which is articulated already in R. Yitzhak Sagie Naor's early commentary on Sefer Yetsirah, composed ca. 1200.[23] In this commentary, gradual levels of ontological differentiation are represented by spirit, voice and speech; the latter articulated in distinct physical letters. In works like Cordovero's, *dibbur* ('speech') of Sefer Yetsirah serves as a technical term for the characterization of letters as constituting the world of differentiation;[24] a term which will become central to the Maggid. R. Moshe Chaim Luzzato's Qoph Lamed Chet Pitchei Hokhmah (hereafter *QLCH Pitchei Hokhmah*), yet another Kabbalistic work valued in the Maggid's circle, draws conclusions from this identification: "Speech cannot exist without letters and the creation of the world, in actuality (בפועל), was through speech. This follows that the creation of the world, in actuality, was through the letters."[25]

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[19] On Azualia's reception of Cordovero, see Azulai's preface to his Hesed le'Avrham (Amsterdam 1685), p. 9; Sack 1981, 164-165.

[20] Hesed le'Avraham (Amsterdam, 1685), fol. 13c. Compare Pardes Rimonim (Jerusalem; 1962), Part Two, fol. 59c. And see Zohar III: 152a.

[21] The Kabbalistic Writings of R. Ya'akov and R. Yitzhak, the Sons of R. Ya'akov ha-Cohen, 39-57. Compare also Sagie Naor, Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah (Scholem ed.), lines 29-33 and Cordovero, Pardes Rimonim (Jerusalem 1962), Part One, fol. 37d (cited in Lorberbaum 2014, 196, n. 103).

[22] The Kabbalah of R. Yitzhak and R. Ya'akov was known to key Kabbalists, the writings of which were accessible to the Maggid's circle, such as Meir Ibn Gabbai, Moshe Cordovero, Avraham Azualay, Naftali Bachrach and others. See Scholem's review in The Kabbalistic Writings of R. Ya'akov and R. Yitzhak, the sons of R. Ya'akov ha-Cohen, 38.

[23] On the writings of Isaac the Blind, see Scholem 1984, 248-260.

[24] Cf. Pardes Rimonim (Jerusalem, 1962), Part One, fol. 13b.

[25] QLCH Pitchei Hokhamah (Koretz, 1785), fol. 24a. This Kabbalistic work, by R. Moshe Chaim Luzzatto, was first printed in Koretz by students of the Maggid, four years after the first printing of MDL. The 1785 Koretz edition include an imprimatur by an influential student of the Maggid,

2   Towards a Meaningful Speech

Luzzatto's assertion is part of a larger teaching which brings us closer to the Maggid's conception of language. The teaching in QLCH Pitchie Hokhamah, the conclusion of which is the remark cited above, opens with an allusion to Psalms 33:6, where the heavens are said to be made by the word of God. Drawing on the identification of Malkhut with *dibbur*, Luzzatto considers the letters constituting the speech of God the actualization of the hitherto unarticulated thought of God:

> "The hidden meaning of "by the word of YHWH the heavens were made" (Ps. 33.6) is that the [principle of] beginning is Thought, [known as] the Primordial Man (אדם קדמון), and that beginning, completely hidden, is revealed in speech. This follows that whatever is hidden in Thought must be realized (לצאת) in speech."

Here the relation between Thought and Speech takes the Aristotelian form of potentiality and actuality. The heavens are the linguistic state in which the undifferentiated hidden thought of God is actualized. Finite beings, which were hitherto included in an undifferentiated form in the thought of God, are now *be-po'al*, in actuality. This teaching of Luzzatto, with its concluding remark, seems to be echoed in a homily from Maggid Devarav le-Ya'akov and its parallels:

> "Praise YHWH from the heavens" (Ps. 148:1). [We should interpret this] in light of, "Forever, O YHWH, Your Word stands in the firmament" (Ps. 119:89), and "by the word of YHWH the heavens were made" (Ps. 33:6). God created the worlds with speech, and the power of the Maker is in the made. The power of [divine] speech is in the heavens, and through the power of this speech they endure and are sustained. This is the meaning of "Your Word stands in the firmament"—[God's] speech stands in heaven.

R. Ya'akov Yosef of Ostroh. Further, according to the publisher, R. Gedalyahu ben Elyaqim, the printing of Luzzatto's QLCH Pitchei Hokhamah was encouraged by the Maggid who said of Lutzatto that "his generation was not worthy of his riotousness and holiness." (Ibid, fol. 2a) Even if this statement is to be understood apologetically, bearing in mind the controversy around claims about Luzzatto's quasi-Sabbatianism, the celebration of this work and, more importantly, its printing by students of the Maggid, must not be undermined. Cf. Tishby 1978 for the historical, as well as theological affinity between Luzzatto and early Hasidism.

This clearly recalls Luzzatto's own teaching in QLCH Pitchie Hokhmah. But notice that, in addition to Psalms 33:6, the Maggid integrates Psalms 148:1, "Praise YHWH from the heavens." This allows him to move one step further in establishing human speech as the final and critical moment in the process of creation or, if you will, differentiation. Unfolding Psalms 148:1, the Maggid continues by challenging the ontological divide between divine and human speech:

> "Praise 'et' YHWH" refers to all the letters from *aleph* to *tav* (*et*). The letters [are articulated] through the five positions of the mouth, which is the *heh* of "the heavens" (*ha-shamayyim*). You too should "praise" [God] with speech acts made up of the twenty-two letters and five positions [of the mouth]. The principle is that this [human] speech sustains the world, like the power [of God's word] in the heavens. "YHWH" [refers to] the Holy One's speech. "From the heavens" means with the potentia [of] the heavens, through which the world is sustained. The enlightened one will understand.[26]

Invoking a notion found in the prologue to the Zohar,[27] the second half of the teaching thus marks a shift from, or an appropriation of Luzzatto's account of speech and letters. Through their speech, human beings participate in the final actualization of the name of God, YHWH, typically symbolizing the process of sefirotic emanation.[28] Noteworthy is the Maggid's use of the term *koah*, translated here as 'potentia', which seems to relate to its Kabbalistic rendering as 'meaning' when associated with speech. Specifically, *koah* signifies the meaning the word has in potentia and the possibility of its actualization through the activity of intentional speech, particularly prayer.[29]

This notion of meaning is clearly expressed by the thirteenth century in the Gerona Kabbalist R. Ya'akov ben Sheshet's interpretation of a Talmudic dictum in b.*Shabbat* 119b regarding the reward of "answering Amen with one's entire *koah*."[30] Countering the popular interpretation of this dictum, in which *koah* is read as physical or vocal force, R. Ya'akov introduces the 'more appropriate' and somewhat philosophical position which understands *koah* to signify the inner meaning of a given word such that the

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[26] MDL 66 (Mayse's translation, modified, in: Mayse 2015, 264). Compare parallels: Or ha-Emet (Zhitomir, 1900), fol. 11a; Or Torah (New York, 2011), 290.
[27] Zohar, Interlude, 5b.
[28] Cf. Avodat Ha-Qodesh, Part One, Ch. 1.
[29] Cf. Liebes 2007, 163-165.
[30] Meshiv Devarim Nechochim (G. Vajda ed.), 172-173; cited in Liebes 2007, 164.

intentional pronunciation of the Amen is considered the actualization of this inner meaning, hitherto in potentia.[31] *Koah* thus marks both the intentionality of the speaker and the hidden meaning of the word which awaits its actualization through the activity of intentional speech. Put differently, it marks the relation between the word and its referent, actualized through the appropriate mental representation cultivated through prayer[32] Azulai takes this further to suggest that in his intentional liturgical activity, the Kabbalist connects one word to another with "the hammer of the soul," thereby creating a "new spiritual existence" in addition to the spiritual vitality already inherited in the letters articulated in prayer.[33] But here, too, emphasis is on the sanctity of the Hebrew letters which, being the differentiated expression of the process of emanation, are said to be metaphysical in nature: "The mental representation of a given [sacred] word brings initiates the actualization of the potentiality underlying the phrasing letters."[34]

Against the Aristotelian characterization of *koah*, the appropriation of Luzzatto in the Maggid's teaching is further reinforced. While *koah* (lit. potentiality) and *po'al* (lit. actuality) are respectively identified, for Luzzatto, with the yet unarticulated thought of God and its actualization in God's speech, for the Maggid these terms establish human speech as the actualization of that of God. Human speech creates, that is, completes the process of differentiation, thereby being the actualization of the speech in which the heavens endure. If heavens are the letters in their potentiality, then human speech is their actualization. This is boldly expressed in a teaching concerning the ontology of human speech, where the Maggid paraphrases '*osei devaro* of Psalms 103:20, plainly understood as 'obeying' or 'fulfilling' His word. By rendering the verb '*oseh*, the infinitive of which is 'to do', as the noun *ma'aseh*, which can be understood as 'action', the Maggid reads '*osei devaro* as "turning [God's] speech into action."[35]

The participation of human speech in that of God is further established in several of the Maggid's teachings, where the term *dibbur* splits into two moments, the speech of God, identified sefirotically with Malkhut, and the speech of humans; the two standing in a dialectical relationship to each other. This splitting is constituted by the two corresponding technical terms of *dibbur* and 'Olam-ha-Dibbur (lit. 'the realm of speech'), such that man's linguistic activity, typically identified with *dibbur*, has the speech of

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[31] Meshiv Devarim Nechochim (G. Vajda ed.), 172-173.
[32] This understanding of *koah* is characteristic of other influential Kabbalistic works as well. See Ephraim Gottlieb's introduction to Ben Sheshet's work (Ibid, 54).
[33] Hesed le-Avraham (Amsterdam, 1684), fol. 13c-d.
[34] Hesed le-Avraham (Amsterdam, 1684), fol. 13d.
[35] MDL, 71.

God, 'Olam ha-Dibbur, as its counterpart.[36] But it should be stressed that by *dibbur* the Maggid appears to have in mind something broader, indeed more radical than specific forms of sacred language which, in Kabbalistic traditions, man is said to focus his thought upon. This is not argued explicitly, but indications as to the identification of *dibbur* with 'everyday' or 'ordinary' language can be traced throughout Maggid Devarav le-Ya'akov and its parallels, though in some teachings the term *dibbur* is indeed reserved to sacred liturgical forms of speech, like study of Torah.[37] In this respect, the Maggid appears to challenge the assumption that the divine vitality conditioning the world of differentiation requires the appeal to a restricted linguistic field, sacred language, which functions as its symbolic counterpart. To be sure, this is not to deny the sacred register of the Hebrew, for, subscribing to classical Kabbalistic accounts of language, the Maggid considers the language of the Torah to be composed of "the names of God."[38] However, we shall presently see how the importance of speech is extended by the Maggid to everyday speech as well.[39]

The Maggid's fascination with everyday language concerns the ability to relate speech, understood here as participating in the process of differentiation, to that which makes differentiation possible. But before attending to such considerations, attention should be drawn to a broader question pertaining to the activity of speech. The focus on human language, followed by the qualification of the so-called pure divine speech, suggests that most interesting to the Maggid is the power human beings possess in their ordinary use of language. Rather than submitting to a fixed revelatory language, man's everyday speech is considered the possibility for constituting the meaningful differentiation of things. But if the power of speech consists in the differentiated, and therefore meaningful constitution of things, then the question arises as to the conditions underlying such a meaningful constitution in the ordinary exercise of language: How does one use words meaningfully without appealing to a metaphysical-like, or, if you will, sacred language in which particular words are said to carry essential meaningful properties? For the Kabbalist, this question can be simply answered by invoking the meaning inherent within Hebrew words, by virtue of the fact that they are the

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[36] Cf. MDL, 26, 44, 53-54, 70-71, 110, 183-184. And yet, in some teachings the term associated with the sefirah of Malkhut, i.e., the speech of God, is simply *dibbur*. See Or Ha-Ma'or (Zhitomir 1900), fol. 5b. It is difficult to establish the distinction between these terms, *dibbur* and '*olam ha-dibbur*, in definite terms, considering that the writings we possess are recordings of teachings translated from the Yiddish and further edited by students of the Maggid.
[37] Cf. MDL, 26, 41, 44, 85-86.
[38] MDL, 227.
[39] Cf. MDL, 152.

differentiated articulations of the undifferentiated source. The meaningful implication of words figures in their intentional use, exercised by the Kabbalist liturgically. But the appeal to the symbolic characterization of words seems to fall short when the question of meaning is asked in connection with ordinary language, because ordinary language marks a discrepancy vis-à-vis the emanative status inherit in sacred language. Thus, the question as to the power man has in rendering language meaningful is rather important.

I have mentioned the Kabbalistic rendering of the word *koah* while underscoring the intentional component in the activity of speech. For the Maggid, however, intentionality takes a more radical form when exercised in connection with words. It means relating the world of differentiation, i.e., speech, to that which escapes articulation but yet conditions it. In this way, any construction of words, any phrasing of statement, can be rendered meaningful, that is, be related to the *ayin*. This is anticipated by what the Maggid considers a simple fact about the reality of words in relation to intention, namely, that speech and thought stand vis-à-vis each other in a dialectic relation, such that "thought yearns to be expressed in speech, through voice," just as "speech desires and yearns to be attached to thought."[40] Viewed in connection with everyday language, this means that words are not exercised referentially, as though having their meaningful counterpart in some fixed metaphysical register, further awaiting their actualization through the intentional prayer of the Kabbalist. Such a position indeed leaves us in the confines of a sacred language, composed of fixed symbolic words which are metaphysically endowed with their referential significance. Rather, one's intentionality determines how words are used and thereby qualifies their significance.[41] This means that the meaning speech carries must not be viewed independently of the mental act.[42] Intention renders words, of any linguistic register, meaningful:

> When speaking with intentionality, "and by intentionality are the chambers filled [with all precious and pleasant riches]" (Prov. 24:4), man draws divinity into the letters, and when doing so they contain the totality [of the spiritual realms].[43]

The implications of this intentional-linguistic activity are far-reaching, for it suggests

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[40] MDL, 184. Cf. MDL 159.
[41] Compare Cavell 2012, 12-16.
[42] Cf. MDL, 70, 91, 101-102, 183-184.
[43] MDL, Ibid.

that spoken words which lack appropriate intentionality result in an imperfect differentiated world. As the Maggid puts it in a different teaching while appropriating the Lurianic notion of broken vessels: "Speaking without intentionality results in breaking the vessels, for [without intentionality] there is no vitality in the vessels."[44] Here vessels are understood in terms of letters which, identified as the physicality of the world,[45] implies the constitution of the differentiated world through the appropriate intention.

Speaking intentionally means cultivating a consciousness of a pre-linguistic state of existence, ultimately leading to the *ayin*, and which, at the first stage, takes the form of discursive thought, *makhshavah*, where the existence of letters is not pronounced. It is directing one's mental state to that which preconditions, and thereby makes possible, the existence of a differentiated world. But this movement, whereby consciousness is revealed in speech through one's intentions, has the *ayin* as its ultimate object. It seeks to reveal the *ayin* in everyday speech. To better understand this, I shall briefly introduce some developments in the Kabbalistic conception of the *ayin*, against which this term appears to have been appropriated by the Maggid.

3 Reconsidering the Ayin

The term *ayin,* rendered conceptually as 'nothingness, indicated for the Kabbalists the state of strict metaphysical unity, but the same term also marks the first hypostasis of God and, by virtue of that, it preconditions the process of emanation.[46] This seems to draw on the Neoplatonic emanation of the *yesh*, 'being', from the *ayin*, found in R. Shlomo Ibn Gabirol's *Keter Malkhut*.[47] But in its Kabbalistic rendition the *ayin* is considered a liminal moment which functions, on the one hand, as the principle underlying the emanative process of the differentiated *sefirot*, hence 'primordial being',[48] while characterized as simple and coeternal with the Infinite, the *ein-sof*, and therefore absolutely transcendent, or simply 'nothing'. It is said to precondition the prime

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[44] MDL, 45.

[45] Cf. MDL, 81.

[46] Though the term *ayin* does not appear in Sagie Naor's commentary, it is central to the writings of his followers. Thus, this term, whose appearance as a Kabbalistic technical term is associated with Job 28.12, marks for R. Ezra of Gerona the first hypostasis of God which sets forth the process of the seirotic emanation. Cf. Ezra of Gerona's Commentary on Songs (Chavell ed.), 483, 506, 510-511.

[47] Cited in Lorberbaum 2014, 180. The relation between Ibn Gabirol and early Kabbalah was indicated in scholarship. Liebes 1987 further argues for the identification of Ibn Gabirol as a proto-Kabbalist, considering his use and appropriation of Sefer Yetsirah as being in agreement with "the spirit of the early Kabbalists." (Liebes 1987, 75).

[48] Cf. R. Yosef Giqatilia, Sha'arei Orah (Warsaw, 1883), 44a. Cited in Matt 1995, 74.

principle of differentiated existence, identified with Hokhmah, thereby leading to its paradoxical characterization is beyond the *yesh,* and yet related to it. This ambivalence towards the *ayin* runs through Kabbalistic thought and is further thematized in terms of a proper name whose reference to its subject implies no distinguishing representation thereof, indeed, no representation.[49]

The characterization of the *ayin* as the completely undifferentiated state is central to the Maggid and is repeated throughout his teachings. But the Maggid also appropriates this term, whereby he attempts to challenge the characterization of *ayin* as above and separated from all differentiation. In order to fully appreciate this appropriation, attention should be first drawn to the commentary on Sefer Yetzirah of the fourteenth century R. Yosef ben Shalom Askenazi, where the characterization of the *ayin* seems to anticipate the appropriation of this term by the Maggid. The striking similarity, which we shall presently address, between the Maggid's conception of *ayin* and that of R. Yosef is not by chance, for this commentary, printed in Koretz two years before the publication of Maggid Devarav le-Ya'akov, was certainly known to the Maggid's circle, and as expressed in Qedushat Levi by R. Levi Yitzhak of Berdychiv.[50] Thus, addressing their sefirotic relation in the introduction to his commentary, R. Yosef considers the dynamic interplay between Keter to Hokhmah as that between 'being' and 'decay', or, to use his own terms, perhaps first introduced in Ibn Tibbon's translation of the Guide, between *havayah* and *hefsed.* Hokhmah is the ὕλη, or היולי in its Hebrew rendering,[51] here identified as the principle of being,[52] while *ayin* is decay. The characterization of *ayin* as

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[49] The corresponding identification of the *ein sof* and *ayin* with subject and proper name finds expression in the appropriation of the Midrashic dictum in Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer 3.1: "Only God and His name existed prior to the creation of the world." As far as I know, the first philosophical rendering of this dictum is Maimonides' Guide I:61, where the name, identified as the tetragrammaton, is considered to function as a proper name which transcends any meaningful representation of God. In this respect, "prior to the creation of the world" marks a state distinguished from all other divine attributes, which, according to Maimonides, are derived from, and thereby correspond to, God's actions. Interestingly enough, following Maimonides, the majority of early Kabbalists introduce this very dictum, rendered Kabbalistically, in order to reconcile the simplicity of God and the emanated sefirot. In this respect, the *ayin* is considered the proper name of God which, being coeternal with the *ein sof,* yet not reducible to it, marks the dialectic moment of transition from simplicity to multiplicity. Cf. Zohar I:22a; Meir ibn Gabbai, Avodat Ha-Qodesh (Jerusalem, 1992), 2-4; Yosef Giqatilia, Ginat Egoa (Yeshivat ha-Chaim ve-Hashalom ed.), 43, 52; Tordous Abulafia, Otzar ha-Kavod, Ch. *Ein 'Omdim*; Rabenu Yona Girondi, Derashot u'Perushei R. Yona (Jerusalem, 1986), f. 18a; Pardes Rimonim (Jerusalem, 1962), fol. 11a-13a.
[50] Cf. Qedushat Levi (Munkacs, 1939), fol. 118d. Cf. Gries 1992, 59.
[51] Cf. Nachmanides' Commentary on Genesis (Chavell ed.), 12-13; R. Ezra's Commentary on Songs (Chavell ed.), 494.
[52] Yosef Ben Shalom Ashkenazi, Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah, fol. 2b.

decay recalls R. Ezra of Gerona's notion of the *ayin*, which he identifies as death, or the exhaustion of created beings:

> "God saw all that he had made, and it was very good," (Gen. 1:31) [the superlative] 'very' signifies the cleaving [of created things] with *ayin*, which is the cause for the change of generations. It is in reference to this that R. Meir taught us (Gen. Rabbah 9:5) that [the superlative] very good (טוב מאד) denotes death."[53]

R. Yosef characterizes the *ayin* in a similar fashion when asserting that "while Being constructs, *ayin*, which is decay, destroys."[54] But it should be stressed that 'decay' here does not imply what in Maimonides' Aristotelian account is attributed to the 'matter' of finite beings, in-itself ever lacking, but is rather associated with the existence of the true Being, in relation to which all limited and differentiated existence undergoes decay and privation. The *ayin* is the absolute Being which, according to R. Yosef, is called *hefsed* insofar as it "denies apprehension and thought."[55] This transcendence of the *ayin*, in light of which it is characterized as 'nothing', has ontological implications as well. Like in R. Ezra's *ayin* here, too, it is said to be responsible for change and degeneration to which finite beings are subject. It, the *ayin*, "strips away the form" of the particular being, thus making possible for that particular to take a different form. In this way, the *ayin* has the paradoxical characterization of being beyond, yet responsible for ontological difference. Its transcendence makes possible the movement of beings in time and space. Or, to use Scholem's formulation, "nothing can change without coming into contact with this region of pure absolute Being which the mystics call Nothing."[56] It is possible that this notion of the *ayin*, found in R. Ezra and R. Yosef, is in fact a Kabbalistic appropriation of the Aristotelian account of change and decay which made its way to Maimonides' Guide and possibly further transmitted to early Kabbalistic sources through the rendition of the Arabic *ka'in* (כאין) and *fasid* (פסיד) as *havayah* and *hefsed*.[57] If this is

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[53] R. Ezra of Gerona's Commentary on Songs (Chavell ed.), 510-511.
[54] Yosef Ben Shalom Ashkenazi, Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah, fol. 3a; 17d. The rendition of *hefsed* as 'decay' must be done cautiously, and as I try to do in the proceeding lines.
[55] Yosef Ben Shalom Ashkenazi, Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah, fol. 3a; 17d.
[56] Scholem 1941, 217.
[57] Cf. Guide of the Perplexed, II:1. It is difficult to determine the translation to which R. Yosef refers to in his use of these terms, for havayah and hefsed appear as technical terms in bothYosef Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah I:2. However, with respect to R. Ezra's account of ayin, the reference to Al-Harizi's translation is quite clear and, to reiterate Scholem's remark, the term

indeed the case, then we are dealing here with a mystical reception of Aristotelian physics, mediated through Jewish philosophy.[58]

A patently similar characterization of the *ayin* is to be found in the teachings of the Maggid, further illustrated in several places throughout his teachings by the conversion of an egg into a chicken. Here, too, we find the incomprehensibility of the *ayin* and its ontological implications:

> One thing cannot be [logically] transformed into something else. Just as the conversion of an egg into a chicken implies the decay of the egg, so too anything [that exist] must undergo decay. It must attain the level of *ayin* and then it can become something else.[59]

The *ayin* is the "in between," that is, in between a definite state of a thing and its transformation into something else. This notion, we shall soon see, is directly related to the possibility of meaningful speech, viewed in connection with intention. But first we must notice an important change in the Maggid's concept of the *ayin*. For R. Yosef, as well as other Kabbalists like R. Ezra and Nachmanides, the *ayin* is the true being which is said to precede, indeed, stand in tension with, the first "subtle principle" of differentiated being, identified, in turn, with the second sefirah of Hokhmah. For many of the early Kabbalists, this is further established by the identification of this 'subtle principle', Hokhmah, with the Aristotelian ὕλη, the היולי which, standing against the *ayin* of Keter, is considered the primal thing from which any differentiated being is issued forth. Thus, in R. Azriel of Geron's Commentary on the Talmudic Agaddot, the letters of the word Hokhama (חכמה) are reconfigured, resulting in the two words *koah ma* (כח מה), literally "the potentiality of what [is possible]".[60] Hokhmah is considered the subtle principle which anticipates, or carries the existence of a differentiated reality which is further constituted by the proceeding sefiroth. In this way, the *ayin* appears to be in

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אפיסה מוחלטת (lit. absolute Naught) appears in Al-Harizi's translation of Guide III:10. (Cf. Scholem 1984, 420-421). Indeed, some phrases in the second prologue to R. Ezra's commentary on Songs are almost a verbatim citation of Al-Harizi's translation. Cf. R. Ezra of Gerona's Commentary on Songs (Chavell ed.), 481-483.

[58] Cf. Phys., I:7. See the discussion in Matt 1995 and Scholem 1984, 420-421 about the pre-Kabbalistic Jewish appropriation of this Aristotelian principle.

[59] MDL, 49. Cf. MDL, 83-84, 91, 134. In speaking of the incapability of transformation from one thing into another, the Maggid seems to draw, again, on R. Yosef's commentary. (Cf. Yosef Ben Shalom Askenazi's Commentary, in: Sefer Yetsirah, Introduction, Ch. 1).

[60] R. Azriel of Gerona's Commentary on the Talmudic Agaddot (Tishby ed.), 84.

tension with the היולי of Hokhmah; a tension which, being responsible for change in time and space, was well acknowledged by R. Yosef ben Shalom. Jumping to the Maggid, the characterization of היולי as the prime ontological principle is maintained in his teachings,[61] but its characterization as standing vis-à-vis the ayin is challenged.

Put bluntly, the היולי is established in the Maggid's teachings not as the ontological principle proceeding from the *ayin*, but as the *ayin* itself. This is a radical shift from the classic Kabbalistic approach to the *ayin* which follows the identification of the *ayin* with Hokhmah, thereby considering it the principle through and in which things receive their particular form: "Hokhmah is the *ayin*, which is the היולי of all existence."[62] And yet in another teaching: "There is an attribute which connects intellect to intellection and this attribute cannot be grasped, for it is the attribute of *ayin*, which is the (היולי)."[63]

The binary opposition of *ayin* and *yesh* is thus challenged in the Maggid's appropriation of the *ayin*. For we are no longer dealing with a metaphysical picture where *ayin* is understood in strict transcendental terms, as though marking the true being standing over and against the world of differentiation. Rather, the *ayin* is established by the Maggid as a dialectic principle which, vanishing any form of differentiation, makes possible the very movement towards the state of particular beings; that is, towards the *yesh*. The *ayin* is not understood as the opposite of the *yesh*, but rather as the ground upon which the *yesh* exists, for the principle of differentiated being is not the subtle ontological principle, the existence of which is in contradistinction to the effacing *ayin*. Rather, the dialectic principle of transformation is the very ground of existence. Finite beings are ontologically differentiated because they have the *ayin* as their ground; it is their היולי. But insofar as it is the ground of all finite beings, the ayin is also that which is expressed in the differentiated existence of such beings. This is expressed in a teaching where, invoking again the egg and chicken illusion, the Maggid draws on the interplay between the word *aytan* (איתן) and its reconfiguration in the form of *tanya* (תניא), the two rendered as 'might' and 'discursive thought', respectively:

> The intellect (*maskil* משכיל) becomes intellection (*sekhel* שכל) and intellection becomes speech, and one cannot grasp that which connects them. It [the connecting principle] is called *aytan*, the reconfiguration of which is *tanya*.

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[61] Compare MDL 162, where Hokhmah is considered the prime matter which "strips away one form and takes another."

[62] MDL, 91. Cf. MDL, 134.

[63] MDL, 83; Or ha-Emet 18a.

> Here it is called *tanya* because in thought it [the *aytan*] takes the form of discursive learning. But in itself [this principle] is called *aytan*, which, considering its incomprehensibility, means 'might'.[64]

The *ayin* is the 'might' of *aytan*; it is beyond differentiation. But it is precisely its undifferentiated characterization which allows it to function as the condition which makes possible the existence of differentiation, be it in the form of discursive thought which, for the Maggid as well as the Kabbalists,[65] is already constituted of letters, albeit in a subtle form. Indeed, the movement from toward speech is an instance of the *ayin*. That is to say, the differentiated nature of finite beings, constituted of speech, testifies to the activity of the *ayin* which, effacing all differences, makes possible the existence of differentiated beings.

It is in light of these remarks about the Maggid's account of the *ayin* that I now return to the question of ordinary language and its relation to the *ayin*. This, in fact, will also bring us back to the opening remarks in this paper, concerning the ontological importance of language to the concepts of *yesh* and *ayin* which have been extensively discussed in modern scholarship on Hasidism. Specifically, I will argue that rather than viewing them as mutually exclusive, a tension which seems to have been central to modern scholarship, the concepts of *yesh* and *ayin* mark a dialectic process whereby the undifferentiated principle of *ayin* makes possible, indeed, is expressed in, the state of differentiated beings. This further implies that one's spiritual and ethical activity is to be viewed in agreement with this dialectic movement.

In a famous teaching, printed towards the end of Maggid Devarav le-Ya'akov,[66] the Maggid uses an analogy of father and child to explicate the movement from within the physical world towards God. The analogy is of a play between father and child, where the father, concealing his own face, receives great joy when the child reveals the father's face by successfully removing his hand.[67] In relating this analogy, one may assume that the Maggid considers the act of disclosure as the movement away from the differentiated world. The face of the father, the *ayin*, is to be disclosed through the removal of the hand,

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[64] MDL, 84.
[65] Cf. MDL, 86; Moshe ben Ya'akov of Kiev, Commentary on Sefer Yetsirah, fol. 22a-b. Moshe be Ya'akov's Commentary, also known as Otzar Hashem, was another work known the Maggid's circle and it was printed in Koretz in 1779, a bit before the printing of MDL. Cf. Lieberman 1980, 93-104).
[66] MDL, 239-242.
[67] MDL, 240-241.

that is, through the withdrawal from the physical world. But the second part of the teaching leaves little room for such a reading. As far as it concerns the notion of concealment, the state of material differentiation maintains its analogical relation to the covering hand. However, the removing of the hand, whereby the face is disclosed, is not explained in terms of overcoming, or withdrawing from the material world, but quite the contrary. It is only within the material state that the face of the father, the *ayin*, is disclosed. In this way, the relation between father and child takes a turn, whereby the movement from child the father, or, put in our context, from a world of differentiation towards God, does not exhaust our relation to the physical world, but rather takes place within its very limits. This is articulated in the end of the teaching, where the Maggid asserts that: "When removed from God, one's thought is occupied with material matters. Nevertheless, the inspired person is capable of finding God even in such material matters for nothing is void of God." So, rather than finding the *ayin* by moving away from the world of the ordinary experience, the inspired person is called to realize that the ordinary experience of the *yesh* is dialectically linked to the *ayin*. Therefore, by affirming the world of ordinary experience it is possible to approximate the *ayin*.

4   Conclusion

This enables us to conclude with a look at how the Maggid conceives of the figure of the *Tzaddik*, the figure who is able to lead himself to the state of the *ayin* within the differentiated world,[68] and in so doing to reveal that the *ayin* is in fact present within all forms of human language. By approximating the *ayin* within the differentiated world of ordinary language, the *Tzaddik* redirects the intention of ordinary language back to the names of God,[69] showing that even the most mundane forms of human language can have the *ayin* as their object when they are spoken with proper intentionality. The *Tzaddik* functions for the Maggid as the paradigmatic figure who appropriates the forms of mundane and ordinary language, and in so doing shows that everyday speech, and not merely liturgical speech, can participate in the ontologically creative act of language. Because even ordinary speech can reveal the *ayin* if spoken with the proper intentionality, the task of human beings is to appropriate the forms of fallen language and to redirect them toward the divine.

This conception of the *Tzaddik* enables us to see what is perhaps the most radical claim within the Maggid's entire corpus of teachings, that even the speech of everyday

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[68] MDL, 101-102.
[69] MDL, 60-61, 110, 293-294.

life, if spoken with the proper intentionality, can participate in the ontological constitution of the differentiated world, and can connect this fallen world to the undifferentiated state. Because the *ayin* is not defined in opposition to human language, but rather as the in-between state situated within all human speech, every human speech act possesses the capability to invoke the *ayin*, if spoken with the proper intentionality. The act of ontological speech, then, is removed from the province of only the liturgy, and taken into the everyday realm. At its most radical level, the strict dichotomy between the liturgy and the speech of ordinary life breaks down. For the Maggid, then, every speech act can potentially lead back to the state of the *ayin*, and every human who speaks can participate in an ontologically creative act. It remains for us to explore the way in which different forms of ethical practice make possible human participation in the ontologically creative act of speech; for this paper, it suffices to show that the Maggid's revision of earlier Kabbalistic conceptions of the *ayin* offers the radical possibility that all human acts may at least in theory participate in the move from potentia to actuality.

And this may be the final paradox in the Maggid's teachings. By showing that the *ayin*, or nothingness, is present in all of our speech, he in fact offers the possibility that our differentiated, worldly speech may be more meaningful than ever before.

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An Exegesis of "Religious Anarchism" of Martin Buber

Fumio Ono

1   Introduction: Religious Anarchism

As is well known, in an exchange on the interpretation of Hasidism, Gershom Scholem criticizes "[Martin] Buber's philosophy," which explains ties to God in reference to the decision "here and now" as simply being an "essentially anarchical view," which does not say anything at all as to "what" (the content of the decision) but rather as to "how" to make a decision (Judaica 1: 198).[1] Scholem argues that the "here and now" that Buber attempts to realize is not a problem in Hasidism, but rather something that will be destroyed in the end.[2] For example, in contrast to Buber, who argues that the separation between "life in God" and "life in the world" should be overcome by way of authentic and concrete unity, he delivers harsh criticism that "Buber's 'concrete unity,' when applied to Hasidism, is a fiction, for 'life in the world' is no longer life in the world when its divine roots appear in contemplation and thereby transform it into 'life in God'" (Judaica 1: 197). Building on these comments, he gives the following definition:

> To put it bluntly, Buber is a religious anarchist, and his teaching is religious anarchism (Judaica 1: 197).

What Scholem tries to convey in the above is that the picture of Hasidism described by Buber as the overcoming of the rigid tradition of rabbinic Judaism is not the true picture

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[1] Unless otherwise stated, quotes from Scholem's Judaica series are identified by the volume and page numbers only. When Buber is quoted, the old version of his collected work is abbreviated as "W," and only the volume and page numbers are mentioned.

[2] Scholem says: „Die Lehre von der Erhebung der Funken durch die Aktivität des Menschen besagt in der Tat, daß es in der Wirklichkeit ein Element gibt, mit dem der Mensch eine positive Verbindung herstellen kann und soll, aber die Freilegung oder Verwirklichung dieses Elements *vernichtet* zugleich die Wirklichkeit, insofern »Wirklichkeit«, wie bei Buber, das Hier und Jetzt bedeutet. [...] Das Hier und Jetzt wird transzendiert und verschwindet, wo das göttliche Element in der Kontemplation erscheint […]. Ja, darüber hinaus enthält die chassidische Auffassung von der Verwirklichung des Konkreten, um die es hier letzten Ende geht, ein wesentliches Element der Destruktion, von dem Bubers Analyse, soweit ich sehe, begreiflicherweise keinerlei Notiz nimmt." (Judaica 1: 188f./191).

of Hasidism but "deriv[es] from his own philosophy of religious anarchism and existentialism," and is no more than "a fiction" (Judaica 1: 202). This is because, according to Scholem's understanding, Hasidism has always been faithful to the Judaic tradition, and the characteristic Buber has identified is simply one aspect of Hasidism.

However, the purpose of this current article is not to settle the Hasidism controversy between Buber and Scholem. Instead, it attempts to re-evaluate Scholem's critical expression of "religious anarchism" in a positive manner. By doing so, it aims to understand the constant generative movement, the movement to establish a new order by destroying existing institutions, systems, and dogmas, which is at the heart of Buber's thought.

2   An Encounter with Anarchism

Anarchism was initially cultivated in socialist thinking, and God's sovereignty and that of extant political power is rejected in Stirner, Proudhon, and Bakunin's thinking. In this regard, Buber's idea, which is premised on the relationship with God, is different from the type of anarchism that rejects any kind of sovereignty. Since anarchism nonetheless orients toward some kind of alternative order, either directly or indirectly, we can raise questions about the principle of sovereignty behind that order. In other words, anarchism is a movement that attempts to find a possible narrow path between the inevitability of sovereignty and the abolition of it. Furthermore, if we understand anarchism, true to its etymology, as a movement to escape extant archê [ἀρχή] (origin/sovereignty), we can see at the core of Buber's thought an element that is aligned with anarchist thought.

Buber was involved with a very diverse range of social reform thought and movements in different epochs, and, in terms of the formation of his thinking, the activities in his youth are of particular importance. For instance, he was, of course, committed to Zionism and contributed to the development of the Jewish youth movement, when the youth movements were gathering pace in Germany. In relation to this, he was committed to the Jewish Renaissance movement, which was followed by a number of important and unique achievements: the establishment of Jüdischer Verlag, the plan to establish a Hebrew University, involvement with *Ost und West*, publication of *the Jewish Encyclopedia*, translation of Jewish classics into German, and the editing and publication of *Jüdische Künstler*. In this context, he became particularly interested in mysticism and carried out research into diverse mystic movements in Germany, Judaism, Christianity, Scandinavia, China, India, and Buddhism. In particular, while scholars such as Heinrich

Graetz had not given due consideration to Jewish mysticism and treated it as a sideline, the fact that Buber, for the first time, discussed the importance of mysticism in Judaism has had a profound impact on the understanding of Judaism since then.

Among artistic movements and community reform movements leading to anarchist thought were the "Friedrichshagener Dichterkreis" in Berlin around 1899, the "Neue Gemeinschaft" of the Hart Brothers in which he participated in 1901, the "Forte-Kreis" in which he participated in 1910, the Hellerau Theatre Association in which he participated in 1913, and the "Pathmos-Kreis" in which he participated in 1915. People he met in these venues nudged him to commit to socialist movements (religious socialism, anarchism, and later the kibbutz movement). In addition, we cannot ignore his continued involvement with educational movements (the *Reformpädagogik* movement by Paul Geheeb, *Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus* in Frankfurt, Jewish adult education, and higher education), in trying to comprehend Buber's thinking.

Regarding Buber's direct relationship with anarchist thought, the anarchism of Gustav Landauer, eight years Buber's senior, has defining importance. The relationship between Landauer and Buber commenced in the "*Neue Gemeinschaft*," and Buber was profoundly influenced by Landauer regarding the devotion to German mysticism and acceptance of socialist anarchism. On the other hand, Buber opened Landauer's eyes to the significance of Hasidism. In addition, Landauer's critique played an important role in Buber changing his attitudes toward World War I. After Landauer's death, Buber republished *The Collection of Writing on Mysticism by Master Eckhart,* which Landauer translated (first edition in 1903), and which was followed by *Shakespeare* and *Der werdende Mensch*. In 1919, a year after Landauer was brutally killed, Buber prepared "the preface" for *Der grosse Maggid und seine Nachfolge* (published in 1922) in which he for the first time discussed the theme of "*Ich und Du*." He then started to draft *Ich und Du* afresh and completed the first draft. What occupied Buber's mind in this process was to take on the challenge of thinking about the community in accordance with Landauer's ideals following the shock of his murder (Anderson & Cissna eds. 1997; Friedman 1991).

In *Die Revolution* (1907), published in the *Gesellschaft* series edited by Buber, Landauer named the universal and comprehensive whole of various kinds of human communities as "*topos*" and defined revolution as "awakening" in which the old is awakened in the new, as a transitional phenomenon in which an old *topos* changes into a new *topos*.

> It is by a utopia that the stability of existence of *topos* changes in this way. […] With a utopia, a different *topos* which is fundamentally differentiated from the prior *topos* is formed. Still, it is a *topos* after all. […] Each *topos* is accompanied by its own utopia. Furthermore, each utopia is accompanied by a *topos*. This is repeated (Landauer 1907: 12f.).

> Therefore, revolution is nothing but a period in which a *topos* transitions to another, in other words, a border between two *topos*. […] The utopia is awakened in this way, […] and is constantly old, at the same time new (Landauer 1907: 17).

As seen above, Landauer sees the possibility of revolution in the transitional phenomenon in which the form of a fixed community becomes unstable and fluid, and a form of a new community is generated in the ideas, such as a *topos*, as the totality of various forms of human communities, the moment of utopia that disrupts the *topos* and the pairing of *topos* and utopia. However, for Landauer, this kind of movement in which the form of community collapses and generates itself is not only found in the field of politics in the narrow sense of the word but also in mysticism. Rather, it is more accurate to say he regarded theological problems as having very actual meanings for political practice.

Buber learned these perspectives from Landauer and became very interested in mysticism so much so that he took up German mysticism in his doctoral thesis as well as developing concrete practice in the form of the Jewish Renaissance movement.

Buber continued to absorb Landauer's thinking even after he migrated to Palestine, and given the political circumstances of the newly founded state of Israel, this led to concrete practices such as *Kibbutzim*. Let us review its main features, drawing from *Pfade in Utopia*, Buber's later writing on politics. Buber positively evaluates the fact that Landauer did not regard the state as something that could be destroyed by revolution. Landauer considered the state as a form of human interaction. Consequently, state-like order exists in the inner world of human beings as well as everywhere in society. According to Landauer, socialist revolution that aspires to alternative human relationships is not pursued within the state but "outside" or "by" the state, and there the building of a new society is planned. What is needed for this is a revival of *Volk*, a free union of people underpinned by community spirit. The route in which traces of traditions of the old form of community are revived, under new possibilities, is defined as the

meaning of revolution. Buber thinks highly of this kind of thinking by Landauer.

> Socialism can never be anything absolute. It is the continual becoming of human community in mankind, adapted and proportioned to whatever can be willed and done in the condition given. Rigidity threatens all realization […]. True socialism watches over the forces of renewal (WI: 898).

Buber criticizes many revolutionary theories for presetting the either-or scheme of the state or non-state in an absolute manner and for excluding everything intermediate, everything that interposes itself as impurity (WI: 888). Even if it aims for good ideals, if the movement is "fixed" into a particular scheme, it would "threaten" the ideals to be realized. Buber argues that the equation of socialist revolution with revival can take diverse forms according to the "degree" of "each situation," while resisting and sidelining the either-or scheme. In addition, if a utopia accompanies a *topos*, the utopia to be desired is already hidden in the situation of "here and now." We can say that Buber learned from Landauer's anarchism the idea of deconstructing the scheme and attempting social change based on human relationships that continue to renew/revive/become.

3   Fetishism and Mysticism

The idea of envisioning a community departing from the movement of dismantling and generation demands a perspective that examines the form society widely takes and at the fundamental level, while going beyond the narrow subject of investigation in each discipline. Here, I would like to mention Fritz Mauthner, a key person who connects Buber and Landauer. An atheist and assimilated Jew from a Hasidism family of Bohemia, Mauthner worked as a writer/critic/philosopher and is renowned for his *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* (1901–1902). Buber, who got to know Mauthner through Landauer, commissioned Mauthner to contribute *Die Sprache* (1907) to his *Gesellschaft* series.

Mauthner was a nominalist and took the view that there is a reality that works on human beings or on which human beings work and that language is mere translation or metaphor of such language. Thus was born the criticism of "*Fetischismus mit Worten*" (Mauthner 1999). Because language is a "habit" (something social), it cannot reach the "individuality" of the reality.

This perspective has something in common with Buber – to understand language as existence in "the between" (*das Dazwischen*) – and something that differs from Buber –

evaluation of the social aspect of language. In particular, Mauthner is slightly but fundamentally different from Buber, who finds the possibility of the principle of individuation in mysticism in "Participation (*Umfassung*)," in other words, "the between."[3] Landauer wrote a lot about Mauthner starting with *Skepsis und Mystik* (1903), and he has much in common with Buber in that he has overcome Mauthner in a critical manner, pointing out that connection with the world and everything exists in the individual, or to put it the other way round, understanding the individual as a node in various relationships and communication, and seeking the "reality" in solidarity and community.

Buber's philosophy is not systematized as an independent theory of language; conversely however, no text of his is unrelated to thinking about language. The piece of work in which he is relatively focused on language is "*Das Wort, das gesprochen wird*" (1960). The article is based on the lecture originally prepared for a symposium with Heidegger in Munich. For this reason, some statements manifest Heidegger, such as the "truth" in Hebrew, which does not originate from *Aletheia* but from "sincerity" toward others. What is more interesting is that he explains the characteristics of language in economic terms and discusses money and language in reference to the phenomena of distribution, communication, and exchange, in other words, from a perspective of a mediated relationship called "the between."

> The Importance of the spoken word, I think, is grounded in the fact that it does not want to remain with the speaker. […] The word that is spoken is found rather in the oscillating sphere between the persons, the sphere that I call the "between" and that we can never allow to be contained without a remainder in the two participants (WI: 443).

We can understand the above quote based on themes such as private ownership or reification of money. In addition, there are other interesting terms such as "otherness," "moment of astonishment," and "the words' aura," and he discusses language and money by superimposing them onto each other as an "exchange=communication" movement, while describing this movement as a game among those who do not and cannot share rules.[4]

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[3] For Buber's relationship with Mauthner and the relationship between mysticism and dialogical philosophy, see Ono (2007).
[4] Lévinas, in his exchange with Buber, mentions the excess that exceeds self-gift by linking it

Buber attended many economics classes as well as classes in philosophy, sociology, aesthetics, and psychology (Universities of Leipzig, Zurich, and Berlin). However, what is more interesting is that his encounter with Georg Simmel in 1898, one of the most important people for young Buber, and his interaction with him overlapped with the period in which Simmel was working on the theory of money including "*Das Geld in der Modernen Kultur*" (1898) and *Philosophie des Geldes* (1900).[5] Simmel, facing squarely the popular lament at that time that "money has become God of our age," was thinking about the commonality between money and the concept of God.

> The concept of God has its deeper essence in the fact that all the varieties and contrasts of the world reach unity in it, that it is the *coincidentia oppositorum*, in the beautiful phrase of Nicholas of Cusa, that peculiarly modern spirit of the waning Middle Age. […] The feelings stimulated by money have a psychological similarity to this in their own arena. […] [Money] becomes the centre in which the most opposing, alien and distant things find what they have in common and touch each other (Simmel 1992: 191f.).

Simmel repeats the motif that the different and uncompromising find unity and compromise in "*Die Gegensätze des Lebens und die Religion*" (1904) in which he places Cusanus's "*coincidentia oppositorum*" at the core of religiosity. This was the exact year in which Buber submitted his doctoral thesis in philosophy, "*Zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems: Nicolaus von Cues und Jacob Böhme*" (1904). This suggests how much both were focused on mysticism as a common source of thought that enables "*coincidentia oppositorum*," which is shared in religion, money, and politics.

As for Buber, he later mentions Cusanus in "*I and Thou*" and presents it as an idea of "bipolarity."

> If one starts out from the soul, the perfect relationship can only be seen as bipolar, as *coincidentia oppositorum*, as the fusion of opposite feelings (WI: 132f.).

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with money (Lévinas 1976: 47). We need another article to discuss the relationship between money, justice, and ethics (Lévinas 2003).

[5] What is often mentioned as important in the relationship between Buber and Simmel is their focus on the reciprocity that makes society possible and the concrete form that reciprocity takes. However, as far as I can see, studies now attempt to examine both in reference to thinking about money and mysticism. See Eisenstadt (2002) for the difference between the two.

Against this contextual background, Buber emphasizes mystic thinking, which is often characterized as "*unio mystica*," not simply as the orientation to "one-ness" but also as the orientation to "two-ness," which cannot be erased, in other words, the idea of "bipolarity." In this instance, the principle of bipolarity that enables dialectics without *Aufhebung* is placed at the core of *Dialogphilosophie*.[6]

> There is no I as such but only the I of the basic word I-Thou and the I of the basic word I-It (WI: 79).

> […] There are not two kinds of human beings, but there are two poles of humanity (WI: 122.).

Drawing from these, we can perhaps speculate that the bipolar idea of "I-Thou" and "I-It" is to criticize thinking that concretizes and reifies what is only possible through a social relationship, in other words, communication/exchange. Buber was a thinker who attempted to re-capture "I," which had been reified or made the subject of fetishism under the equation between social relationship and mode of exchange, and, for this reason, he examined language and exchange on the same plain of communication/exchange. Be it money or language, be it "I" or social relationship, mysticism plays an important role in peeling off beliefs and understandings, which are reified as an isolated existence, and in releasing them into the relationship of communication and exchange. This idea is shared by Buber, Landauer, Mauthner, and Simmel.[7]

4   Conclusion

In concluding this article, I would like to make a few suggestions as to what actuality Buber's "religious anarchism" can have, and what possibility it has to connect to other ideas away from the historical context.

Habermas delivered a lecture, "Martin Buber: A Philosophy of Dialogue in its Historical Context," (2012) as the speaker at "The First Martin-Buber-Lecture" in the

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[6] See Ono (2018) for Buber's dialectics without *Aufhebung*.
[7] Mention must be made of Moses Hess as a predecessor of Marx and Simmel, who thought about money in reference to the concept of "communication." Buber discussed Hess in "The first of the last: on Moses Hess" (*Der Erste der Letzten*, 1950), which discusses Hess's socialism and Zionism (JJ: 406ff.).

Israel Academy and positioned Buber as one of the "heirs of the Young Hegelians" who aimed to "situate reason itself in social space and historical time," and to "focus on how reason is embodied in the human organism and social practice" (Habermas: 35f.).

Habermas finds the "legacy of the Young Hegelians" in embodying rationality in social relationships and human communities, and considers Buber as one of those who inherited the "legacy," and this is a very valid observation about Buber's philosophy of the between (*ibid.*). Buber himself admitted, "Feuerbach postulates the whole man as the highest object of philosophizing, and by man he does not mean man as an individual, but man with man -- the connection of I and Thou," and "I was conclusively influenced by Feuerbach in my youth" (WI: 342). As we have already argued in the current article, Buber inherited anarchist thought from mysticism, socialism, and communism. When we connect Buber's thought to theories of money as "communication," in other words, as a mode of exchange as put forward by Moses Hess, Marx, and Simmel, it is suggested that the anarchist elements in Buber's thinking are a hidden communion between socialism/communism and *I-Thou*.

Finally, I would like to explore Buber's anarchism in other contexts. The cultural anthropologist Victor Turner proposed unique concepts of "liminality" and "*communitas*" in *The Ritual Process*. Using these concepts, Turner analyzes the phenomenon in which a person is suspended over the boundary from a particular order to another in the ritual process. Being in a state of liminality in the ritual process is seen as ambiguous existence, dangerous and anarchic existence, and the community in liminality is called *communitas*. Turner then explains the *communitas* by connecting it to Buber's concept of the interhuman.

> Perhaps the best way of putting this difficult concept into words is Martin Buber's – though I feel that perhaps he should be regarded as a gifted native informant rather than as a social scientist! […] Buber lays his finger on the spontaneous, immediate, concrete nature of communitas, as opposed to the norm-governed, institutionalized, abstract nature of social structure. Yet, communitas is made evident or accessible, so to speak, only through its juxtaposition to, or hybridization with, aspects of social structure. Just as in *Gestalt* psychology, figure and ground are mutually determinative, or, as some rare elements are never found in nature in their purity but only as components of chemical compounds, so communitas can be grasped only in some relation to structure. […] Communitas, with its unstructured character, representing

the "quick" of human interrelatedness, what Buber has called *das Zwischenmenschliche*, might well be represented by the "emptiness" at the center," which is nevertheless indispensable to the functioning of the structure of the wheel (Turner 1969: 126-7).

Communitas appears through the tear of institutionalized social structure. The liminal status of the *communitas* can be easily understood if we recall Landauer's and Buber's concept of utopia, which has already been discussed. Turner gives an excellent description of the liminal process in which a form collapses and transforms into another form by sensitively focusing on the anarchic element in Buber's philosophy. Here also, the relational perspective, which regards the form as only visualized in a kind of relationship with structure, is explained in reference to *Gestalt* psychology, which reminds us that *Gestaltung* was the principle in Bible translation for Buber.

Very interestingly, Turner describes the domain in which *communitas* appears at the boundary as "the powers of the weak." Examples include holy beggars, third sons, little tailors, simpletons, the Good Samaritan, and prostitutes. These are seen as marginal and weak in the existing systems and institutions, but, conversely, they can provide the moment to disrupt, dislocate, and make slip these systems and institutions. If one re-captures Buber's thought from this point of view, Buber's interpretation of Hasidism, which is critical of rabbinic Judaism, is based on an idea of "the powers of the weak," which deconstructs *archê*.

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Martin Buber's Reception of Hasidism

Kotaro Hiraoka

1   Introduction

Martin Buber was a representative and widely read Jewish intellectual of the 20th century. This article aims at shedding light on Buber's reception of the mid-18th-century Hasidic Movement.

2   The Buberian "Jewish Renaissance" and Hasidism

Buber was born into a Jewish family in Vienna in 1878 when it was still a part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. As the grandchild of a scholar of Midrash (Solomon Buber, 1827-1906), he spent his formative years steeped in the teachings of Judaism. Starting in 1896, Buber studied at several universities in Europe: university of Vienna, Leipzig, Zurich, and the one of Berlin. In 1898 he joined the Zionist Movement, and at the 3rd Congress he lectured on the importance of education. In 1901 Buber served as editor of *Die Welt*, which was the central mouthpiece of the Zionist Movement. There he advocated for a cultural interpretation of the Zionist Movement over a political one.

Looking at Buber's 1901 article titled "Jewish Renaissance" featured in the magazine *Ost und West* (East & West), the following statement can be observed: "It [i.e. the sense of life] lost itself in pathological manifestations such as *chutzpa* (nerve) and Hasidism."[1] From this assessment, it is clear that there was no place for Hasidism in Buber's early thought.

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[1] Martin Buber, *The First Buber*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 33: "es 〔Lebensgefühl〕 verirrte sich in krankhafte Erscheinungen, wie Chuzpe und Chasidismus" Buber, Martin, "Juedische Renaissance." in *Martin Buber Werkausgabe 3, Frühe jüdische Schriften 1900 – 1922*, herausgegeben, (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007), p.146. The first occurrence of Buber's use of the phrase "Jewish Renaissance" was in Vienna circa 1900 when he was writing drafts of his doctoral dissertation. The draft's title was "Psychology of the Renaissance" and was an incomplete manuscript. See, Asher D. Bieamann, "The Problem of Tradition and Reform in Jewish Renaissance and Renaissancism." *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. 8 Issue 1 (Fall) 2001: 66.

In a series of lectures[2] delivered to Prague University's student Zionist group named "Bar Kochba" between 1909 to 1911, however, Buber was identified as "the man who asserted that no renaissance of Judaism could take place that did not bear in it some elements of Hasidism."[3]

What could possibly account for this dramatic shift in Buber's assessment of Hasidism in the eight years between 1901 and 1909? The answer can be found circa 1904 in the midst of his return to the Hebrew language when he encountered the founder of Hasidism in a short publication titled *The Testament of Rabbi Israel Ba'al Shem Tov*. In his 1918 publication titled *My Path to Hasidism*, Buber describes the process thus:

> One day I flipped open a small book. It was *Tsewa'at Ribash*—in other words, it was the testament of Rabbi Israel Ba'al Shem. The following words suddenly emblazoned themselves into my consciousness: "It will be well for him to thoroughly comprehend the special trait of zealousness. Let him arise from his sleep through his zealousness. For he has become holy and made into a different person. He will be suitable to procreate; and when God created the worlds, he commanded a blessing upon *him* who was created in the image of the Holy One." When I read these words I was suddenly overcome, and I realized that I had made contact with the soul of Hasidism."[4]

Buber began his studies into Hasidism as a result of this experience, and he considered it his duty to communicate the message of Hasidism to the world. In 1906, Buber published *The Tale of Rabbi Nachmann*, and as his research deepened, it seems that the ties between Hasidism and the Jewish Renaissance continued to get stronger.

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[2] According to Schmidt who translated into English Buber's early works, the three talks delivered to Bar Kochba were the direct result of Buber's efforts to incorporate Zionism and Hasidism into a new type of Judaism. Gilya G. Schmidt, *The First Buber* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1999), xiii – xiv.

[3] Maurice Friedman, *Encounter on the Narrow Ridge: A Life of Martin Buber* (New York: Paragon House, 2012 (e-book Edition)) No. 1367.

[4] This content was part of the essay with the title "My Path to Hasidism"（*Mein Weg zum Chasidismus*）and was presented at the report on the 1918 *Federation of German Jews Youth Organizations*. This is my translation from the Japanese translation of the German origin [マルティン・ブーバー（板倉敏之訳）『祈りと教え』（理想社、1966 年）、19－20 頁].

3 Regarding The Testament of Rabbi Israel Ba'al Shem Tov

Even though Buber had indeed read *The Testament of Rabbi Israel Ba'al Shem Tov*, I thought it prudent to read the original text myself. Since I did not have a copy, I accessed two versions—the 1934 Warsaw Edition and the 1998 New York Edition—online through a site specializing in Hebrew books.[5] In so doing, I discovered that what Buber relates about his personal experience and what is actually written in the book are manifestly different. Buber's description of his encounter with the text is as follows:

> "It will be well for him to thoroughly comprehend the special trait of zealousness. Let him arise from his sleep through his zealousness. For he has become holy (geheiligt) and made into a different person. He will be suitable to procreate; and when God created the worlds, he commanded a blessing upon *him* who was created in the image of the Holy One."[6]

The 1934 Warsaw Edition and the 1998 New York Edition of the Testament are as follows:

> "It will be well for him to comprehend the special trait of zealousness as best he can. It is in his zealousness that he will arise from his sleep. For he has been renewed (נתחדש) and made into a different person. He will be suitable to procreate, and when God created the worlds, he commanded a blessing upon *him* who was created in the image of the Holy One."[7]

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
[5] http://hebrewbooks.org/home.aspx (October 4, 2016)
[6] "Er ergreife die Eigenschaft des Eifers gar sehr. Er erhebe sich im Eifer von seinem Schlaf, denn er ist geheiligt und ein andrer Mensch worden und ist würdig zu zeugen und ist worden nach der Eigenschaft des Heiligen, gesegnet sei Er, als er Welten erzeugte." Martin Buber, *Martin Buber Werkausgabe 17 Chasidismus II Theoretische Schriften*, (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2016) S. 47.
[7] My translation of the Hebrew text as of the photo below.

"Become holy" (geheiligt) in the quote from Buber was actually renewal (נתחדש) in the Hebrew original. If Buber's expression verbatim were to be transliterated into Hebrew, it would be the following: נתקדש. There are two other editions (Edelény Edition and the Jerusalem Edition) available for viewing in the online archives of Israel's National Library, which I researched; but all of them use the expression renewed (נתחדש). To date (April, 2018), what I have been able to surmise is the following three points: 1) The book or transcript which Buber read featured the expression "become holy"; 2) Buber intentionally (mis) read the manuscript, which he was known to do; 3) Buber naively misread the expression.

The first scenario seems unlikely since no manuscripts were found which confirmed Buber's reading. Because Buber was known to intentionally misread, the second scenario has more plausibility. Yet the most plausible scenario in my mind is the third one. I arrived at this conclusion while I was researching the book and transcripts of *Ba'al Shem Tob's Testament*, during which I discovered editions written in Rashi script. In these editions, the Hebrew letters "het" (ח) and "kof" (ק) are extremely similar in appearance and can reasonably be surmised to be the source of the discrepancy.

The Testament of Rabbi Israel Ba'al Shem Tov was an instrumental text in Buber's turn toward Hasidism. Even if we suppose that Buber's misreading was simply an honest mistake, it is remarkable that such an innocent misstep happened at a most critical and decisive juncture.

4   Important Discoveries from My Last Visit to Jerusalem in August 2018

Because there were multiple editions of *The Testament of Rabbi Israel Ba'al Shem Tov* among the manuscripts which can be read only on site at Israel's National Library, I was able to confirm my hypothesis. Among the many editions which use "renewed" I discovered the 1859 Chernivtsi (Czernowitz) edition which used "become holy" (נתקדש).

Through this discovery, I was able to conclude that it is highly likely that Buber transliterated verbatim the Hebrew "become holy" (נתקדש) into the German "geheiligt." Had I not been able to conduct this research at the Israel's National Library, in all likelihood I would continue to assert the probability of Buber's misreading. As such, I have reconfirmed the imperativeness of researching the entire body of literature.

With this new information, I intend to continue my research into the matter of Buber's misreading of the relevant text in *The Testament of Rabbi Israel Ba'al Shem Tov* and investigate the question of how the text was edited.

5   Conclusion

In this article I have established that Buber's earliest turn toward receptivity of Hasidism was through his reading of *The Testament of Rabbi Israel Ba'al Shem Tov*. I have related how Buber described his experience with the simile "like having my mind illuminated as by a flash of lightning" and "being suddenly overcome and making contact with the soul of Hasidism." In my opinion, Buber's reception of Hasidism was in fact his own sanctification. From this experience, he left his old persona and changed into someone who was compelled to "evangelize" the world with the message of Hasidism. Considering Buber's subsequent journey into Hasidism through his final years, it is reasonable to identify this sanctifying experience as a major turning point in his life.

Incidentally, in 1944, after Buber emigrated to Palestine from Germany, he published his work *Between People and the Land* (בין עם לארצו English title: *On Zion*) in which he states that the bond between the people of Israel and the land of Israel is not the political apparatus of nation-state, nor is it the narrowly defined nationalism of his day, but rather holiness. In the previous symposium in Jerusalem,[8] I received a question from

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[8] Kotaro Hiraoka "Martin Buber's Understanding of Nationality -Relationship between People and Land in Modern Jewish Thought," in *"Theocracy" and "Nation" in Jewish Thought: Past and Present; Proceedings of the Second International Symposium of the Project of Young Scholars held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Sponsored by Doshisha University Dec. 30, 2013* (Published by CISMOR, Kyoto: Doshisha University, 2014), 44-52.

professor Paul Mendes-Flohr asking, "What exactly was 'holiness' in Buber's mind?" With regard to this question, I answered that holiness for Buber was not merely a concept but something which had the power of radically changing his entire life.

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マルティン・ブーバー（板倉敏之訳）『祈りと教え』（理想社、1966 年）。

Progress and Ambiguities:
Kaufmann Kohler's Vision for Jewish Women and Zionism
During the Transitional Period of the Reform Movement

Anri Ishiguro

1   Introduction

American Reform Judaism gradually developed through the ages while it vacillated between traditional Judaism and progressive ideas from an American context. According to Kerry M. Olitzky, American Reform Judaism can be divided into six parts (See Table 1).[1] This paper focuses on the transitional period from the 1880s to 1900s. According to Olitzky's divisions, this span was the period of "Liberal Judaism" or the "Golden Period."

Kaufmann Kohler (1843–1926)[2] and Isaac Mayer Wise (1819–1900)[3] were among the prominent leaders in the early development of American Reform Judaism. This paper

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[1] Kerry M. Olitzky, Lance J. Sussman, and Malcolm H. Stern, *Reform Judaism in America: A Biographical Dictionary and Sourcebook* (Greenwood Press, 1993), xix.

【Table 1】

The Periods	Time Span	Platforms
Pioneer days	1824-1865	
Golden Period, Liberal Judaism	1865-1900	The Pittsburgh Platform (1885)
"Uptown" and Progressivism	1900-1920	
Reorganization period	1920-1945	The Columbus Platform (1937)
Expand to the suburbs	1945-1965	
After 1965	1965-	The San Francisco Platform (1976), The Miami Platform (1997), Adopted in Pittsburgh (1999)

[2] Kaufmann Kohler was an American Reform rabbi and president of Hebrew Union College (1903–1921). He was born in Fuerth, Bavaria and entered the gymnasium in Frankfurt in 1862. Later he was influenced by Samson Raphael Hirsh (1808–1888) who was admired as the founder of Neo-Orthodoxy in the context of German Judaism. *Jewish Theology* (1918) was one of his best-known books. Yaakov Ariel, "Kaufmann Kohler and His Attitude Toward Zionism: A Reexamination," in *American Jewish Archives* 43, 2 (1991), 209; "Dr. Kohler Installed: Brilliant Inauguration of Hebrew Union College President," *The New York Times* (October 19, 1903).

[3] I.M.Wise contributed to develop Reform Judaism through the 1870s and 1880s. Michael A. Meyer, *Response to Modernity: A History of Reform Movement in Judaism* (Wayne State University Press, 1988), 241f.; H.G.Enelow, "Isaac M. Wise, Founder of American Judaism," *New York Times* (December 24, 1916).

examines diversity in the Reform Movement in the context of American Judaism and the ways in which Zionism was understood in the early periods of American Reform Judaism during its transitional period. Through one of Kohler's original documents, which is relevant to the status of Jewish women in Judaism, the diversity of American Reform Judaism and the ways in which it understood Zionism are examined.

The reason I decided to focus on Kohler instead of Wise is because Kohler wrote a draft of the Pittsburgh Platform in 1885. An overview of the early history of American Reform Judaism regarding its attitude toward Zionism, more specifically, the Reform rabbis' opposition to Zionism, reveals Kohler was the best example during that period.

Firstly, the Pittsburgh Platform is regarded as the first official declaration of Reform Judaism in the United States. Subsequently, the Reform rabbis adopted eight principles. The most famous and significant topic was relevant to their identity and opinion of Zionism. Political Zionism (1897–), which was founded by Theodor Herzl, had not yet been formed when the Pittsburgh Platform was declared. However, many scholars have shown that the fifth principle of the Pittsburgh Platform revealed that Reform Judaism did not agree with the ideas of Zionism, as in the following quote:

> We recognize, in the modern era of universal culture of heart and intellect, the approaching of the realization of Israel's great Messianic hope for the establishment of the kingdom of truth, justice and peace among all men. We consider ourselves **no longer a nation, but a religious community**, and, therefore, **expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish State**.[4] (Emphasis added)

In this revealing passage, Reform Judaism officially proclaimed they did not agree with Zionism or possibly described themselves as non-Zionist. However, as revealed subsequently, Kohler's attitude toward Zionism was more complex.

Secondly, Kohler was a good example of the ambiguities displayed toward Zionism in Reform Judaism during the transitional period of the Reform Movement in the United States. Yaakov Ariel demonstrated Kohler's ambiguity toward Zionism in his 1991 article entitled "Kaufmann Kohler and his Attitude Toward Zionism: A

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[4] "Appendix: Platforms of American Reform Judaism, The Pittsburgh Platform (1885)," Michael A. Meyer, *Response to Modernity: A History of Reform Movement in Judaism* (Wayne State University Press, 1988), 387f.

Re-examination."[5] According to Ariel, although Kohler rejected political Zionism, he signed William Blackstone's petition in 1891. This official United States government document appealed for measures that would return Palestine, the "Land of Israel" *(Eretz Israel)*, to the Jews. However, Ariel indicated that in Kohler's perspective, there was no contradiction between his support of the Pittsburgh Platform (1885) and his endorsement of the petition (1891).[6] In terms of chronology, there is an incongruity with regard to Kohler's attitude toward Zionism. On the other hand, we can assert that Kohler changed his position slightly through time. Ariel claimed that Kohler still maintained an anti-Zionist stance after 1891. I will consider Kohler's inconsistency in a different way from Ariel's previous study. Chapter 2 will describe Kohler's ambivalent attitude to Zionism. In Chapter 3, Kohler's thoughts on the status of women in the Reform Movement of Judaism are examined.

This paper, since it considers the diversity in the Reform Movement in Judaism during Kohler's time, the contradiction of his ideas on Zionism and his understanding of the status of women are outlined as well. Finally, the possibility of diversity of the Reform Movement and the ways in which Zionism was understood in the transitional period are suggested. In the next Chapter, I discuss Kohler's confusing attitude toward Zionism.

2 The Ambiguities in Kohler's Interpretation of Zionism: What Types of Zionism did Kohler Disapprove?

Traditionally, during Kohler's time, Reform Judaism rejected the concept of Zionism even though Kohler had friends who were Zionists such as Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, and Nathan Strauss, who was also a philanthropist.[7] Kohler's political and theological attitude was one of Anti-Zionism. In Kohler's Sunday lecture, "*Palestine and Israel's World Mission,*" which he delivered at the Rodef Shalom Temple on March 31, 1918, he criticized the political Zionist movement.

> Now, my friends, I ask you in all sincerity, has this ardent hope of the centuries, this fervent longing and praying of the Jew for the return of God's majesty, to Zion, found, or will it find, its realization now when Palestine, by the efforts of

[5] Yaakov Ariel, "Kaufmann Kohler and His Attitude Toward Zionism," 217.
[6] Yaakov Ariel, "Kaufmann Kohler and His Attitude Toward Zionism," 219-221.
[7] The American Jewish Archives, MS Col #29.

the British arms and the British government, is in some way or other to come into the possession of the Jew? […] Will this [developing the Jewish colonies in the Palestine] be the final solution of the great enigma of Jewish history? […] It certainly cannot make Palestine the homeland of the Jew. It cannot be our homeland, the homeland of the American Jew. We disclaim any other but this land of America as our homeland […].[8]

In his lecture, Kohler emphasized that the homeland of the Jews must be the place where they lived. Furthermore, he concluded, "No, Judaism is not the product of one land, but the product of many lands and many civilizations."[9] He rejected the idea of the Zionist myth about Hebrew language as "Judaism is too large and too many-sided to have only one center and one language."[10] In the last segment of this speech, he asserted that even in Jerusalem, a true Zionist believer might not be discovered.[11] This statement can be interpreted as Kohler's rejection of Zionism not only in a political or colonialist sense but also, in disagreement with Aḥad Haʿam, in its cultural implications.[12] In other words, Kohler warned against a Zionist ideology that denied the Diaspora. By the 1920s, the Zionist ideal of Aḥad Haʿam was accepted because Hebrew needed a center and Jewish society could develop from the Zionists' construction of this nucleus in the form of a national home. Hebrew became an essential and special element for the dissemination of Jewish culture.[13] Kohler paid careful attention to these varied Zionistic trends.

Up to this point, it is presumed that Kohler still rejected any idea of Zionism, even though he signed Blackstone's petition in 1891. We will now take a different perspective and examine some of the more complex iterations in Kohler's 1898 statement entitled "Zionism."[14]

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[8] Rev. Dr. Kaufmann Kohler, *Palestine and Israel's World Mission: A Sunday Lecture*, before the Rodef Shalom Congregation, Pittsburgh, PA. (Sunday, March 31, 1918), 3-5.

[9] Rev. Dr. Kaufmann Kohler, *Palestine and Israel's World Mission*, 7.

[10] Rev. Dr. Kaufmann Kohler, *Palestine and Israel's World Mission*, 9.

[11] Rev. Dr. Kaufmann Kohler, *Palestine and Israel's World Mission*, 11.

[12] Eugene elucidated the differences between Aḥad Haʿam and Kaufmann Kohler in their understanding of Jewish ethics. He demonstrated that Kohler rejected Aḥad Haʿam's interpretation. Eugene B. Borowitz, *Exploring Jewish Ethics: Papers on Covenant Responsibility* (Wayne State University Press, 1990), 442.

[13] Allan Arkush, "Cultural Zionism Today," in *Israel Studies*, vol. 19, no. 2, Special Issue: *Zionism in the 21st Century* (Summer 2014), 3.

[14] It was delivered before the "Judaeans," New York City, on March 3, 1898. Judaeans Address I (1899).

> Although a determined opponent of the Zionist movement ever since it began, I
> would not call myself Anti-Zionist. My views are positive, not merely negative.
> […] It is contended by the Zionists that we Reform Jews who no longer pray
> for the national restoration of Israel, have no right to antagonize a movement
> with which the millions of orthodox Jews throughout the world are naturally in
> full sympathy. This is utterly false.[15]

It is thus evident that Kohler did not recognize himself as anti-Zionist. His apparent
contradictions with regard to Zionism could be perceived rather as a complicated state of
mind and attitude toward the notion of a Jewish nation. In particular, after understanding
the sentiment contained in the statement above, it is no longer problematic that Kohler
signed Blackstone's petition in 1891 even though he had prepared the draft of the
Pittsburgh Platform, which is regarded as the first anti-Zionist proclamation of Reform
Judaism in 1885. At least, the initial official statement made by the followers of
American Reform Judaism was anti-Zionist. However, even as the propounder of the
Pittsburgh Platform, Kohler's understanding of Zionism was complex. Later, in 1918, as
stated above in this paper, Kohler projected his own ideas with regard to Zionism. He
could not agree with the political or cultural Zionism expressed by the early colonial
Zionists as the building of a national home in Palestine. Even in 1918, in a statement
about "The Messianic Hope" in his book *Jewish Theology,* Kohler declared that he could
not support any ideas of Zionism.[16]

　　According to Naomi Cohen, an eminent scholar of American Jewish and Zionist
history, Kohler and Emil G. Hirsh tried to reform Jewish theology in a context suitable to

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[15] This address has entries in: Kaufmann Kohler, "Zionism," in *Studies Addresses and Personal Papers* (Alumni Association of Hebrew Union College, 1931), 453-455. This curious passage reflects Kohler's understanding of the Zionists' idea about the Orthodox approach. According to him, Judaism was in conflict with Zionism simply because the Zionists wanted to colonize Palestine. He goes on to note that the idea of "Zion has been the treasury of comfort and inspiration alike for Jews and Christians." Clearly, Kohler values the Jewish history in Diaspora and, as a result, the place of Zion does not necessarily mean *Eretz Israel*. To him, Zionism is a threaded idea that aims at dividing the Jewish community; on the other hand, Judaism seeks to unify the Jewish nation. Regarding the Jewish question in Europa, for Kohler, the meaning of "true Zionism" is in line with their mission; therefore, it is not only religious or spiritual in character but also social and intellectual in nature. In this context, Kohler agreed with Blackstone's petition (1891). Kohler's attitude toward Zionism, as illustrated above, is very different from that of Orthodox Messianism. The mainstream Orthodoxy has also rejected Zionism. However, in the period preceding Kohler's time, some progressive Orthodox rabbis such as Rabbi Yehudah Ben Shlomo Chai Alkalai (1798-1878) and Rabbi Zvi Hirch Kalischer (1795-1874) showed their new interpretation of Messianism and chose to return to the land of Israel.
[16] Kaufmann Kohler, *Jewish Theology: Systematically and Historically Considered*, 390f.

the *Volksgeist* (the spirit of the folk, national or ethnic spirit and soul) of the time. However, they are vividly remembered as anti-Zionists.[17] In fact, Kohler did not reject Zionist activity outright.[18] The very idea of *Volksgeist* illustrates Kohler's conflicted state of mind. How then can we resolve the ambiguity of his attitude to Zionism?

In fact, in *Jewish Theology* Kohler exhibited an attempt to articulate the need for a "renaissance" of the term "nation," in tune with his modern reformation efforts. At the same time, he tried to retain the context of traditional Jewish knowledge in terms of religious thought.[19] Kohler's ambivalence demonstrates that there existed a multiplicity in the definition of the concept of a nation and signifies that there were varied interpretations of Zionism.

3   The Limitation of Progressive Understanding of the Status of Women

To conclude this short paper, I will examine an example illustrating Kohler's ambivalence and thus explore the circumstances of the transitional period in American Reform Judaism. This section will scrutinize the view of Reform Judaism on the status of women.

Karla Goldman, a prominent scholar of the experience of Jewish women in synagogue, has demonstrated Kohler's contradictory appraisal of the status of women in her 1990 paper entitled "The Ambivalence of Reform Judaism: Kaufmann Kohler and the Ideal Jewish Woman."[20] American Reform Judaism generally did not oppose attempts to improve the status of women in the Jewish public sphere.[21] In fact Kohler encouraged the establishment of a Jewish women's organization.[22] As Goldman writes, "Reform Judaism…pulled down the screen from the gallery behind which alone the Jewish Woman of old was allowed to take part in divine service."[23]

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[17] Naomi W. Cohen, *The Americanization of Zionism, 1897-1948* (Brandeis University Press, 2003), 50-52.

[18] Kaufmann Kohler, "Zionism," 461-463; Yaakov Ariel, "Kaufmann Kohler and His Attitude Toward Zionism," 217.

[19] Kaufmann Kohler, *Jewish Theology: Systematically and Historically Considered*, 390f.

[20] Karla Goldman, "The Ambivalence of Reform Judaism: Kaufmann Kohler and the Ideal Jewish Woman," in *American Jewish History*, vol. 79, no. 4, Summer 1990), 477-499.

[21] Karla Goldman, "The Ambivalence of Reform Judaism: Kaufmann Kohler and the Ideal Jewish Woman," 477.

[22] "The City, Reception to Dr. and Mrs. Kohler," in MS Col #29, Box1, "1903, Assuming the Presidency of HUC," American Jewish Archives; Faith Rogow, *Gone to Another Meeting: The National Council of Jewish Women, 1893-1993* (The University of Alabama Press, 1993), 48.

[23] Kaufmann Kohler, conference paper, in Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Rabbinical Conference, November 16, 17, 18, 1885 (Central Conference of American Rabbis, 1923, reprint), 11; Karla

Further, according to Goldman, "The task of interpreting appropriate roles for modern Jewish women offered Kohler a chance to express his uneasiness about the Jewish confrontation with modernity. [...] An examination of Kohler's struggle to place women within his conception of an ideal modern Judaism can illuminate the profound conflicts underlying his attempts to define Judaism for the modern world. […] It may be more surprising to find that, despite Reform's redefinitions of woman's role and of Judaism, Kohler was unable to separate contemporary Jewish women from an ideal grounded in the past."[24] Goldman concludes by saying: "Kaufmann Kohler took a leading role in this effort to transform a way of life into a way of being American. But the effort to realize the emancipation of Jews while preserving Judaism was fraught with ambiguity, an ambiguity exemplified by the struggle to find a place for women in a reformed religion."[25]

Here is another instance illustrating Kohler's ambivalence relative to the status of women. A sermon he gave in 1899 shows his most significant old-fashioned ideas of Jewish women.

> Not the synagogue but the home as [Judaism's] main factor and safeguard, **the wife and the mother** decide the destiny of the Jew… **Not the synagogue but the home must see Judaism regenerated, the Sabbath peace and joy restored and the spirit of devotion and prayer revived.**"[26] (Emphasis added)

In this statement, Kohler does not see a possibility for a new active role for women in Reform Jewish observance. He still wished to retain the older, traditional ideal of women's status. He expressed a preference for women expressing their talents at home, fostering Judaism through observance and education.[27] It is not surprising to find this type of ideal in the first transitional period of Reform Judaism. The formal ordination of

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Goldman, "The Ambivalence of Reform Judaism: Kaufmann Kohler and the Ideal Jewish Woman," 477.
[24] Karla Goldman, "The Ambivalence of Reform Judaism: Kaufmann Kohler and the Ideal Jewish Woman," 478.
[25] Karla Goldman, "The Ambivalence of Reform Judaism: Kaufmann Kohler and the Ideal Jewish Woman," 499.
[26] Kaufmann Kohler, "The Jewish Ideal of Womanhood," 1899, Kaufmann Kohler Papers, box 6, folder 2, American Jewish Archives.
[27] Paula E. Hyman, *Gender and Assimilation in Modern Jewish History: The Roles and Representation of Women* (the University of Washington Press, 1995).

female rabbis needed to wait for the 1970s.

Even though, in an ideal context, Kohler supported women's activity, his real-life view of women is limited. The consequences of his ambivalence were made clear when Jewish women were forced to establish Jewish women's organizations to win a place for themselves, whether in the private or public sphere, via the two organizations, a) The National Council of Jewish Women, in 1893, and b) Hadassah, The Women's Zionist Organization of America, in 1912.

4　Conclusion

In this paper, Kohler's ambiguities toward Zionism as well as toward the status of women in Reform Judaism are also revealed. The state of American Reform Judaism was developmental, and so it exhibited some self-contradiction. Kohler did work to make American Reform Judaism progress; however, he retained an old-fashioned, traditional understanding of Jewish women. The status of women in Reform Judaism did not change during this period.

His Zionism was also full of contradictions. As we saw in the second section, he was not anti-Zionist, even though officially, Reform Judaism was opposed to Zionism. Even though he disapproved of secular Zionism, the ambiguity in his ideal of the "nation" in the modern context quite resembles the Zionist idea. To conclude, I would like to note two points about the complicated relationship between American Zionism and American Reform Judaism. First, Kohler's ambivalence toward Zionism shows the germination of the Reform Zionist rabbis which emerged in the following generation—Stephen S. Wise and Judah L. Magnes, although they represented a minority in or perhaps even exceptions to American Reform Judaism. Second, Kohler's ambivalent attitude toward the status of women led some Jewish women to become activists in Jewish women's organization and Zionists due to their concern for social welfare services and charity.

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The Secret Journey of a Small Grammar:
Spinoza in Contemporary French Philosophy

Masato Goda

1

It has been more than thirty years since I discovered the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Before publishing the Japanese translations of *Totality and Infinite* and *Otherwise than Being*, I published an anthology of Levinas' work that included texts such as "Il y a", "Reality and its shadow" and more. While I was translating these texts, I already noticed the importance Levinas accorded to the notion of "breaking of rhythm" as well as to that of "rhythm" itself, either when he compared "il y a" to the prose poem by Edgar Alan Poe in "Il y a" or when he stressed the musicality of image in "Reality and its shadow."

What is "rhythm" or "breaking of rhythm" for Levinas? For the latter, we can find a decisive passage in *Otherwise than Being*:

> "Proximity is nothing but difference -- non-coincidence, arrhythmia in the time, diachrony refractory to the thematization, refractory to the reminiscence which synchronize phases of a past. Impossible to narrate -- other losing his face in the narration." (AQE, p. 258)

As far as I know, Levinas didn't use the term "arrhythmia" (*arythmie*) at all elsewhere; nevertheless, no doubt there is a solid link between "breaking of rhythm" remarked in "Il y a" and "arrhythmia" used in *Otherwise than Being*, a link running through thirty years. And it is not an exaggeration to affirm that Levinas' philosophy is nothing but "philosophy of arrhythmia." "Arrhythmia" shocks obsessively the "Same" and defeats any attempt of totalizing. This calls to mind the words written by Henri Meschonnic in his *Criticism of Rhythm* (1984), where he states that "unlike cadence, rhythm is non-totality." Therefore, what Levinas calls "rhythm" is nothing but what Meschonnic calls "cadence".

2

I have just mentioned Henri Meschonnic. Meschonnic (1924-2009) who was a French Jewish poet, linguist and translator. His parents immigrated to Paris from Bessarabia. After teaching at the University of Lille, he joined the Experimental University Center of Vincennes in order to create the 8th University of Paris with Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard and others. He taught there from 1968 to 1997. He is famous for his anthropological analysis of rhythm on the one hand, and for his new translations of the so-called *Old Testament* on the other. More specifically, Meschonnic translated into French the books of *Genesis*, *Exodus*, *Leviticus*, *Numbers*, *Song of Songs*, *Ruth*, *Lamentations*, *Ecclesiastes*, *Psalms* and *Jonah* from 1970 to 2008.

Meschonnic paid profound attention to the philosophical activities of Levinas, and remarked before others did on how Hebrew secretly affected Levinas' work in French. I've been deeply inspired by this remark of Meschonnic.

As you may well know, Levinas made explicit his disapproval of the rehabilitation of Spinoza projected by David Ben-Gurion, and spoke about Spinoza's betrayal of Judaism and took it upon himself to refuse forgiveness forever. How about Meschonnic? Last year I found a book written by Meschonnic in a Parisian library, titled *Spinoza. Poèmes de la Pensée* (2002, 2017). At the end, he writes as follows:

> "It is this relationship between body and language, between rhythm and effect of thinking that makes Spinoza both Jew's Jew and Jew for the Jews. And this beyond the biographically comical re-Judaization which wants to compensate for the uncancelled excommunication. Then what still remains so that we can say Spinoza is a Jew against Jews, nay more Jewish than all Jews? (…) Force of unity affect-concept and *Natura*" (p. 368).

Indeed, this text is too difficult to translate; nevertheless, the difference between Levinas and Meschonnic regarding Spinoza is obvious. Then, where is the interpretative originality of Meschonnic? He points out the "absence of thinking about language" in all past studies on Spinoza. One may justify it all the more by recalling that Spinoza himself restricts "understanding by signum (sign)" within "first genre of understanding." But for Meschonnic, language isn't sign at all. I can't at present provide the full picture of this book; I shall only pick out two points from it. Firstly, Meschonnic attaches great importance to Ibn Ezra (1089-1167) as the predecessor of Spinoza in regard to language. Meschonnic writes as follows:

"Ibn Ezra is the only writer in Medieval Judaism that gives the greatest importance to the rhythm in discourse. According to him, if a commentary weren't a commentary on accents, one mustn't want it nor obey it. About the relation between Spinoza and accents in the Bible discussed in Spinoza's *Essence of Hebrew Grammar*, I'll pick up on it afterwards. Contrary to the common belief, this relationship is related strongly with all the ideas Spinoza entertained about language. The link between Ibn Ezra and Spinoza, on which there still remain many things to be told, says something very important in regard to the relation between writing and rhythm by Spinoza."

Secondly, Meschonnic admits to a rare exception in the case of Ferdinand Alquié who, as a professor at the Sorbonne, took up Spinoza in his lectures at the beginning of 50th. While Meschonnic took the system of Spinoza to be impossible, he paid attention to Spinoza's *Essence of Hebrew Grammar* and recognized its great importance in both linguistic and philosophical senses. Meschonnic says:

"Alquié is one of the few who could take up the problem of language. This is enough to be praised. But unfortunately, Alquié drew a wrong conclusion from his reading of the French translation of Spinoza's *Essence*. According to Alquié, " 'Spinoza always handled clumsily Latin; if his texts were written in Hebrew --- Spinoza thought in this language --- instead of Latin, his texts would have been more clear. We are convinced of this'."

Spinoza began to learn Latin around the time of his excommunication. Meschonnic takes this fact as Spinoza's intentional decision. Latin was the "language of rupture" for Spinoza. He tried to elaborate "concepts" with a language which had ceased playing the role of a national language. It was a decision toward "universality." Contrary to Alquié, Meschonnic said: "The poetic of thinking for Spinoza could be conceived or invented only in Latin. There is nothing to confirm the opinion of Alquié according to which Spinoza always handles Latin clumsily." Nevertheless, this doesn't prevent him from saying "Spinoza often wrote Latin in a manner contrary to convention and forced it." Spinoza himself confessed to this.

Then what "bended screw," as it were, is in Spinoza's Latin? Meschonnic pointed out the work in Hebrew was regarded as ''language of affect'' for Spinoza. In Spinoza's poetic of thinking, Hebrew works on Latin which in turn works on Hebrew. Thus,

Spinoza underlined in his *Essence* the unity of affect-concept, practiced through a rhythmic that takes account of particularities of Hebrew accents. In a talk with Jacques Ancet, Meschonnic said: "In the Bible, there is a certain rhythmic which organizes the whole Bible into a continuum. Rhythmics with plural hierarchies of accents. There are 18 disjunctive accents and 9 conjunctive accents."

3

It is in this way that Alquié has been refuted by Meschonnic. But is that all? Meschonnic mentioned the French translation of *Essence*, which was published in 1968. Its translators were Joël Askénazi and Jocelyne Askénazi-Gerson. But we must not forget that it was Alquié himself who asked them to translate *Compedium Grammatices linguae hebraeae*. And it was Alquié himself who wrote the Introduction to its French translation, an Introduction of only four pages. However, I think it made enormous but unknown effect on at least French philosophy of the second half of 20th century. Alquié said:

> "In such days when one often comes to investigate his most trivial scribbling in order to elucidate the thinking of an author, how this *Treatise*, surely unfinished but shaped up to the 33 chapters, could remain almost unknown? To tell the truth, it is regrettable all the more that the greatest importance is attached today to the link between the philosophy of Spinoza and Jewish tradition. How could one not interrogate what Spinoza thought about language through this tradition which had been transmitted to him? By the way, contemporary philosophers attach more and more importance to the problem of language. Is it possible to neglect the pages Spinoza devoted to such a subject?"

Based on such a motive, Alquié asked Mr. And Mrs. Askénazi to translate Spinoza's *Essence* with detailed commentary. For Alquié, it had both grammatical and philosophical interests. Refraining from saying anything about grammatical interests, he listed philosophical ones.

Firstly, Spinoza regarded as perfectly regular many cases which grammarians before him had taken as irregular. This is suitable for a philosopher for whom the laws of Nature are universal and necessary. Even if it appeared as miracle, nothing occurs outside of them nor contrary to them.

Secondly, Spinoza declared in chapter V that the words in the Hebrew language are almost always classified as nouns. As such, they are fundamentally different from the Latin words. Spinoza defines the noun as "words by which we signify or indicate anything which enters into understanding". Then, what enters into understanding? Things, their attributes, their modes, their relations on the one hand, actions, their modes, their relations on the other. Such an explanation does not let us forget Spinoza's *Ethics*.

The third point is related inseparably to the second. In chapter X we learn that prepositions are also nouns and thus they can have the plural form. For example, there is a plural form of "between" (French '*entre*'); that is "betweens/among" (French '*entres*') which can take the article insofar as they are a noun. We can therefore say "Those betweens/among" or in French "*les entres*." This suggests to us that there are many kinds of intervals between one thing and the other, let alone in what we usually recognize as one thing. Alquié says we can not underline enough the philosophical importance of this fact.

Fourthly, Spinoza took up the relation between modes and time, and came to elucidate an essential link between temporality and actuality. From this point of view, every participle must "degenerate" into an adjective, that is, into a general idea, when one stops considering a thing as affected in the present. Then a participle which designates "a man counting now" comes to signify "a man who counts", that is to say "an accountant" as a profession. Alquié found here an exemplification of Spinoza's criticism of a general idea. In other words, we should not stop at the level of "second genre of Understanding." We must go toward the "third genre of Understanding" and try to grasp the concrete singularity of individual mode.

But, in turn, what is the "present"? In chapter XIII, we learn that Hebrew admits as "parts" of time only the "future" and the "past". The "present" isn't a "part" of time. You may think this contradicts what I just said about "participle", but that is not the case. The present is nothing but the "limit" between the "future" and the "past" and as such makes possible "sub specie aeternitatis."

Finally, in chapter VII we find the idea according to which one can not understand any part unless we know them all. Chapter XII poses the question of so-called causality as well as about the ideas the Hebrews had on it. All the interpretations regarding Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus* depend on this. Furthermore, chapter XX which discusses the reflective-active verb (*verbe réfléchi actif*), touches upon the problem of immanent causality.

4

Of course, we cannot know who read this introduction. While Alquié wrote it in 1968, he took up Spinoza's *Essence* in his lecture of 1953 at the Sorbonne for the first time. Of course, it is impossible to know who attended his lecture. However, I suppose one future eminent philosopher was there. His name is Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), who had studied under the guidance of Alquié from 1945 to 1968, when Deleuze presented his *Spinoza and the Problem of Expression* as his Sub-Thesis. Deleuze wrote to his friend François Châtelet that he was completely divorced from Alquié on the day following his Thesis review. All the same, Deleuze had been a disciple of Alquié for a long time.

In 1956, Deleuze published his essay titled "The Idea of Difference by Bergson", which occupied a very important place in his philosophical career. There Deleuze wrote as follows:

> "Difference of nature (*Différence de nature)* doesn't exist between two things; on the contrary, such a difference is itself a thing (*une chose*). Just as difference has become a substance, movement also has come to have substantial character without supposing a thing which moves. It is in this way difference of nature itself has become a nature." (*L'île déserte*, Minuit, 2002, pp. 52-53)

Reading this passage, I cannot help finding in it a reappearance of Spinoza's ideas in which prepositions such as "between" must be regarded as noun. In this regard, there is a clandestine relay from Spinoza to Deleuze through Alquié.

And this is not all. Deleuze wasn't the only philosopher who renewed the notion of difference; in particular, we should not forget Jacques Derrida who served as an assistant at the Sorbonne from 1960-1964. Derrida was therefore a colleague of Alquié at this period. As for Derrida, it is said that he was almost always silent regarding Spinoza. Superficially it is true. But allow me to read a footnote added to his dissertation on Stéphane Mallarmé titled ''Double Session'' (*Double séance*); the text is dated as 1970.

"'Between'' (*entre*) can become a noun and have an article as well as a plural form. We've said 'the betweens/among' (*les entres*) which is not derived from its singular form. In this case, 'the betweens/among' is original and there can't be its singular form. In Hebrew, 'between' can have a plural form''.

After that, Derrida quotes a passage from Spinoza's *Essence*. I would like to communicate to you my enormous surprise I had when I found this footnote. I dare to

assert that Spinoza's Hebrew grammar occupies the center of Derrida's philosophy of difference. In 1968, Derrida published an essay titled "*La différance*." Derrida wrote not "*difference*" but "*différance*" with an "a" so that we could recognize a dynamism of (auto-) differentiation. In doing so, Derrida said as regards to the suffix "-ance": "'-ance' does not indicate the active voice nor the passive voice. It is a middle voice." I think it is possible to relate the so-called "middle voice" to the "reflective-active verb (verbe réfléchi actif)" spoken of by Alquié, which in turn goes back to the Hitpaʻel verb in Hebrew.

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Photo: Paul Hiraoka

The 3rd Symposium on Jewish Studies

"Judaism in Modern Era –
Interpretative Studies of Ancient and Current Texts"

A collaboration between CISMOR and the Faculty of Theology, Doshisha University
and
The Faculty of Humanities, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Date : August 19th, 2018 (Sunday) 8:30-18:00

Venue : The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry Gaster Building, Hebrew University of Jerusalem – Mount Scopus Meeting Room #400, On the second floor

Presenters

Paul Mendes-Flohr
Kotaro Hiraoka
Fumio Ono
Masato Goda

Joel Swanson
Tetsu Kitamura
Ada Taggar-Cohen

Zev W. Harvey
Anri Ishiguro
Yu Amano

Tzvi Schoenberg
Ori Werdiger
Moses Lapin
Orr Scharf
David Cohen

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PROCEEDINGS of
The Third International Symposium
on Jewish Studies

Judaism in Modern Era
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and Current Texts

August 19th, 2018
Edited by Ada Taggar Cohen